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Abstract 
This thesis is about an encounter with performance - be that theatre, dance or live 
art - and with what happens when you attempt to put into words the visceral, 
heightened and irretrievable experience that is witnessed in such a space. Moving 
against the conventional ways social science almost inevitably starts to unpack this 
experience through always-already made frameworks and interpretations,, the thesis 
begins instead in the abstract realm of 'empty space'. This is to argue, following 
Gilles Deleuze, that first and foremost 'something in the world forces us to think'. 
The thesis therefore proposes a syntactical grammar of thought, one that operates 
connections not hierarchies, works upon consistent not systematic modes of 
thought, and experiments rather than confirms. In the specific encounter with 
performance art, three registers or reatms are advocated for the achievement of a 
certain kind of knowing; these are corporeality, immateriality and temporality. 
Working through these the thesis investigates how an encounter registered at the 
pared down level of 'empty space' might inspire other ways of looking at the world 
which inevitably question the ways in which we know what we think we know. 
Therefore, in producing a negotiation with what might be an unverifiable real - the 
affect of our visceral bodies) the immateriality of being in love, and the haunting 
force of the past upon the tension of our present moment - the thesis argues for 
the validation of non-representational scriptings of the social. To achieve tl-iis the 
thesis folds, Without prejudice, theory and practice by chatting an apprenticeship 
through the work of Gilles Deleuze alongside empirical encounters with some of 
the processes leading up to the creation of performance (that of the somatic 
training of Body-Mmd Centring, the art of devising theatre, and the space of 
rehearsals). 
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We would do better to ask what is a subjective or implicit 
presupposition: it has the form of 'Everybody knows 
Everybody knows, in a pre-philosophical and pre- 
conceptual manner ... everybody knows what it means to 
ttlink and to be ... Evegbody knows, nobody 6an deny, is the 
form of representation and the discourse of the 
representative ... But here and there isolated and passionate 
cries are raised. How could they not be isolated when they 
deny what 'everybody knows ... '? And passionate, since 
they deny that which, it is said, nobody can deny? 
(Deleuze, 1994: 129-30) 
Something in the world forces us to think. This something is 
an object not of -recognition 
but of a fundamental entounter. 
What is encountered ... may be grasped in a range of affective 
tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its 
primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this 




In The Empýy Space, the theatre director Peter Brook details what it is we mean 
when, as a society, we refer to the art of theatre. Moving against historically and 
geographically specific definitions, which are often charged with the prejudices of 
society at the time', he opens by presenting what he sees as the basic mechanics, 
the bare essentials, which form an act of theatre. It is rather simple: 
I can take any empty space and call it a bare stage. A man (sic) 
walks across this empty space whilst someone else is watching 
him, and this is all that is needed for an act of theatre to be 
engaged. (Brook, 1968: 11) 
The thesis that follows is about an encounter With this space of performance art 
- be that theatre, devised performance or dance. I am not interested here in 
theories of theatre, or its history, but in the experience of the theatre and the 
encounters that it brings: what happens when you attempt to put into words the 
visceral, heightened and irretrievable experience of any live art performance. 
Therefore, all of the conceptual and empirical directions that the thesis takes come 
back to these questions: How are we affected when we experience an act of theatre, 
either as a spectator or an actor, and how do we come to make sense of this? Why 
are people moved when they witness the ending of I&n: g Learý Why, and how, and 
what, do we feel when we hear Lear's words as he crouches, as an old man, over 
the dead body of his daughter Cordelia: "This feather stirs; she lives! if it be so/It is 
a chance which does redeem all sorrows/That I have ever felt" (Shakespeare, ký.: g 
Lear Act V, scene III: 264-66)ý Again, what is the language that speaks to us when 
we look upon, or act within, the movement of two bodies dancing? What is 'going 
on', and what does 'going on' mean, when we are caught up in the intensity of the 
rhythm between the bodies, the fluctuating speed and slowness of gesture as a hand 
caresses and then rejects the touch of the skin of the other body? In performance 
we can have stunningly visceral and affecting (sensate as well as artistic) directions 
of bodies; hauntingly evocative designs of sets and props interfering with the clarity 
1 It is clear that Brook is speaking about a Western conception of theatre (although not exclusively so), and that 
this specificity necessarily shapes most of our accounts of theatre and performing arts where "acting style and 
the theories that explain and Justify it are right and natural for the historical period in which they are developed 
and during which they arc accepted" (Roach, 1985: 12). 
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of the material sense of place; and powerfully effective use of the tension of the 
present tense that is the space-time of the performance itself In each of these 
registers - corporeal immaterial, and temporal -a performance can be evaluated, 
and in each of these registers the performative provides a currency for use in the 
social scientist's endeavour to unravel aspects of everyday fife. 
This thesis is about being drawn to the actual 'empty space' of such 
performance because of the way it mobilizes different levels of phenomena: 
sensations, architecture, movement, words, theories and fiction. In this way, 
performance brings us into contact with the immediate effects and mediations of 
the physicality of our being in the world, the architecture (built and sigmified) that 
situates and channels a path through the world, and the power of the 'present 
moment', both in the ongoing sense of being on the move and in 'knowing' how to 
go on. Taking up the spirit of Peter Brook's abstract definition, the thesis takes the 
art of theatre as something that forces us to think and to think differently. In this 
wav, it is an argument for the worth of bringing performance to the practice of 
doing social science, and in particular human geography. As a theoretical motif for 
the thesis, and as an instance of the actual ground upon which performances are 
played out, I present the title and the term of empýy space. 
In this introductory chapter, I want to draw out the manner in which this thesis 
unfolds. This serves a crucial point because the manner of the thesis, its style of 
presentation that is at once experimental and programmatic, precise and unrefined, 
in itself attempts to make an important argument: that we, in academia, need to free 
up the terms of reference through which we construct the interpretations, 
explications and descriptions of the social - not least because such referencing 
affects the way in which we select the areas of investigation. As I will explain, this is 
a performative style of research which is about "what happens when the stuttering 
no longer affects pre-existing words, but, rather, itself ushers in the words it 
affects" (Boundas and Olkowski, 1994: 23). On the one hand, this performative 
strategy reveals the theoretical and empirical problems involved in the type of 
research that is capable of working out of an encounter with performance art. In 
particular, this resonates with the concerns in social science coming together in the 
work of non-representational theory (Thrift, 1996,1998,2000a), performativity 
(Butler, 1997; Rose 1997a, 1997b), and non-epistemic ontology (Holzman & 
Newman, 1997; and certain strands of Hetherington & Law's recent work 1998, 
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2000). On the other hand, this explains the idiosyncratic nature of the thesis in its 
attempt to show how these concerns produce an alternative sensibility in our stance 
towards what counts as knowledge. Such idiosyncrasy begins with the three 
audiences for whom this thesis is intended: the social sciences in general, the field 
of performance studies, and the followers of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. 
Playing to the mix of these audiences produces a hybridized style of presentation, 
the characteristics of which I will detail in sections 1.3.1-1.3.4. However, I begin by 
illustrating the purpose behind thinking through 'empty space' both in the way in 
which my arguments Will deal With the concrete space of performance and in the 
way in which the performance itself leads us to a certain kind of conceptual space. I 
cannot stress how important this issue of the conceptual space is: a space for 
thinking that is not paradigmatic but gntaTmati6-, not hierarchical but finkiq, and not 
systematic but consi'stent (see Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 91). Next I outline, and 
make an argument for, the particular qualities of performance that make such 
cempty spaces' a potentially vibrant resource for social scientific research. I do this 
through three research examples' taken from the three empirical pieces of research 
carried out for this thesis: 
An investigation into the role of corporeality in performance through the 
participation in the somatic training art of Body-NEnd Centering p3mq, used both 
by movement artists (from dancers to actors) and healthcare practitioners 
(chiropractors to developmental therapists). 
An insight into the immaterial realm of performance through the observation of 
the processes involved in the production of a piece of devised theatre as it moves 
from being a work in progress towards a premiere performance. [Guest House 
devised and performed by Uninvited Guests; premiere: Arnolfini, Bristol, 22nd 
October 1999. ] 
An exploration of the significance of time within the achievement of performance 
art carried out through the intensive observation of, and involvement in, the 
rehearsals leading up to a professional theatre production. [All Mj Sons, performed 
at the Bristol Old Vic, 3rd February - 7thMarch, 1998. ] 
In the next section I will set out why, in the pursuit of many of the aims of 
bringing performance and social science together, I am following the work of Gilles 
2 These are examples that are neither particular nor universal; the example here "is a singular object that presents 
itself as such, that sboms its singularity ... expropriated of all idcnfity, so as to appropriate belonging itself' 
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Deleuze and what has been cited as a philosophy of difference (see Ansell-Pearson, 
1997a, 1997b; and in geography, Doel, 1999). Finally, I will map out the design of 
the chapters in relation to the particular elements of performance and to the 
Deleuzian concepts that open and experiment with thought capable of making 
sense of such performative qualities. To sum up, daring to edge towards saying that 
which is impossible, I hope that a mere trace of "that which does not allow itself to 
be clarified without disappearing" can be achieved (Martin, 2000: 62). Or at least I 
hope to show some of the theoretical avenues through which such sayings might be 
accomplished and made to make sense. That is to say that whilst there is a tendency 
to argue that many things are unsayable, a lot of the time efforts to intimate such 
things stop before they have even started - not least because of the trenchant 
nature of the categories by which we feel we can Justify and articulate the 
interventions we do make. In this way this thesis moves against such caution: whilst 
it doesn't offer any concrete answers it does suggest theoretical and empirical 
spaces where we can start looking. 
1.2 Empty space 
The abstraction of empty space - practically, as the clearing of the stage for 
theatrical production, and conceptually, as in the encounter of thought - does not 
work against the material and the concrete. Rather it is an attempt to work off the 
images of thought that effectively stop potential avenues of thinking. In particular, 
and as a starting point to this thesis, the aim of this kind of abstraction is focused 
upon removing the following obstacles that I see as the unnecessary confines of 
social science, obstacles that can be understood as the conceptual props that 
seen-ungly support a lack of thinking. The first of these is the rational discourse that 
straitjackets the appreciation of the body as no more than an object for knowledge. 
In this way, the realm of emotions, feelings and specifically embodied stances to the 
world (gender and sexuality) are thrown out of the courts of reason as a dangerous 
irritation (venturesome, uncertain and chancy) making the body excessive not only 
in itself but in relation to our predominant understandings of it. The second is the 
humanist and subject-orientated stance, including that of phenomenology, that 
frames understanding through the language of intent and agency, and ignores all the 
ways in which nonhuman organics, materiality and situations shape and are as 
(Agamben, 1993: 10.1). 
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much a part of the world as we are Instead, we need to work towards 
understanding the degree to which the encounters that these 'others' give rise to 
become us, making us who we are. Finally, there is the representational system that 
works an economy of always-already defined interpretations. For example, in the 
case of social constructivism, it works towards that ghost in the machine, the real. 
This system organizes scholarship by privileging those who sign up to a singular 
essentialism from which everything emanates, denigrating the potential of those 
research practices that experiment with the basis for what it is we think we can 
understand. It is not that these images of thought get things wrong, and nor is it the 
case that the alternative this thesis hopes to offer is a better way of doing things. 
Rather it is to work at producing other modes of thinking that might elicit 
additional ways of understanding. And perhaps more importantly it begins to work 
on the need for a different vocabulary for communicating and co-authoring new 
maps for the new problems such thinking opens up. 
The thesis then is about meeting the force of the performance experience through 
an openness to think, within a necessity to think, and with a passion to think. It is the 
encounter itself that gives rise to thought not vice versa. It is the embodiment of 
being there that starts us thinking, necessarily needing to think about knowing how to 
go on - With the meaning, the narrative unfolding, and the appreciation of the 
corporeal (and thus our) skills on show. Such thinking is practice itself; it is a mutual 
founding. As I will set out shortly, this thesis moves against a theory and practice, 
and an empirical and transcendental, divide. It is also a passion, a shot in the dark 
that is a move away from representation towards a performative apprehension. These 
are apprehensions that are about beginning from vagueness, about not ruling out 
intuition, and about being tentative in the handling of things because that which is 
grasped can only be sensed. Apprehensions sketch out With a sense of risk and 
experimentation that which seems to be slipping from View, and as such have an 
academic currency in the way they are more attentive to the contingent nature and 
significance of things in the making. The point is to attempt to start in the 'empty 
space', at a place degree zero, at a place before the representational systems of 
always-already constituted blocks of meaning that frame the limits of what is sayable. 
As Bonitzer has put it when speaking of the empty space operating in the work of 
the filrnmaker Nfichelangelo Antonioni, "empty space is not a void: full of mists, of 
fleeting faces, of evanescent presences or of random movements, this space 
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represents that final point of being finally freed from the negativity of intentions, of 
passions, of human existence" (1989: 218). 
The fights Might go down, sounds Might be played, odours might infuse the 
auditorium - perhaps not the bare essentials of this act of theatre, but all potential 
forces, like the body of the man, that channel and bring about the events which are 
unfolding. Expectations are high in the belief that you are about to witness a 
heightened instance of the everyday. The man in Peter Brook's description appears. 
Where is he coming from? Why is he here? Where is he going? Who is he? Does it 
matter? Imagine that these questions do not matter, and that foremost you are 
caught up in the general line of the performance: a man is walking across this 
empty space. You see the performance as an act of spacing and not as something 
that is about a particular place or a specific character. This level of description 
Might at first glance appear to be entirely abstract, whereas it comes directly out of 
the material practices that most concern our daily lives. For instance, take the act of 
walking: an action that takes us forward and brings us into potential encounters 
with other people and other things. This is not an escape from the materiality of 
the world, for, through building knowledge out of such actions, the argument is 
made for thinking knowledge creation as part of our bodily process, which in turn 
speaks of the variation of our embodiment within the lived world itself Instead of 
orientating arguments from the presupposition of self-autonomous, intentional 
agents of subjectivity, one focuses on the "common human practices and skills into 
which we are socialized and that in turn produce people, selves, and worlds" 
(Dreyfus et al, 1997: 16). It makes explicit acknowledgement of the ways in which 
we know "how to negotiate our way through a world that is not fixed and pre-given 
but that is continually shaped by the types of actions in which we engage" (Rosch 
et al. 1991: 144). Such a description of theatre speaks directly of the syntactical 
grammar of action, the syntax of which is the moment-by-moment assemblage of 
the worlds, encounters and events that make up our lives. I am drawn to this 
syntactical grammar - that which parallels the connective operation of prepositions 
in linguistic grammar - because of its simplicity and exactness. A good example of 
the way that this is more evocative is given in Deleuze's reflection upon babies: 
"With a young child, one already has an organic, personal relationship, but not with 
a baby, which concentrates in its smallness the same energy that shatters paving 
stones" (1998: 133). The description of empty space thus signals the intent of this 
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thesis to pare things down to an ahistorical operational clarity, serving notice of the 
belief that there is far less distance between the description and the object of 
description than is commonly held. By which I mean that the ways in which we 
mobilize the material, the affective, the sensed and the nonhuman, is less a point of 
referential disclosure and more the way we constitute their place in the world by the 
experiential actions we make - actions that are brought about through encountering 
these 'others'. 
The lights go down. The visual field loses its clarity in the darkness, and yet there 
is a knowing that something was visible. There is a creaking of wood. Sounds echo as 
a pattering traces out an invisible movement; thinking is infected and inspired by this 
other sensation. The curtain fifts. The unseen information of odour pulls attention 
into the dark, empty space: an encounter here and now. Two bodies and another 
encounter there, now touching. Feeling that, having the capacity to be affected too, 
the duration of the encounter binds forces in. just as the colours of hqw'ds MIX when 
brought together, and when waves of light disperse in contact with other spaces, and 
as molecules refashion themselves in contact with others, the present make-up of the 
world is continuously shaped and reaffirmed. The two bodies in the empty space 
continue moving and touching, unfolding the tension of contact, the force of 
affecting and being affected. This is all done to, and contained within, the time of the 
performance. It is about thinking in terms of the present moment. For example, 
think/feel the sensual becoming of the following performance event of touch as an 
active aiming at nothing above its own abundance: 
A finger turns in light circles across your toes and the pads of 
your feet. Is this irritating? ticklish? erotic? relaxing? According to 
difference, the delineation does not usher from an exterior source, 
like the masseur telling you to relax or a social norm insisting that 
when your wife does this it is sexual and when your doctor does 
this it is not. Instead, let the physical action define the borders and 
meaning.... What the event is and what it feels like arise on the 
scene. (Brusseau, 1998: 10) 
However, it is impossible to stay still in the immediacy of the 'empty space, for 
even in the space of a few seconds of a performance, such as these two bodies, a 
territory for interpretation begins to be etched out. VA-Iilst the tabula rasa of the 
'empty space' is an impossible place the purpose is to diagram the Journey rather 
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than its actual departure and arrival points - to see where the )ourney takes you, to 
experiment. This is to take a stance that is open to thinking of the advent of 
difference-in-itself that any action manifestly ushers in; and one that is equally open 
to the improvized use of empirical and theoretical investigation where both unravel 
simultaneously, unravelling experientially Just as they are woven together 
referentially in the act of writing them up. This is about investigating how these 
experiences inspire a mode of thinking that makes a "product of a negotiation with 
an unverifiable real" where the work of theory in this place is a "description and 
transcription of what one cannot see or prove with visible evidence" (Phelan, 
1993: 1/32). 
1.3 Performance 
First, I want to make a distinction between the space of performance and the place 
of the concept of performativity that has in recent years come to take hold: for 
example, see in performance studies itself the work of Eve Sedgwick (Parker & 
Sedgwick, 1995); in the social sciences in general Judith Butler's recent work 
(Butler, 1997) and the special issue of the journal Theog, Culture & SOC7'eo (19 9 9); 
and within geography the empirical work of Gillian Rose (1997a; 1997c), the 
theoretical work of Nigel Thrift (1997,1998,2000a) and the special issue of the 
journal So67*eo & Space (2000). Performativity is a slippery term indubitably linked to 
the idea of a performance, but, regardless of the multiple instances by which a 
performance might come to be defined (see Schechner, 1994), the performative 
slips across, beyond and through such actual renditions. In this sense, whilst 
constituting a discrete act - the performance - the performative is not itself a 
concept signifying such an act. The performative is the gap, the rupture, the spacing 
that unfolds the next moment allowing change to happen. Alongside this easy 
conflation of performativity with performance, there is the additional concern that 
the boundary between performance and everyday fife is increasingly becon-ung 
obscured such that everything becomes a performance. Currently within social 
sciences there is a prevalent assertion that a performance comes about through 
there being an audience (Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998). Thus, in everyday 
circumstances people become performers because they underline their behaviour 
through the apprehension that they are being scrutinized by others (including, in 
narcissistic terms, themselves). It is the closeness of the word 'perform' (to make, 
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or do something) to the word 'act' (to dissimulate, feign action) that causes this 
discursive doubling-up (Schechner, 1985 & 1994). The distinction that I want to 
make is that narcissistic performance chimes with the latter, whereas it is the 
former general performance, practice let us say, that is constituted by the 
performative. A key concern remains: Is the concept of performativity one for all 
occasions? Yes, in that the performative has a univocal sense: it is the cusp of an 
emergent structure. And no: whilst uniVocally speaking of the incessant alterity 
within the spaces of our encounters, the potential the performative etches out for 
refusal, fracture and torsion is set within ipec#i6- sites. In this it is necessarily aberrant 
and parasitic upon conventional, citational, and socially stratified context (whether 
that be upon the theatrical structures and rules of a specific performance art or 
sited event, or whether upon Goffmanesque performances set to everyday fife (see 
in particular, Goffman, 1956). As Perloff notes, our structures of meaning have to 
be repeated to work, and as this always entails a shift in context as well as in use, 
everything becomes open to chance (1996). Hence, whilst the performative, as a 
theoretical toot or concept, can be used in any given circumstance,, its usefulness 
and what it uncovers and creates is fundamentally specific to the context in which it 
is sited. 
The above considered, the space of performance lends itself explicitly to the 
realm between theory and practice produced in the performative encounter itself, 
for four reasons. First, performance opens up to View this 'as if space, a space that 
gives time for potential enactments to take place in a way that is much more 
tangible than in imagination and thought. It does this by putting on show the in- 
between and the in-the-making performative actualization. Second, this space is a 
personal space in that it binds you in through an immediate sense of belonging to a 
shared condition. So whilst it does not construct a space for general theory, it 
exhibits the micro-political investments produced in the personal spaces of our 
own bodies in relation to the everyday actions we all have the potential (whilst 
perhaps not the capacity) to make. It is in this sense that performance heightens the 
everyday instances of our corporeality by staging the ways we affect and are 
affected by encounters. Third, there is a fink here between performance and the 
phantasmagoria - theatre has long played upon the conviction by its practitioners 
that it can make manifest what cannot be seen: "from the ghost of Hamlet's father 
to the ghost in the machine of contemporary theatre's special effects, Western 
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theatre has had a sustained conversation with the incorporeal" (Phelan, 1997: 2). 
This means that the performance space plays explicitly to a general research 
problematic: that the object of one's mediation or interest itself disappears. As 
Phelan puts it, linking together the previous and the next point, "the enactment of 
invocation and disappearance undertaken by performance and theatre is precisely 
the drama of corporeality itself" (1997: 4; see also Auslander, 1997). Fourth, and 
finally, performance and theatre is an art with 'real' bodies in the sense that it is a 
live art: "Art is never an end in itself It is only an instrument for tracing fines of 
lives" Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 187). Above all, taking all these reasons, it is a 
question of belief; and it is a question of giving space for the experimentation of 
that belief. It is not so much a question of whether it can be proven that this is 
right or wrong, but more about the development of capacities and skills that enable 
alternative means for the extraction of sense. 
In relation to the space of performance within the social sciences the thesis is 
about taking up Peggy Phelan's question: "If the diversity of human culture 
continually showed a persistent theatricality, could performance be a universal 
expression of human signification, akin to language? " (1998: 3). The openness in 
utilizing this alternative theatre for academic endeavour is an openness that means 
to "escape the conventions of methodological allegiance to a particular field's 
system of knowledge. In the eyes of its adherents, performance studies was able to 
combine new work in critical theory, literary studies, folklore, anthropology, 
postcolonial theory, theatre studies, dance theory, and feminist and queer studies 
while forging a new intercultural epistemology" (Phelan, 1998: 4). Whilst I agree 
with this in the terrain of academia, and its many disciplinary and sub-disciplinary 
boundaries, I think that in speaking only of epistemology it misses one of the most 
significant tricks of performance studies. This is that it offers a window into 
thinking an alternative ontology - that it reveals the space of other possible worlds. 
The thesis therefore takes Phelan's sentiments on board and looks to the work of 
Gilles Deleuze to move towards a sense of folding ontologies through wl-&h we 
might make aspects of life, representational or non-representational, apparent and 
therefore useful. In the next section, many of these particular qualities of the 
performance space are both refracted through and creative of the problems that 
Deleuze's thought delivers us to. 
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1.4 An apprenticeship after Gilles Deleuze 
Do not count upon thought to ensure the relative necessity of 
what it thinks. Rather, count upon the contingency of an 
encounter with that which forces thought or a passion to think. 
(Deleuze, 1994: 139) 
In tl-iis section I want to set out why the work of Gilles Deleuze offers a perfect 
apprenticeship to the task of making sense of the encounter with performance, and 
why in particular it enables this encounter to be taken forward into academia in 
general. I want to offer four reasons for this because the thesis is as much an 
examination of Deleuze's thought in practice, as it is about the encounter with 
performance art. 
1.4.1 Performative research: foldings and weavings 
First and foremost, it is the style of thinking that Deleuze delivers us to. When he 
asks What is philosophy? ' in his final collaboration with F61ix Guattarl, Deleuze 
answers that it is the art of formulating, fabricating and inventing concepts. Whilst 
this is pitched in relation to philosophy it explains a practice that can equally 
operate for theoretical work in other fields, including that of performance and that 
of the social science that thinks spatially (space featuring in one of its guises as a 
concept itselo. This can be seen in Deleuze's own mixing of his philosophy when 
he addresses the art of the cinema: 
It is a practice of concepts, and it must be judged in the light of 
other practices with which it interferes. A theory of cinema is 
not 'about' cinema, but about the concepts that cinema gives 
rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts 
corresponding to other practices ... It is at the level of 
interference of many practices that things happen, beings, 
images, concepts, all the kinds of events. (Deleuze, 1989: 280) 
In this way the theoretical enterpnse at work through the empirical encounter is 
about intervening with the conditions that make possible the production of new 
modes of existence. I see this as a folding and a weaving because the concept "posits 
itself and its object at the same time that it is created" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 22), 
which is to say at the moment of the encounter. In this way, the fold also presents 
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the simultaneity of thought. There are two moments of a dice throw: the weave of 
the dice that is thrown (experiential) and the dice that falls back (referential). These 
are the "two hours of a single world", a simultaneous enactment of the ongoing 
constitution of the world, the hour of chance and the hour of necessity respectively; 
the chance of the encounter which forces us to think and the necessity of being able 
to go on in relation to that which it delivers us to (see Deleuze, 1983: 25-26). Instead 
of causality-finality we have chance-necessity: "not a probability distributed over 
several throws but all chance at once" (ibid: 27). 
1.4.2 Performative research: folding the experiential and the referential 
Second, in achieving this, and in the achievement, it enters into variable relations with 
other domains. It is not the position of this thesis to present any theoretical or 
empirical analysis as an answer in itself, rather it is to show a way of thinking through 
a problem. I am not trying to prove a theory, nor am 1, through empiricism, 
attempting to present a moment of how the world really is. Rather, starting at an 
interface with the world that produces a certain problematic, that of the experiential 
encounter with theatre, the question is more about asking how we - in all of our 
disciplinary guises because we are first and foremost humans experiencing the world 
- might come to make sense of the encounters that perform the world. As Smith 
points out C4it is no easier to read an image, painting or novel than it is to 
comprehend a concept" (1998: xii). So it is not enough to show what I am trying to 
work through via different means - for example, a video of a performance, or a piece 
of text, or a particular painting - as if they could encompass in their different style of 
presentation that which is apparently non-representational in writing. The point is 
what style we take up and use within the sphere of academic interpretation. Those 
other styles that interfere with ours (if we have such a bounded style) force us to 
think and in so doing conceive of alternative concepts that offer up another way of 
understanding the world; not Just any understanding, but understandings that can be 
seen to do something precisely because these mixings of domains take place in the 
particular context that brings them about. Consequently, the stance of a Deleuzian 
understands that the academic practice cannot be taken independently of other 
practices - the artistic, the scientific or the theological. This 
does not mean that it has 
to account for all the others, an impossible and unhelpful task (in my view, the 
academic veracity of what I want to set forth is derived from the ability to distil 
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potential avenues that are necessarily partial). Rather, it is to be open to the full 
richness of the concrete through the bringing together of any potential combination 
of the elements in the specific contrapuntal relationships - the stance of the scientist 
moving alongside that of the artist producing a conceptual space in between which 
neither the one nor the other could capture. 
This contrapuntal relationship is experimentation in contact with the 'real' (as in 
the empirical richness of the concrete), that wl-ýich operates a particular fold, that of 
the experiential and the referential. Experientially: this is what brings us into 
thinking. It is one way of understanding the nature of your attention as you engage 
with a theatrical performance. And yet something more takes place. Referentially: 
the performance takes hold of you. The sensed action of the encounter is filtered in 
order to make it do somethingfor you, rather than it being something that just does 
somethin to you. This is a fold because neither the 'r you' or the 'to you' is 9 ýfo 
superior. Together they make up the algebra of being able to 'go on', to five 
through, to cope, to act. The man moves across the stage (experientially) in a way 
that reminds you (referentially) either of someone else, or of a personality trait (ie 
he cowers ever so slightly when he does it). The movement of the man begins to 
etch out a meaningful territory - his walk becomes a pacing up and down and you 
relate to this in a particular way. The performance seemingly references experiences 
that you have lived through before. The referential is not a representational system, 
it is the moment where we trace out a territory for going on. 
1.4.3 Performative research: folding theory and practice, the conceptual 
and the empirical 
This leads me on to my third reason, that of the conceptual architecture given to us 
through Deleuze's notion of the plane of Immanence: "the image thought gives 
itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one's bearings in 
thought" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 37). This concept of the plane of immanence 
is often misread,, and, because it seems to be able to encompass everything, it is 
likewise misunderstood as some form of transcendental plane. This is not the point 
of its creation (see Goodchild, 1996: 46-47). Rather, through this concept, Deleuze 
argues that when we are at work in dealing with the world in any of our guises - as 
artist, acaden-uc, scientist, or even lover - we are working with "concrete 
cmultiplicities"' where a whole host of processes are bringing the present moment 
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about. This renounces the notion of emanation or projection in favour of 
connection in that it does not follow the realm of s1gnification premised on an 
Absolute origin but looks to what connections, encounters and interferences 
actually do. It is not that origins are removed altogether; it is just that they have 
durations that make them less grand and non-totahzing. Take this example of a 
man walking across a stage: the man is a biological force, 'multiply' the number of 
forces that n-ught be at play here and you see that in this way the man is made up of 
certain types of molecules, specifically those that make up the enzymes and 
stimulating fluids that have come about within in him due to him having just drunk 
a glass of wine; or take the stage he walks across, the wood it is made out of, the 
craftsman who built it, the tree from which the wood came, the fact that it has a 
history (that it was on this stage that Henry Irving played Hamlet), and so on. 
These are all concrete, empirical instances bringing about certain processes of 
connection in the very performance of this action. We could take any one of these 
fines of connection - the history of the stage, or the biological forces mobilized by 
the man in the way he effects his performance - knowing that it is just one 
multiplicity out of the full field of multiplicities that come to constitute this plane of 
immanence. All these multiplicities are immanent to one another because they 
come about through contact with the same world. This moves against 
transcendentalism for it is not suggesting that this immanence has existed once and 
for always. Rather it is that this idea of immanence captures the fact that the 
concepts that we have created to get a grip on the world are immanent to a host of 
other such compositions of concepts in that they are coming out of the same 
encounter (eg tl-iis act of a man walking across the stage). A plane of immanence is 
that autonomous realm, the image that thought gives itself, in which we hold the 
particular concepts we are creating or working with together (see Deleuze & 
Guattari,, 1994: 7). It might seem transcendentally vast in comparison to our 
immediate appreciation of the concrete moment but that is because there are so 
many fines of flight and concepts that we could have taken and created in coming 
to grips with this moment of the world's unravelling. In this way, the plane of 
immanence is constructed by the concepts we create and put to use. Equally, as the 
creation of concepts is derived from being immanent to the world - 'something in 
the world forces us to think'- the plane cannot be transcendental in the manner of 
being once and for always because it is changing along With the world. Thus: 
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Creating concepts is constructing some area in the plane, adding 
a new area to existing ones, exploring a new area, filling in 
what's missing. Concepts are composites, amalgams of lines, 
curves. If new concepts have to be brought in all the time, it's 
just because the plane of immanence has to be constructed area 
by area, constructed locally. (Deleuze, 1995: 147) 
The way the thesis is structured reflects this, and it does so in two keys, one major 
and one minor. The major key turns around the way in which the empirical research 
for this thesis functions; a fact that also effects the way it is presented. As mentioned, 
the three periods of research were all intensive immersions into particular fields of 
the five arts, the purpose being to encounter that aspect of the five art performance 
and give it time to force me to think. Each research period should be seen only as a 
particular take on the whole aspect of the performing arts. Each piece of the research 
mobilizes different concepts in the aim of achieving certain connections and 
apprehensions that enable us to make sense of what is literally and metaphorically 
Cgoing on'. The time of being in contact with the empirical field is distilled to the 
emergence of a coherent formation of these connections. This means that the direct 
empirical instances presented in the thesis are often a small fraction of the overall 
immersion time involved, but that equally it should be understood that in this way 
the empirical and the theoretical are not set apart. In place of such division, different 
intensities of both theory and empiricism weave in and out throughout the thesis. 
The point is theory is practice and practice is theory - whilst theory, the creation or 
use of certain concepts, enables the apprehension of certain aspects of the concrete 
world, practice is the contact With the concrete world that fuels the theoretical 
process: 'something in the world forces us to think'. This leads me to the minor key: 
that whilst it is often common practice to exhibit the empirical elements in 
compartmentalized sections (or even chapters) this thesis presents both the 
intensities of theory and practice in a style that further blurs the boundaries between 
the two. Thus many of the chapters feature the particular theoretical problems 
encountered in the empirical realm (those moments when we are forced to think) as 
an exemplification of the process of creating concepts. And vice versa, in the fold of 
theory and practice, concepts are shown to shed light on particular aspects of the 
empirical, serving to show Deleuze's work in action. 
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1.4.4 Performative research: folding the general and the particular 
Fourth, I am personally taken with a particular preoccupation of Deleuze's, one 
that blasts through those confines of social science, that of his appreciation for a 
non-organic conception of fife; or as he puts it, of "a Life (1997). Whilst this 
only presents its face explicitly in his latter work (1988b, 1993,1997; & 1998) it 
underwrites the formulation of many of the diversions in his seminal early works 
(1990a; 1994). Why am I taken with it? "A Life ... " opens a window to the 
ontological ethics of Deleuze's work too frequently overlooked by those - 
understandably - distracted by the terminology and the playful, often obscure, 
nature of his writing. This window is beautifully caught in his account of a scene 
from Dickens' Our Mutual Eriend where those witnessing the event of a dying man, 
whom few have any concern for, see in his dying the "spark of life" (1997: 4)'. This 
spark represents for Deleuze a univocal quality, a quality that acts as a bond 
between us through the way it effects a "deep interest" - "probably because it is 
life, and they [we] are living and must die" (ibid). 
Between his life and death there is a moment that is no longer 
anything but a life playing With death. The life of an individual 
has given way to an impersonal and yet singular life that 
disengages a pure event freed from accidents of the inner and 
outer life, that is from the subjectivity and objectivity of what 
happens. A bomo tantum With whom everyone sympathizes and 
who attains a kind of beautitude. (ibid) 
The point is that 'Life' "is an impersonal and nonorganic power that goes 
beyond any lived experience" (Smith, 1998: xiv). In this way, it is the theoretical 
surface upon which it is possible to comment upon the general, whilst never 
denying that such generality is folded out of the actual, and particular, lived 
experience in which it comes to be evoked. For example, these are evocations like 
the instance in Dickens' above or that moment of performance where two bodies 
touch. The very moment of these evocations is the ontological space of this final 
fold, a fold that is equally an empirical and epistemological space. There are many 
perspectives to choose from not only in terms of the place from which we can be a 
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witness, but also from the way In which, this time around, we seek assistance' in 
making sense of what it is we are witness to'. The performative moment of 
understanding and recognition will work in this thesis by the way it acknowledges a 
sense of the general because we can register that the spirit of certain moments, that 
of a Life, will happen again. The fact that it won't happen again exactly means that 
this cannot be an authority or an ownership of the potential repetition; the 
particular, the specific context, is equally important. Folds are in this sense 
everywhere, without the fold being universal. It's a 'differentiator', a 'differential' 
(Deleuze, 1995: 156-57). In this thesis, in its guise as an apprenticeship after Gilles 
Deleuze, I present these folds as problems which work through the philosophical 
manoeuvres achieved in Deleuze's work. By putting these problems to use in both 
the theoretical space of the encounter with performance, and hence through each 
of the three registers of corporeality, immateriality and temporality, I present 
Deleuze's philosophy of difference as that which can make a difference. 
1.5 How the thesis unfolds 
Each of the chapters is distinguished firstly through the investigation it makes of one 
of the three registers of sense upon which the encounter with performance can come 
to make sense - the register of corporeality (Chapters Two and Three), Immateriality 
(Chapters Four and Five) and time (Chapter Six); and secondly, through the 
particular aspect of Deleuze's philosophy each puts to work in creating an alternative 
methodology (conceptual as well as empirical) for research into and through such 
registers. Therefore in Chapter Two I begin by addressing the problem signification 
3 Interestingly this links to the (last/latter) thoughts of many of the key continental philosophers (see Lyotard, 
"Anima Minima", 1997: 235-249; Foucault, "Life: Experience and Science", 1998b: 465-478) and to work 
playing on the similar, earlier thoughts of Aristotle (see Agamben, 1998; and on this bare life, Thrift, 2000b). 
4 "In a vacuum their work would be meaningless. Here we find a clue. It leads us naturally to the idea of an 
audience; we see that without an audience there is no goal, no sense ... I watch a playjýrssisle i unepiýce. To 
assist - the word is simple: it is the key" (Brook, 1968: 155-56). 
5 For example, take the spectatorship of an act of performance, that of a dance: "An authority on dance, whom 
we may refer to as an informed viewer, upon seeing a dancer perform two similar moves, may conclude, 'The 
dancer repeated the step'. One who is ignorant of dance and claims no ownership of its language, whom we 
may refer to as an ecstatic viewer, at this same moment might say, 'The dancer performed two sinAar 
movements - the first in one place in the room, the second a little later in a different place in the room'. The 
differences observed by the second viewer might seem so insignificant to the first viewer that he chose to 
ignore them altogether, concentrating instead on the larger patterns which conform to the language of dance 
which he feels he owns" (Goulish, 2000: 33-34). 
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has in the face of the corporeal realm. Beginning with Dernda's famous aphorism, '11 
n'y pas de hors texte', I will show that whilst there is a necessary incompleteness in 
knowing experientially through the body, and in communicating such knowing 
referentially through the always-already interpreted frame of language, a certain 
performative kind of knowing can be achieved. The first Deleuzian problem is then 
one that shows the importance of the diagrammatic transformations that cut across 
the way our different signifying regimen figure the body. A workable answer is 
presented in the second Deleuzian problematic, that of asking 'What a body can do? ' 
In Chapter Three I take this question on board and exemplify a possible empirical 
investigation into the production of a way of knowing through the body: the fact that 
through our viscerality, the body is both the engine and the recording surface for 
many of our encounters, scripting their meaning through the affect, rhythm and 
movement it delivers us to. Through research into the practice of BMC I argue that 
an alternative cartography can be made out of mapping the spaces caught in-between 
affecting and being affected. This is an open system of signification, but a 
signification nonetheless, which, through mobilizing anatonuical, folk and experiential 
knowledge, makes, as I will show though the empirical work, sense for those who 
practice it. In opposition to essentialism, I term this an ethological mapping and unite 
it with Mix Guattan's notion of transversal pathways; respectively these present the 
third and fourth problematics. 
Chapter Four takes the materiality of the body into the realm of immateriality. 
Through the work of Walter Benjamin in particular, I will demonstrate that, despite 
the essentially non-representational nature of immateriality, the immaterial plays a 
hugely significant, if personal, part in the performance of the social. By theming the 
chapter through the personal condition of falling in love, the fifth and sixth 
Deleuzian problematics set out the potential of working a symptomolgy of signs: a 
theoretically clinical art that scripts, through encounters With the material world, 
intimations of that which cannot be grasped. Continuing to argue the case for an 
apprehension of inl-Materiality, the fifth chapter starts by moving out of this 
personal terrain into the space of events, again stressing the artifice of our 
representational systems through its inability to bear Witness to that which does not 
appear. This spectral presence is the power of the event itself, and in this chapter I 
want to argue for a style of thought and practice that is worthy of it. In terms of 
thought, I present a lengthy illustration of Deleuze's art of creating concepts as 
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seventh problematic; and in terms of practice, I turn back to the particular qualities 
of performance art, and make the case for, and an interpretation of, that which is 
put on show in the process of devising theatre: the making room for things to 
happen. The chapter concludes by offering interpretations (problems eight and 
nine) of Deleuze's concept of univocity as a theoretical operator capable of linking 
the particular instances of the incorporeality of events put on show in the space of 
performance with a sense of the general line of non-organic life drawn across us all. 
Chapter Six turns our attention to time, for if one thing is irrefutable about the 
specific qualities of performance art it is the way it directly involves and is created 
through the tension of the present tense and the spacing of time itself. In fl-lis 
capacity, performance, whilst a heightened experience, plays to the particular ways 
in which time modifies and situates the signification of all of our endeavours: 
through its passing, where the present moves in both directions towards the past 
and the future, and through the way the past coexists with the present. I locate a 
potential sighting of these operations of time through the research conducted into 
the rehearsal process, and through this location I present two final problematics 
raised in the work of Deleuze, that of the unravelfing of subjectivity within the 
tension of the present moment and that of Bergson's notion of the 'pure' past. 
In conclusion, Chapter Seven asks how we get off this particular stage of empty 
space. In answering, I attempt to take forward the purpose of this thesis: to extract 
through the three registers of corporeality, immateriality, and temporality potential 
openings made possible through both the theoretical citings made in response to 
the encounter with these registers and the empirical practicality sited here through 
the space of performance art. This is to conclude that there is something that can 
only be 'said' in the unsayable; that in the conduct of doing social science we forget 
that we are operating on a process of loss; as Phelan notes, "learning to see is 
training careful blindness. To apprehend and recognize the visible is to eliminate as 
well as absorb visual data" (1993: 13). 
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Tracings of flesh striated: arche-ecriture, signifiance 
viscerality 
Here I am in the presence of images, in the vaguest sense 
of the word, images perceived when my senses are opened 
to them, unperceived when they are closed. All these 
images act and react upon one another in all their 
elementary parts ... Yet there is one of them which is 
distinct from all the others , in that I 
do not know it only 
from Without perception, but from within my affections: it 
is my body. I examine the conditions in which these 
affections are produced: I find that they always interpose 
themselves between the excitations that I receive from 
without and the movements which I am about to execute, 
as though they had some undefined influence on the final 
issue. (Bergson, 1990: 1-2) 
Trac, ',, - ni viscera , gs ojflefh s1rialed. - arche-icrilure, 
sýg fiance &' liýy 
2.1 Introduction: the 'body' itself is not a discrete object for 
investigation 
The body is and is not ourselves. The body does everything and 
it does nothing. Neither ends nor means, always involved in 
matters which go beyond it, always jealous of its autonomy, the 
body is powerful enough to oppose itself to any merely 
deliberate end yet has none to propose to us if we finally turn 
toward and consult it. (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 112) 
In the empty space it can be argued that we first register what is happening through 
the body: the primary characteristic of the encounter is that it can only be sensed. 
Conceptually, whilst this is the operational point of its abstraction, empty space is 
an impossible space to be: I sense that I can't have the empty space until I am there 
already. This emptiness is immediately filled by a body - my body, your body, 
anybody. Situated, as a body, sensing through fleshy materiality one creates space, 
the surrounding space of being. The substance that is our materiality gives us our 
sense of place and the space of the empty stage; it speaks before any question of 
our embodiment within the social. Wl-iilst we sense through the body we fold this 
up immediately in the way we make sense of that which the body is delivering us to. 
In this way we need to ask how we make this move from sensing to making sense? 
We need to ask what conceptualisation of the body do we allow to take place on 
the stage. 
In the last four or five years the sub-discipline of cultural geography has seen a 
proliferation of literature on the body (Duncan, 1996; Matless, 1995; Pile, 1996; 
Nast & Pile, 1998). In contributing to this I want to make a distinction concerning 
two different ways of thinking the body. On the one hand, the body is figured as 
the object of knowledge. This apparently affirms the body as a viable object of 
analysis, and provides much insightful work focused upon the array of practices 
and discourses that enframe, and are enframed by, this knowable object of the body. 
On the other hand, the body is approached as the subject of knowledge. It is the 
body's sensate qualities of touch, smell, taste, sight and sound that enfold our 
being-in-the-world out of the encounters With others (organic or non-organic, 
individually or in milieu), etching out our orientations and understandings. Delving 
further in this direction one becomes aware of the affective mixing within the 
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particular anatomical compartments of the body, the interchangeable channelling of 
energy flows and chemical fluids that comprise our unique sensational qualities that 
give colour to our experientiality with different feelings, emotions and moods. 
Through affect this elusory body literally composes the spaces through which we 
move (Radley, 1995). 
This distinction is symptomatic of a universal mechanics working at the heart of 
all knowledge production. In her essay Bodies and Knowled , ge: 
Feminism and the crisis of 
reason, Elizabeth Grosz diagnoses this as the crisis of reason exhibited in "the 
mismatch, conflict, or displacement between 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity... (1995: 
26). For Grosz, this crisis is discernible in the academic practice of self-validation 
and methodological self-justification; an issue that will be debated in a later chapter. 
For the moment, I want to extract two issues from Grosz's argument, both of 
which outline the risk of configuring the body outside the normal codes of 
signification, a shift that heralds a vital change to the ways we understand and carry 
out knowledge production. Firstly, by no longer gagging the body Within the codes 
of signification, constructing it as a knowable object, one implicitly embraces the 
realisation that there is no single, neutral conceptual tool kit or methodology for the 
production of knowledge. As Grosz puts it, one is now able to raise the question 
"How does this language, method, technique constitute its object? " (Grosz, 1995: 
27). Secondlv, the criteria for evaluating the salience of knowledge is ungrounded 
by the accompanying denial of the belief that an "object of investigation exists 
independently of the knowledge of it" (ibid: 28). This offers a new space for 
considering the intelligibility of our corporeal urges that have hitherto been 
discredited as subjective and irrational, and consequently thrown out of the courts 
of reason. These opening points together implicate a principle theoretical 
cornerstone to the thesis: that above and beyond there being any easy conceptual 
divide separating object and subject, one senses that both are folded performatively 
out of the same moment and substance. 
A second frame of points arises out from this 'apparent-paradoXical' folding. 
Firstly, whilst the body is not a discrete object the space between bodies (organic 
and non-organic) offers itself as an adequate decoy for such aspiration. The 
question behind the advent of this interstitial space is one which asks how Might we 
,g 
discover our own body? Let me example this: know this other body, and in knowin 
suppose we encounter another body through the touch of sight where we sense this 
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body's appearance, movement, gesture and form. The first two qualities of 
appearance and movement seem in effect to be immediately apparent - sometl-ýing 
is there before us and we get some sense of space via this presence. Whereas the 
quality of the latter two differs in that they impose upon us the creation, via the 
sense of our own body-grammar, of the sentences that this other body, the body, 
necessarily leaves incomplete (Gil, 1998: 108). The point is we can't know the body, 
it doesn't know itself - as Merleau-Ponty (1973) says the body has no answers to 
propose to us. Yet, what we might do in a given encounter is frame this other body; 
see it, name it, empathise and anticipate its expression. The crucial point I want to 
suggest is that this anticipation is mediated by the giýven palettes of signifýin 
reg=e , and it is this factor that enables us to communicate throuTh the body an 
indication of its existence'. The body is then culturally staged and dramatized 
through particular conventions, such that bodily practices are moulded by the 
prevailing scenery and contingencies for possible action. Thus, whilst the body is a 
performance staged within the enclosure of cultural co-ordinates, this does not 
exhaust the body's meaning. 
Finally, therefore, it is important to note the ways in which the body is subject to 
slander; the inscriptive fact that the body is symbolized, typified, connotated, 
prefigured, and named. The body represented is not authored by the body; it is 
highly mediated by the protocols of signifying systems; it is as if we are seeking 
release from the world by transforn-ung flesh and ourselves into text (Dillon, 1988: 
100). Beneath the word, subtending it, the body is something of a crucible of 
energy mutations. These energies are in themselves unknowable, but, in spite of 
this, I want to suggest that adequate sen-ilologies can be sought so that a certain 
kind of knowing Might be achieved. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section argues through the 
consequences that follow from the fact that our knowledge creation privileges the 
mental over the corporeal. This is about exposing the gap the unknowability of the 
body creates in the seemingly complete representational system through which we 
make it apparent outside of itself (eg in text, painting, etc). The next section 
addresses the importance of our understandings of the body as codified within 
11 hope to have suggested the sense of folding by using the prepositional use of 'through', thus linking 
communication relative to the body that affects it whilst acknowledging that it is communIcation that ý#ects the 
body into apparent being. 
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different sen-iiotic regimes: that of signifying serniotics, the counter- signifying 
strategies through which the body disappears in strategies that de-corporeahze, and 
at a non-discurisve, pre-signifying level that frames the body contextually 
(historically and culturally) through the tangible consequences of its actions. In the 
third section, through an initial focus on the last work of Merleau-Ponty, we 
attempt to think again this prediscursive realm, that which is prior to referential 
contemplation and before "the imposition of metaexperiential organization and its 
codification by reason" (Grosz, 1994a: 96). In this way I attempt to site the empty 
space beyond representation, as a space of post-signification, in preparation for the 
next chapter, an apprehension of an alternative vocabulary for thinking our 
materiality in itself. 
SECTION ONE 
2.2 Arche-6criture 
I use the words you taught me. If they don't mean anything any 
more, teach me others. Or let me be silent (Beckett, En4, , game, 
1986: 113). 
I am Writing on the body; I am Writing the body - it is a sign, a label, a name, the 
letters body. This act of writing is not simply evocative of its moment, it 
possesses a double articulation, that second articulation of an expected readership 
and the requirement that there is somettling to communicate and that that 
something is communicable. In other words, the act of Writing possesses us With a 
split reality - on one level it speaks the immediate corporeal moment, on another 
level one is caught up in a grander scheme where one is placed within a signifying 
regime. I am not writing With the belief that this writing is an end in itself -I write 
the word 'body' with the trust that it signifies something, and yet with the 
knowledge that it almost doesn't matter what it means. It is a disquieting practice as 
this Writing seems to possess another. To write is not to produce a written text but 
is also in itself a performative utterance -I feel as if I am assembling a world, 
constituting and being constituted by this act of writing. 
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2.2.1 The 'body'and two aphorisms 
In one way or another, the practice of social science announces the nature/culture 
binary through its inevitable assumptions concerning the concept of language: that 
the written word and its phonetic alphabet (with its implication of the primacy of 
speech) indelibly speaks the 'truth'. After all the very constitution of academic 
practice is expressed in the spaces created via language: 
Even before one speaks of visible or overriding structures 
(primary and secondary education, the university, authority, 
legitimacy), there is the very experience of discourse and 
language: the interest of philosophy already finds itself involved 
there in institutions. Everywhere and always, institutions ... 
attempt to dictate our rhetoric, the procedures of 
demonstration, our manners of speaking, writing and addressing 
the other Perrida, 1995: 327). 
Whatever critique I wish to present here begins with its necessary immersion in 
the very system against which it Will be set. The words spreading out upon this 
blank page contain the binary rift inscribing the nature/culture divide: that moment 
when you consider a word of language as being that which possesses meaning, 
,g present at 
hand that the word where there is the assumption that there is some thin 
signifies. For example, when writing the word 'body', is language (here) the 
expression of determinate sense or meaning? Is it immediately apparent what it is 
that I Wish to signify to you by the presence of this word (this sign of a sign)? The 
openings engendered in these questions offer specific conceptual sites from which 
to support the rest of the chapter, so I want now to consider the implications of 
these type of questions by addressing two aphorisms, both of which make well- 
known statements concerning the nature of writing. The first sets out many of the 
main arguments caught within a structuralist account of writing (where writing is 
related to speech possessing prosperity in the production of written texts). The 
second moves to set out the agenda of this thesis by arguing with Derrida for a 
4writing in the general sense' (arcbi-icriture), for understanding writing as affectively 
performative (on this see Norris, 1987). However, to advance discussion I want to 
turn to the work of Judith Butler, in particular her book Bodief That Matter, and a 
recent interpretation by Vicky Kirby on the ideas contained there. As a direct 
gesture towards orientating her readers, Butler writes that "to know the significance 
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of something is to know how and why it matters, where 'to matter' means at once 
4to materialize' and 'to mean"' (1993: 32). In effect Butler is making us aware that 
the object of her analysis is not the body as matter (or substance, as Kirby 
emphasises) but rather the processes by which the body comes to be valued. A 
crucial implication of this focus is that Butler's work operates through the 
assumption that "there can be no access to a pure materiality outside or before 
signification and, by extension, no access to a pure materiality of bodily fife is 
separate from language" (Kirby, 1998: 103). 
2.2.2 The arbitrary nature of the sign: (essentialism) 
In many ways "the arbitrary nature of the sign" is an anti- es sentialist argument 
appearing to imply that there is nothing outside the sign to invest it with meaning; 
in other words that there is no transcendental signified. At work here is the 
founding principle of knowledge production: the belief that experience and the 
world is present to me, and that it is possible to 'voice' such experience in an exact 
fashion via speech and writing. The poststructural turn arrived with this ambiguity 
within Saussure's work, writing across the map of knowledge with its critique of 
authorship and the humanist subject at the heart of authenticity and self-presence. 
Thus, Barthes declared in his essay The Deatb of the Autbor that "Linguistically, the 
author is never more than the instance writing, just as I is nothing other than the 
instance saying P. language knows a 'subject', not a 'person"' (19 88: 145). Outside of 
the immediate moment one has no self-awareness, and one is not the central 
agency writing the world that unfolds out of that moment. So, when we attempt to 
account for the experience of the body, rather than this sign of the 'body' having an 
essential signified, it speaks of an incommensurable gap between what is 
signified/perceived and the signified's referent. In this way the sign possesses an 
arbitrary characteristic in that it may virtually refer to anything. So whilst the sign - 
'body' - is not significant because of its relation to the thing it designates, in a 
practical sense it gains weight through what is contained in its use, namely "the 
formal relation of sign to sign insofar as it defines a so-called sigrflifying chain" 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 112). The sign, in other words, performs and creates a 
2 This is a pivotal question of subjectivity: "The lyric 'I' emerges as a positional relation. Its subjectivity is made 
possible by a linguistic and ultimately social structure in which 'I' speaks (Davidson, 1986: 41; quoted in Pcrloff, 
1998: 406). 
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signIfied, which does not have a direct relationship with an essential 'real'. 
Glendinning has termed this "foundational assumption of classical humanism" as 
the concept of "ideal conceptual exactness" involving a "dogmatic or non-logical 
exclusion of possibilities of the phenomenon of language, an exclusion practised in 
the hope of 'isolating' a supposedly essential (and thus indefinitely repeatable-as-the- 
same) identity or content" (1998: 77/79). 
To accept the performative potential of language is to understand that the 
signification of semiology hes in it bringing forth "a place that allows things to 
happen" whilst being aware that this practice in itself "does not give what it says; it 
lacks being" (Certeau, 1997: 30). It thus seems that signification can only work in 
the absence of a transcendental signified. The baton of meaning has to be passed 
down the signifying chain by interpretation, by interpreters like us. In an argument 
that rrught seem to advance the body's signification within academia, one can here 
stress that it is through our bodies that the signifying coherence of society is 
maintained. The body is however understood as nothing but a tool of its theoretical 
representation. To illustrate, language effectively passes through the body using the 
body as its medium for expression, such that language is understood to operate 
itself as a vehicle for pre-formed ideas. In such arguments neither the body nor 
language are seen as a pre-condition of thought. The predominant assumption at 
work here - that an utterance of a writing should present an immediately apparent 
meaning, which, more crucially, should be definite and exact - is not one among 
many of the prejudices framing knowledge creation but "tbe philosophical 
prejudice, the philosophical injustice" (Glendinning, 1998: 78). To reiterate, the 
happening of things is in the passing of the baton and not the baton itself Thus 
one can argue, like Deleuze and Guattan, that an interpreter's existence is a bereft 
one, doomed only to encounter a world already interpreted, seizing upon the mere 
joy of maintaining these always already crafted forms (that don't of course exist). 
As an aside, whose echo will return later, one can understand the insidious nature 
of this interpreter's existence within academia, for one can justifiably argue that: 
there is no longer even any need to interpret, ... because the 
best interpretation, the weightiest and most radical one, is an 
eminently significant silence. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 114) 
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The silence over the body as a subject of knowledge is particularly apt. Moving 
on, whilst the sign has no necessary relation to anything outside it, that is not to say 
that there is no outside the sign. The sign seemingly exists as something separate 
from the extra-finguistic reality of matter (and I am able to write that). But, as Kirby 
brilliantly illustrates, the issue is not so much one of the matter of difference (the 
incessant deferral of the origin of the sign's meaning) but more the difference of 
matter, for if there is no transcendental signified, then the stable ground outside 
signification is matter itself Underwriting this last point there is a suggestion that 
the 'sensible plenitude of substance' (Kirby, 1998) is in some way already present to 
itself - it does not require linguistics and a regime of signification to become 
apparent. Crucially, the anti-essentialist potential of the sign is brought out of the 
acceptance of the existence of an essence, of a sense of substance. Therefore, if we 
take a second glance at the nature of the arbitrariness of the sign we can argue that 
it actually comes out of the doubt we have concerning the veracity of the reference, 
and the generative fact that this doubt is both conceded and refused in the very act 
of referencing. I can never wholly say, write, signify anything, but that is what 
drives me, and allows me, to write in the first place. Nothing is apparent. 
So when trying to call the thing we call the body forth as an object of intended 
capture we find ourselves impoverished in our speech and writing. Yet the language 
we use cultivates in its practice the very lapses and interstitial mis apprehensions that 
designate its function. Thus the impurity of signification and the violence of 
language are the very qualities that place us somewhere and allow things to happen; 
as Derrida has argued "writing is unthinkable without repression" (1976: 226). It is 
the repression in the act of writing, the necessary exclusions, which finds difference 
inhabiting the identity it judges (Kirby, 1998: 55; see also Glendinning, 1998: 79). 
And tl-iis "radical difference between referent and signified is the site where the 
materiality of language and that of the world which it seeks to signify are 
perpetually negotiated" (Butler, 1993: 69). Thus, as a conclusion and bridge to the 
next aphorism "I do not believe totality can be contained in language; my problem 
is what remains outside, the unwritten, the unwritable" (Calvino, 1982: 143). 
We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, 
however, is directed not towards phenomena, but as one might 
say, towards the possibilities of phenomena. We remind ourselves, 
that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about 
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phenomena ... Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one 
(Wittgenstein, 1953: ý90). 
2.2.3 71 Wy pas de hors texte ,3 (There is nothing outside-the-text) 
This second aphorism serves to disinvest the binary opposition of meaning. 
Derrida does not here write serniologically -a belief in a system of meaning where 
words are the symptom of some real referent - rather he deliberately uses the root 
word gramme (to write) over that of seme (to mean). As Kirby argues, the sign of 
Derrida's 'grammatology' is informed by a context that is more than linguistic, With 
the implication that the world is not a part of a linguistic whole but rather that both 
'world' and linguistics are mutually implicated. Therefore, the sign and the system 
of signification are not discrete entities, because they are familiar within the context 
of substance. Derrida is not saying that there is nothing outside the text, rather he is 
suggesting that there is no 'outsid e- the- text' because there is a general arche4criture 
encompassing everything. This links back to the previous section that has suggested 
that it is the difference of matter that matters, whereby signification is grounded 
and woven out of this unbounded plane of substance. Substance is not this brute 
unmediated quality figured as some kind of absolute exteriority. This point is 
amplified in the inference that if there is no outside-the-text then there can be no 
inside either. This 'writing in the general sense' presents the principal theoretical 
foundation endorsed within this chapter: there is no inside disassociated textual 
loýýic writing the world, nor is-there an interior subject adjudicating its creation. 
Writing emanates from the simultaneous fold of substance and thought such 
that any mode of arc&467iture, language for instance, "bursts the boundaries of its 
constitutional articulation, engendering a reality whose inscriptive production 
implicates the ideological with/in the physical" (Kirby, 1998: 52). Two points can 
be arrested out of this. Firstly, the conditional possibility of language's functionality 
rests in its structural ambiguity, in there being a grammatical sense of play at its 
operational heart (transparency is more a hindrance than a necessity). Secondly, it 
should be recognised that the grapheme is not just the clothing of the idea or 
thought, it is its incarnation (Grosz, 1995). This is a rarely visited site, one not 
mentioned in the academic registry of recommended places; even when it is 
3 Derrida, 1976: 158. 
30 
Trwings offlesb strialed: arcbe-icriture, signýiance & Pisceraliýy 
considered, it is usually derided for ignoring the pressing 'real' day-to-day struggles 
implicated within actual instances of social, political and economic concern. 
I regard this as an inefficient understanding of what is at stake because there is a 
misconception that the textuality in evidence here is merely one way in which it is 
possible to appertain a formal understanding of text, albeit very pervasive and 
reactive response. This belief, that, in effect, Derrida is suggesting that there is 
nothing outside the text ignores Derrida's accent upon the dissolution of the 'real' 
versus the 'text'. This dissolution is conceived via the conception that the world is 
produced in the trace, or difference, constituting all forms of writing (arche-ioriture). 
This is to say that the immersive gesture of folding, or the happening of the 
immediate moment, implicates simultaneously object and subject, Writing and 
substance, and the signifying polar opposites that seemingly frame theoretical 
argument. Whilst there is a dissolution of the 'real'/'unreal' equation, it can be said 
that there are different modes of writing; and that these differ because they have 
unique capacities and qualities in performance (aside from the fact that everything 
next is different to what has gone before). So we can ask, What if: 
the book should be the written counterpart of the unwritten 
world; its subject should be what does not exist and cannot exist 
except when Written, but whose absence is obscurely felt by that 
which exists, in its own incompleteness? (Calvino, 1982: 136) 
Derrida's use of the term of supplementariýy assists further orientation on this 
point. When talking about the supplement Wid-lin the act of writing you can suggest 
one of two things. Firstly, you can think of Husserl's struggle to sbow a pure self- 
present origin in the face of the extraneous language by which it seems possible to 
achieve such a presentation. The supplement, in this case seen as language, is hence 
an unwanted addition incidental to the pure self-present world out there. Because 
of this inside/outside split, typical of the phenomenological project, self-present 
origins are infinitely deferred, an ironic state of affairs when considered alongside 
this belief in an ideal real world. The "phenomenological enterprise is doomed to 
, gs 
tbemselves, because 'the thing itself is failure for there can be no return to the Min 
,g 
itseýf is concealed by the additional always concealed... (Howells, 1999: 24). The tbin 
supplement. 
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Secondly, in a reversal typical to Derr1da's logic, the supplement becomes 
essential to the very thing it is deemed to contaminate. Again this is a 
demonstration of the fold of writing as it emerges out of the unbounded MiX of 
thought and substance. Akin to diffirance, the supplement is thus a way of referring 
to an unacknowledged process of substitution. For example, let us consider the 
notion of the present moment as it is understood in performative terms: the 
Present is so excessive and driven out of an incessant logic of the ongoing that it is 
necessarily apparent only through substitution; it can only be apprehended through 
a supplement. Such a practice, in fact any practice (talking, breathing, Writing etc), 
in being immediately a part of the present becomes simultaneously a part of it. 
Whilst grammatical logic notices that this last sentence in effect says nothing - 
nothing more than a similar argument that in being the colour red it was 
simultaneously red - the illogic here hes not in my writing but in the senuiology that 
separates the word from the world, and writing from substance. In not defining this 
supplement as an extraneous or inferior substitute for the complete self-present 
real, one announces it as that which shows up the essential insufficiencies of 
whatever it is supposed to complete 4. In Derrida's words "there is never a painting 
of the thing itself ... because there is no thing itself .... The original possibility of 
the image is the supplement" (1976: 412). It is supplementarity itself which is 
originary: origins are occasions, the being caught in the midst, and how in practice 
one finds oneself caught up in this way. This interstitial point is "the promise or 
profile of the singularity of the trace that is not yet language or speech or presence 
nor absence, beyond binary, oppositional, or dialectical logic" (Derrida, 1995: 79). 
In this way the tra(in: g of the point is the perfort-native. 
Modes of arche-icriture offer a different angle upon which one can apprehend the 
csame)'; yet it is this same that is conditioned by impossibility, the impossibility that 
nothing can be the same again. Shding across one can read the 'same' as self- 
apparent presence, the loss of which has always already begun. The desire to make 
our materiality, our body, self-apparently present is ironically cut through by the 
impossibility to desire that with which one coincides Uohnson, 1987: xi). Merleau- 
Ponty alluded to this when arguing that the body is a presence that does not entail a 
4 The moral question once more arises: if the real world is not immediately self-present but via the supplement, 
then one can easily read this supplement as imagination. This works through our respect for someone else, for 
we can only have this respect 
if there is a certain paradoxical non-identification (Derrida, 1976: 270). 
32 
Tra6iq, f ojflesh sln*aled. ý arche4criture, sýTnffiance & viscerafiýy 
possible absence insofar as it can never be 'completely constituted' as it is that 
which sees and touches (1962: 92). This has its parallels in the conceptual possibility 
of arcbe-iaiture: 
Without the possibility of diff6rance, the desire of presence as such 
would not find its breathing- space. That means by the same token 
that this desire carries in itself the destiny of its nons atis faction, 
diff6rance produces what it forbids, making possible the very thing 
that it makes impossible. Perrida, 1981: 143) 
Whether you are immersed in speaking, writing, dancing, tasting, breathing, 
feeling, viewing, composing, painting, shooting, singing, screaming etc, out of the 
single fold these modes of arcbe4nriture express and herald one of the qualities that 
make up the moment. Such expression never encapsulates the totality of the 
moment, and yet it articulates more than the moment itself, tracing a differential of 
space/time which presents "an inseparability between representation and substance 
that rewrites causality" (Kirby, 1998: 61). 
In summary, these two aphoristic accounts uncover the assumptions that split 
phenomena by way of inhering to a philosophical ideology of ideal exactness and a 
methodology of re-presentation. Without such assumptions one acquires an 
alternative habit of thinking that thinks "at once both the rule and the event, 
concept and singularity" (Derrida, 1976: 119)'. This line of argument sets up a 
threshold of incommensurability generated and threatened by a conceptualisation 
of the body as a delimitable entity. 
That was a way of putting it - not very satisfactory; 
... Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle 
With words and meanings. (Eliot, 1963: 198) 
5 In a similar vein, the task here is to tease out new words that might possess the different qualities of the body; 
after all the existing language rarely means anything - as T. S. Eliot said "last year's words belong to last year's 
language/And next year's words await another voice" (1963: 218). Academia is guilty of being silent over the 
visceral, fleshy, organic, fluid, channelling, sensitive, feeling, excitable matter that is the 'body', so, in many 
ways, instead of Eliot's "last year's language" one could read 'contemporary criticism' (as provoked by any 
serious questioning of our corporeality and the ways we understand it). Crucially, we will be forever awaiting 
that other voice. 
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In the next section I will attempt to examine the abstract social and cultural 
trains of thought that circulate around and figure the body forth. I will do this by 
exan-uning four signifying strategies. The first continues within the si 11 ime ignifying regi 
and looks at the way we assume the body's presence through speculation (in the 
sense of both literally sighting the body and in the terms of conjecture). The second 
briefly examines contemporary strategies by which the body is counter- signified 
relative to these speculative, self-present assumptions, writing the body as an 
indifferent individual, as mere number within the societal machine. The third 
strategy will (as a foundation for the fourth strategy) examine the primitive serniotic 
that heralds the body as an originary source. Finally, a post-signifying regime is 
advanced that offers the space to open up awareness of alternative performative 
non-representational ways of configuring the body, a tactic that explicitly works out 
of a conception of the world as written out of the arche-ioiture that folds thought 
and substance. 
SECTION TWO 
2.3 Signifying machine - Speculating (on) bodies 
The spectacular body is both the symbol and the instance. 
(Brooks, 1993: 5) 
On the Renaissance stage boy actors played women (see Stallybrass, 1991). The 
body is here rendered, or gendered, visible through prosthetics (costume or 
otherwise). But what is actually sighted here? The audience must ýbeculate upon 
these bodies, and immediately it is apparent that there is unsettling play at work - 
one has to be concerned with the 'part' that the boy actor has which is not in his 
part! The play here is between this site of indeterminacy (the body itselo and the 
sexual difference (sexuality itselo that produces our inconsistent fixation. Such 
anaton-ucal considerations have been addressed within geography. Gillian Rose has 
transposed such speculation and placed it at the very heart of knowledge 
production by siting Irigaray's notion of the male imaginary as having a "certain 
topography, of one-ness, verticality, solidity" all of which is "bound into male 
genital 'morphology"' (1993: 66). Thus, Rose argues, this concept of morphology 
demonstrates the symbolic importance of anatomy as it inscribes the body into a 
specific cultural coding, namely that of a masculinist discourse. Yet such 
34 
, gs qljlesh strialed. - arrhe4criture, siTnifiance 
& visceralýty Tratin 
pronouncements covers over the indeterminacy that gives rise to such speculation. 
In other words, there is a play of meaning manifest here which operates a spacing 
between that allows for movement and articulation (see Derrida, 1981). In a similar 
vel , n, on the Restoration stage women played boys who were revealed to be women. 
For example, in a bed scene', Mirtilla, in love with cross-dressed Olivia (cross- 
dressed as a man), leads Olivia to her bed. Enter the Prince, who, in love with 
Mirtilla, is enraged and grabs Olivia, upon wl-iich "The Prince boldin Olivia by the 
bosom of her coat, her breast appears to Mirtilla": 
MirtiHa: Ha? What do I see? 
Two Female rising breasts 
By heav'n a Woman. 
(Stallybrass, 1992: 64) 
As Stallybrass says "wbat is seen is most vexed, being the point of intersection 
between spectatorship, the specular, and the speculative" (ibid). There is an 
inherent danger within any emphasis on the way that the body comes to signify 
something that sees to the neutering of our sexed corporeality. Pivoting too far in 
this direction however maintains the binarized categories of either male/female or 
ess entialist/ constructionist. And yet the breast is an important body space 
symbolising a whole host of topics: maternity, reproduction, abortion, etc. There is 
a need to balance biological and anatomical accounts of the body with their vital 
socio-cultural configurations and transformations. As Grosz has argued, "the body 
is the unspecified raw material of social inscription that produces subjects as subjects 
of aparticular kind' (Grosz, 1995: 32). This question of a particular kind arises out of a 
problematization of the assumptions that Write the body as neutral raw matter 
ignoring the fact that the body is consistently caught within citation which itself is 
not neutral and only announces itself Within specific citation- Situating activities. As, 
for example, the social cultural backdoth composing the codes of, for instance and 
for our purposes here, the Renaissance and Restoration stage. 
6 The object of the bed in theatre is a focal point of scenes of sleep, of sex, and of death. But also there is a 
focus so obvious that it resists interpretation as we question what the scene is about: the bed draws attention to 
undressing or being undressed, a process where gender is made visible and is thus crucially staged. The bed 
therefore unsettles the easy spectatorship of the body, a deliberate stagecraft presenting the crucible of 
representation. 
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Are we the points that organize the manifold into a field that we understand? 
And what are the positions of men and women in relation to the production of 
knowledge? Within the fold of this question the strategy of the screen becomes 
apparent. The screen, otherwise known as the corporeal schema or body image, is 
the mediating term that enables us to unite a consciousness that is not spatially 
located to external objects that are located in space. This is not merely 
psychological, for it suggests that "the body 'knows' what its muscular and skeletal 
actions and posture are in any movement or action, quite independent of any 
knowledge of physiology or how the body functions" (Grosz, 1994a: 91). But the 
question of 'How we become aware of our body as distinguished from others, and 
in other words, locate our experiences? ' remains. 
To recognise his (a child) image in a mirror is for him to learn 
that there can be a viel, ýPoint taken on him ... By means of the image 
... he becomes capable of being a spectator of himself. Through 
the acqwsition of the specular image, the child notices that he is 
visible, for himself and for others (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 136). 
Significantly, Grosz argues, Merleau-Ponty sites perception in the no-man's-land 
between mind and body, empiricism and idealism, pure physiology and pure 
psychology, noting that it precedes and exceeds either binary opposite. Thus, once 
again there is a sense of imbrication for in being uncontainable in either sphere 
(pure physiology or pure psychology etc) mutual implication is given to both terms. 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is consciousness incarnated such that the mind is 
embodied and based on corporeal and sensory relations, and the subject is a 'being- 
to-the-world' that is neither pure exteriority nor pure interiority (1962: 3). The body 
is not therefore merely the work of a pure, knowing subjeCt7. Yet there is the 
implicit supposition of a separate bodily sphere and a conceptual one. The 
phenomenon of the phantom limb is a prime illustration as it demonstrates that the 
body is an active entity that gives form and sense to its own component parts and 
to its relations to the world. In Merleau-Ponty's ownrather Heideggerian terms, the 
body "applies itself to space like a hand to an instrument" (1962: 5; see in relation 
to Heidegger, Dreyfus, 1991). Space here is not a flat, neutral Euclidean realm, 
7 Movement is "not limited to submitting passively to space and time, it actively assumes them" (Merleau- 
Ponty, 1962: 102). 
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because the body's application to the world is half of its realization (the other half 
being the world itself, the material objects). The point (sub j ect) organisng the 
manifold (a topological space/surface that is -related 
in some way to Euclidean 
space) into the field. We manifold something so as to see it again, so to have 
multiple forms, multiple folds of the same: flat, neutral space. The mathematics of 
possibility may allow space to have many functions, but these are co-ordinated 
around the same origin, us. 
2.4 Counter-signifying semiotic - strategic transformations 
The glance up from the screen has replaced the inquisitive look 
of the past. The screen reveals one's past, one's data, a page 
from one's life, not the human face. On the screen is your 
infon-nation, Nýour credit history (surpassing your judicial history 
in importance), without which you don't quite exist as a 
trustworthy citizen (Silva, 1997: 90). 
The body in late capitalism is constantly territorialized by the abstract flow of 
numbers, money and the market. Is this a citizenry we desire - the desires of the 
economic, global majority foisted upon us all? The body here, for it is the body on 
which such numbers are pinned, is represented by, or indeed reduced to, a sign that 
marks a mobile and plural distribution that conquers and integrates the body 
forming a mixed, distributed serruotic (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 118). This 
semlotic prohibits any embrace towards the doubt and ambiguity of the body - not 
many of us possess certainty but we are warranted by society to pretend that we do. 
Reduced to a sign like a number, the body is figured within this 'normality' of 
certainty that is supported and promoted because it works Within the construct of 
capitalism. What role models are we allowed to have? And what does the body 
become because of this? In other words, the body is prized as an extension of work 
for production. For example, many commentators have described the gymnasium 
as society's newest place of worship. These new Meccas exemplify the social 
mentality of our more 'civilised' dwelling spaces, which, in the planned exhibition 
of cleanliness and order, police and exercise our corporeal state and many corporeal 
acts. Body spaces are to be pristine, both in the political as well as in the aesthetic 
sense. So, in appealing to our commodified sense of self, images of the body (via 
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magazines, billboards, TV and film) show the corporeal state physically honed for 
efficiency and preened for apparent purity and success. 
In this sanitised state the individual as a body is reduced to membership in a 
mass; in terms that Adorno uses, one re-emerges through a technological 
reconfigurement in a process of subjection that strives towards "the indifference of 
each individual life that is the direction of history" (1973: 362)'. Weber has 
remarked that "the more perfectly the bureaucracy is 'dehumanized', the more 
completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all 
purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation" (1948: 
216). Keith Tester unites these opinions under the umbrella of Benjamin's sense of 
the loss of aura exhibited in the technological approach of the C20th, the apogeal 
point being the First World War (1998). The central tenet of Tester's argument is 
that the problem of the body has "emerged out of the wreckage of the aura of the 
individual" (1998: 17). Beginning with Benjamin's commentary upon the 
technology of photography, the images rendered of the body are transformed 
alongside the transformation of the technology that captures them. In this way the 
individual, specifically centred on its body, is configured within the social and 
cultural processes of the time. In particular, the progress of photographic 
technology after 1880, strips the body of its aura - that which is about the unique 
and the durable and "the differences between things and the clothing of that 
difference in an almost magical quality" (Tester, 1998: 19). The advent of this 
technological change characterises the individual's relationship With his or her body 
through the sense of the sameness of things at the expense of the singular and 
unique (see Benjamin, 1992: 214). From Benjamin's analysis of the photograph of 
Kafka, Tester sums up this state of affairs: 
Kafka was forced, thanks to stage props, genre conventions and the 
requirements of the technology to look exactly like every other boy 
who has his photograph taken at this time. (1998: 20) 
One can read in for photography the late c20th technologies of surveillance - 
CCTV, individual credit data information, National Insurance number 
identification, loyalty cards, etc And indeed the sartorial rermt policing bodily 
8 The technologies of mechanization increasingly seem to predetermine the rcpresentative character of our 
bodies compounding their status as indifferent individuals. 
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expression in the workplace. The body is transformed into a sign that operates 
i mechanisms attuned to economic within the cogs of the cultural and soc*al 
globalisation. There is a danger here of eliding the material practices that underwrite 
the surface appearance of people at work. So, wh-ilst the destruction of aura - 
which I have suggested is exhibited in the counter- signifying reduction of the body 
to a sign - expresses the transformation of tradition and the patterns of living, one 
can witness intimations of new freedoms "announced in the distorted, comical and 
even terrifying patterns of modern experience" (Caygill, 1998: 32). In summation, 
the transformation of experience is always in train, and the counter- signifying 
processes at work on the body are a forceful exhibition of the direction in which we 
are heading. Crucially, however, tl-iis counter-signifying sen-notic is not the body. 
2.5 Primitive, pre-signifying semiotic 
So 9"Ven am I to thinking With my blood9 
I have that within which passes show"' 
How is it that our bodies cause us embarrassment? Why is it that there are fines 
drawn that separate our visceral, humoral, sensate, fluld experience from the spaces 
we inhabit? Does society operate only because discursive structures, for want of a 
better description, cordon off much of the living, messy, aqueous matter that 
exhibits our body? For example, this permeates acaden-Uia, where writers like Mary 
Douglas (1984) write an ethnographic distinction heralding a social and a physical 
body. We are embarrassed then because specific historical and social forms frame 
the place of, and places for, the material fluidity and visceral physicality of the body. 
This is a Cartesian writing, one that seeks the reduction of the physical from the 
social, one that turns the physical, messy body into a primitive semlotic that 
civilized society alms to control. It is the Cartesian split, the emergence of 
modernity", that distinguishes the body as primitive; thus one can see the 
, g, 
1995: 128). 9 Beckett (TextsforNotbin 
10 Hamkt Act 1, Scene ii, 85; "Hamkt is full of some stuff that the writer could not drag to fight, contemplate, or 
manipulate into art" (T. S. Eliot, 1975: 48). The fluid, visceral affections and sensations of our material bodies, 
that which cannot be dragged into fight or manipulated into art, is so because it is art already, because through 
it the fold removes such division. 
11 Foucault: The Order of Things (1973) ('Man and his Doubles') and Histog of Sexuaký, (1984) (cg the hysteria of 
women equated with the humoral body and the need to master it). 
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anatomical theatres of the c16th splitting the fold of thought and substance by 
clinically opening up the humoral physiology of our corporeal innards into a visible, 
'knowable' spectacle. Felt speculation is gone and the ambiguous humoral emotions 
are found out; a trend that reaches its apogean manifestation in the psychological 
discourse of shame publicised by Freud. The body is now primitive and the social 
civilized. This primitive body is overcoded, the substance of its expression, multiple 
and polyvocal, facing off the territorialities of the State apparatus. 
However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can 
be more incomplete than his image of the totality of drives which 
constitute his being. He can scarcely name even the cruder ones: 
their number and strength, their ebb and flood, their play and 
counterplay among one another, and above all the laws of their 
nutrient remain wholly unknown to him. (Nietzsche, 1982: § 119) 
However, as Douglas herself suggested "there is no reason to assume a primacy 
for the individual's attitude to his own bodily and emotional experience" (1984: 
121). Yet in performative terms the place accorded to the fluid, primary body 
allows a certain set of hermeneutic observations and scenes. Thus, in The Vinter's 
Tale (Shakespeare, 1999), Autrolycus ambiguously perforrming a status below and 
above Perdita's adopted farruly of shepherds, excuses himself from their company 
by pretending Urinary need: 
I Will but look upon the hedge and follow you. (ibid) 
As Paster comments (from which this example has been taken) "the phrase 
works as a perlocutionary demonstration of rank, enacting more verbal refinement 
from Autrolycus and arguably more of a desire for bodily privacy than would have 
been expected in an itinerant peddler - or ... from a fellow rustic" (1993: 27). 
In vernacular sixteenth and early s eventeenth- century speech 
and writing, the whole interior of the body - heart, liver, womb, 
bowels, kidneys, gall, blood, lymph - quite often involves itself 
in the production of the mental interior, of the individual's 
private experience (Maus, 1995: 195). 
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The body is "at once the subject and the object of pleasure", the uncontrollable 
agent of pain and the revolt against reason - and the vehicle of mortality" (Brooks, 
1993: 1). The body revolts against reason, against a singular conception of what it 
entails. Nevertheless, the body functions as an attractive nodal point on which to 
start and hang discussion concerning the theorization of performance, as art or in 
13 
social terms . And this points to two problems. First, in bringing with it a whole 
host of questions that unsettles determinate argument, the body destabilizes neat 
conclusions and appropriate language are continually undermined. Determined 
statements are only so because there are attempts at coagulating the potentially 
volatile and unstable differences that flow and quiver throughout and beyond what 
feels like our embodiment - again it is an exhibition of that apprehensive hope of 
capturing cleanly the body, or any matter, Within language. Second, we experience 
the body as being inalienably our own, and what goes on in and through our body 
is something that to us 'goes Without saying'. This is then manifested in our daily, 
habitual and involuntary routines, all which goes to persuade us that the body "falls 
beneath the threshold of significance into the domain of the merely natural" 
(Paster, 1993: 5; see also Paster, 1997 and Hillman and Mazzio, 1997). The idea of 
this primitive state is not a temporal or psychological harking back to some 
essential, pure amniotic origin but rather a statement that acknowledges the 
unfounded urge for truth that is representation; that there is something to know, 
that there is a naturaltruth to be discovered. 
Whilst this primitive conception of the body is the being open to C'the coils of 
the intestines, the quick current of the blood stream, and the involved tremors of 
the fibers" (Nietzsche, 1954: 44), all of which are denied by the proud remove of 
the si nifying stratifications of discourse, the interaction between bodily self- 19 
experience and its discursive realization "takes place in and through culture or its 
more politically conceptualized cognate, ideology" (Paster, 1993: 4). This leaves us 
with the pressing question of 'when does the discursive framework influence our 
awareness of bodily experience? ' You can imagine a spectrum stretching from the 
immediate encounter like a contact improvisation of two bodies reading off each 
12 This points up the interesting performativc importance of the body as a spectacle that has to be spectated 
equally by a body -a fold. 
13 "The actor's body constitutes his instrument, his medium, his chief means of creative expression - that is a 
commonplace on which performers and spectators alike have readily agreed" (Roach, 1985: 11). 
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other through movement and sensorary connection, to a level where the body is 
made by the "trans substantiation achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit 
pedagogy, capable of instilling a whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political 
philosophy through injunctions as insignificant as 'stand up straight' or 'don't hold 
your knife in your left hand... (Bourdieu, 1977: 94). Instead of looking for the 
acculturated, referential aspect of our materiality, one might propose a refigured 
ontology that speaks of the flows, surfaces, intensities, colours and rhythms of the 
body at the moment it comes about and unfolds. This is to suggest that what is 
inside is neither more or less revealing than what fies at the surface. This is to 
accept that whilst the capacities and conduits of our internal body is anatomically 
measurable the capacity of our body to love, to pity, to take in the other is 
incalculable and vital. As Scarry writes the "interior of the body carries the force of 
confirmation" (1985: 215): instinct, feeling, mood, tendency, aura, rhythm, Vitality 
all communicate our lives to ourselves. This body-grammar of our viscerality is the 
communication of our senses, through it the body takes place (in both senses) and 
we become able to affect and be affected. In the immediate moment, in terms of 
the place of the body in an event, this quality heralds signification; it is not because 
of signification. Thus the final section looks at post-sign1fying regimes. 
2.6 Post-signifying regimes: "we must consider very diverse 
domains simultaneously"; or the sign of Jonah 
One sense and another in a common flesh. (Grosz, 1994a: 95) 
Between The Pbenomenologv of Perception (1962) and The Visible and the Invisible (1968) 
Merleau-Ponty is noted for a shift in focus away from the corporeal schema 
towards the more earthy concept of the flesh - "thinkable by itself', Without 
name in philosophy, something existing as an "exemplar sensible" (1964). In this, 
Merleau-Ponty presents "the condition of both seeing and being seen', of 
touching and being touched, and of their intermingling and possible integration, a 
commonness in which both subject and object participate, a single thing folded 
back on itself' (Grosz, 1994a: 95). 1 want to examine the implications of this fold, 
linking the fold of subject and object with the notion of being able to see 
something because it is culturally framed, folded along with the experiential 
materiality of seeing and thus being present to be seen. The drive of this fold 
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courses through every moment (my writing, your reading), and this energy etches 
out the diagrammatic transformation, that in confluence, presents to us society 
and society to us. The weft of this fold speaks of the first problem of Deleuze's 
philosophy that I want to signpost in the way it leads us into a certain conceptual 
method for doing research and thinking academically. 
Problem 1: The abstract machine and diagrammatic transformations 
So, on one side we have the machinic assemblage, flow and 
intensity of bodies (physical systems), and on the other, the 
formalization of expression (semiotic systems) - in other words, 
a content and a form, the sensing and the making sense, the 
experiential and the referential. The contents are not the 
signifieds dependent on the signifier; they are not the objects of 
the subject that enunciates. These two sides exist in reciprocal 
presupposition - the seen and the seeing. The conceptual 
architecture of this reciprocal assemblage is caught in the 
concept of what Deleuze and Guattari have termed the abstract 
machine. In effect, the abstract machine draws a single plane of 
consistency between planes of expression and planes of content. 
It is not physical any more than it is serniotic, it is diagrammatic, 
and "it operates by matter, not by substance; by function, not by 
form ... 
functions are not yet 'serruotically' formed, and matters 
are not yet 'physically' formed" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 141). 
In other words, a function has only traits of contents and 
expression between which it establishes a connection - the 
connection is all and it is what happens that matters14-The 
diagram is therefore: 
no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography 
that is coextensive with the whole social field. It is an abstract 
machine. It is defined by its informal functions and matter and 
in terms of form makes no distinction between content and 
expression, a discursive formation and a non-discursive 
14 A matter-content having only degrees of intensity, resistance, conductivity, heating, stretching, speed, or 
tardiness; and a function-expression having only 'tensors', as in a system of mathematical, or musical, writing. 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 141) 
43 
, gnifia 
Tracigs offle., -h ftriated. - arcbe4crilure, siT nce & visceraliýl 
formation. It is a machine that is almost blind and mute, cvcn 
though it makes others see and speak. (Delcuze, 1986: 34) 
To give an example, think of a potential diagram of the 
transformations occurring within primitive societies: there would 
be a network of alliances (forces - gifts and counter-gifts) 
defining a practice, proceeding or strategy that come together to 
form a system that would clearly be in perpetual disequilibrium. 
2.6.1 Antinomies surrounding bodies 
Yet in the act of writing this out in a meaningful way, we are still trying to square 
the circle. Our apprehensions of the quixotic, unstable tracings of the material body 
are always shadowed by antinornies. If the material fluidity of the body is folded 
through our socio-cultural discourse and practices, from whence comes the affect 
of the immediate moment? Either power lies in signs and their relations, or it lies in 
force such that signs can never on their own create power, create affect. If the 
former were not so power as force could not be controlled, orientated, or 
determined as tl-iis would imply subordination to a sign system. Power would 
operate at a whim to circumstance. If power lies in signs alone there would have to 
be some capacity in the sign capable of quashing force - yet surely only a force can 
oppose another one. Force is not a gross fact, raw energy Without direction; neither 
does a sign have the capacity to signify by itself. Rather than suggest a synthesis 
here one path is to argue that "there are forces that make the sign mean something 
for someone" (Gil, 1998: 9) - force can only exercise its 'force' if it is translated as 
it does so. This translation need not be through the serniotic sign system, rather it 
might be someone tacitly following the lead of another, or, of someone picking up 
the rhythm and flow of movements in a dance, etc. There are apparatuses and 
assemblages that encode forces in particular ways; in a sense these too are operators 
within the particular moment. Thus, "while energy is related to the pure positivity 
of a flux, force implies fault lines produced in this flux and in particular points at 
which energy is coded by some agent" (Gil, 1998: 10). The body is the perfect 
recording surface for these fault lines: half causing them and half feeling their cause. 
Making something of this syntactical position of the body as that piece of grammar 
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which makes connections leads us into the question and the method of asking 
'What can a body do? 'This is the second Deleuzian problematic I want to turn to. 
Problem 2: What a body can do 
I have already mentioned the fact that we do not have a cultural- 
theoretical language attuned to the affections and sensations of 
the fleshy body, With this in mind I want to turn to the potential 
of the language presented by Deleuze and Guattari in their 
comprehension of the body15. ý starting point in unpacking the 
esoteric pronouncements presented by these two thinkers is this 
Spinoza influenced quote: 
We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, 
in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot 
enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of 
another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by 
it, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to Join with 
it in composing a more powerful body. (Delcuze & Guattari, 
1988: 257) 
Buchanan has rightly argued that this way of understanding the 
body attempts to think an ethology (action and affect) rather 
than aetiology (cause and effect) (1997a: 74). This ethological 
accounting configures the body as aposten'on* affect of an 
encounter that it has the capacity to carry out. The body here is 
not presumed to be a knowable object but is understood as a 
part of a subjectivity that emerges out of the practice within an 
event. A result of such thinking is to be built off the premise set 
out by Deleuze in the following words from his revised second 
book on Spinoza: 
We speak of consciousness and its decrees, of the Will and its 
effects, of the thousand ways of moving the body, of 
dominating the body and passions - but we do not eten know wbat 
a body can do. (1988: 18-19) 
15 One of the most controversial conceptions they present is that of the 'body-without-organs' (BwO). I do not 
wish to debate the significance of this concept in this thesis, for, as Buchanan has shown, the BwO "cannot be the 
basis of Delcuze and Guattari's understanding of the body, because it is in fact a consequence of it" (1 997a: 73). 
45 
Tra67'nTs ojflesh sitialed. - arrhe4ailure, siT*nýiance & viscerakýy 
The body M this light is the new model for philosophy, the new 
centre for understanding human geography, and this philosophy 
needs a new language and a new method for understanding the 
practical awareness that it instils. I don't want it to be 
misunderstood that the new here is a better way of writing the 
body, the assumption there being that I know what previous 
conceptions and written accounts of the body have been trying 
to say, and that the alternatives that are to be proposed complete 
the task. So, in effect I want to distance the following discussion 
from teleological assumptions concerning knowledge 
production, the suggestion that any new claim places us further 
along the path towards an unproblematised notion of truth. Not 
just by dint of writing this within academic discourse these 
claims are necessarily tin-uted because they are necessarily 
implicated in and written out of the language constructing 
previous conversation concerning the body. 
2.7 Conclusions: What meaning in her breast? 
In the last book published during his lifetime, Italo Calvino created the character of 
Mr Palomar (named after a famous European observatory, or a pun on palo (stake) 
and mar (sea) to indicate a solid stake contacting a fluid, ample, infinite continuity). 
In several, highly ordered meditations, Mr Palomar presents a man "whose thinking 
seeks order, meaning, purity, and control in a universe that is random, contingent, 
complex, and - in the repeated word of the book - labile" (Carter, 1992: 139). In 
the arche-icriture of one such meditation: 
Mr Palomar is walking along a lonely beach. He encounters few 
bathers. One young woman is lying on the sand taking the sun, 
her bosom bared. Palomar, discreet by nature, looks away at the 
horizon of the sea. He knows that in such circumstances, at the 
approach of a strange man, women often cover themselves 
hastily, and this does not seem right to him: because it is a 
nuisance for the woman peacefully sun-bathing, and because the 
passing man feels he is an intruder, and because the taboo 
against nudity is implicitly confirmed ... 
but 
... in acting 
like 
this, I display a refusal to see; or, in other words, I am finally 
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reinforcing the convention that declares illicit any sight of the 
breast (Calvino, 1985: 9). 
Mr Palomar walks back passed the female bather, this time trying not to 
consciously not look at her breasts. Ironically, this conscious denial of the breasts 
presupposes an undue concern with them, thus, in this second encounter he 
optically peniates the entire scene, including the woman, with "neutral objectivity". 
This done, he further contemplates what has just gone before and becomes 
aggrieved at the thought that this last encounter has reduced this female to the level 
of things, to a mere pair of breasts. Thus he endeavours to pass the bather once 
more, this time offering a noticeable and appreciative glance at the bosoms, 
according them their due, relative special value. The intention behind this latest, 
most perfected (male) performance of an encounter With a female bather's bare 
bosoms, is to relieve the breasts from the semi-darkness of centuries of 
"sexiomartiac puritanism" and to instead enact, in a open-Minded manner, a display 
of gratitude for the "cosmos that rotates around those haloed cusps" (ibid). 
However: 
The moment he approaches again, she suddenly springs up, 
covers herself with an impatient huff, and goes off, shrugging in 
irritation, as if she were avoiding the tiresome insistence of a 
satyr. (Calvino, 1985: 10) 
There is a duration to this process of signification: the bare bosom is not always 
rendered in a specific essential manner, it possess simultaneously a latent Virtuality 
of all possible presentations. But at a given moment, due to a certain assemblage of 
players one serruotic regime holds relative dominance. This is the point I have 
wanted to make. 
Several points coexist in a given individual or group, which are 
always engaged in several distinct and not always compatible 
linear proceedings. The various forms of education or 
cnormalization' imposed upon an individual consist in making 
him or change points of subjectification, always moving 
toward a higher, nobler one in closer conformity With the 
supposed ideal. Then from the point of subjectification issues 
a subject of enunciation, as a function of a mental reality 
47 
U rUNIVERSIOTY NIVERSITY 
,L OF BRISTOL 
II 
2M 
M Aýrmý%k Ppv 
Traciqs ojj7efb fftiated. - arcbe4crilure, fýgnýiance & vifceraljýy 
determined by that point. Then from the subject of 
enunciation Issues a subject of the statement, in other words, a 
subject bound to statements in conformity with a dominant 
reality (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 129). 
Can the breast be posited as prior to the social constructions placed on it - 
prejoratively male constructions; or, is identity determined by the biological sexing 
of the body rendered (optically) explicit by the presence of breasts? Taking the 
latter point of essential sex identity the breast renders the body as the single 
category 'female', thus trumping all other forms of identification. There is in this 
story of Mr. Palomar's beach walk, a layering of signification and figurative 
representation. In order to reach a certain state of awareness the world is rendered 
through a flow of interpretation, which at the same time is altered according to a 
set of circumstances alien to its flow (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 139). So, whilst the 
"body appears to have an essential truth which will overcome all disguise" 
(StaUybrass, 1992: 82), the signification of the sign of the breast is usurped by the 
meaning accorded to it by socially constructed discourse. In all of this there is a 
danger of hoping to locate the 'truth' in our bodies: a failing that blinds us to fact 
that the moment of embodiment is a moment of limitation where we encounter the 
interpretations always-atready applied to our bodies through the dangerous 
significations of prejudice and desire. 
Perhaps, what is required is a humble sense of pragmatics: a belief that there is 
no CCinvariant immune from transformation" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 139). 
None of these semlotics or regimes suggested can be identical to the condition of 
their possibility. You don't represent the body, the body can not be represented: 
rather you might try to shore up, for a moment, the circulation and flow of energy, 
sorrow or rage, that has been experienced, in to order to intimate a field of 
sensibility that is a part of our being fleshy, sensual, liquid matter. As a post- 
signifying regime this opposes a sen-iiotic of signifiance and enacts instead the 
process of subjectification (Deleuze & Guattarl, 1988: 119) and that of a 
diagrammatic transformation. You cannot identify one regime of signs, that of an 
imperial signification, for "there is such a rruxture within the same period or same 
people that we can say no more than that a given people, language, or period 
assures the relative dominance of a certain regime" (ibid, 119). New 
lines of flight 
are now given a positive sign, no 
longer to be chased by a negative blockage of 
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(scape-goatism'. Thus, at a ýýiven moment a people (an event) effects a certain 
assemblage thnt n,, -11 es the relative dominance of a certain regime. Tomorrow it 
will probably be different; if I did the painting again it won't possess the same hue, 
the relative dominance of pigmentation and sensation is different; or what if Mr 
Palomar's second stroll passed the naked bather is different from the first? 
There is no longer a centre of signifiance connected to 
expanding circles or an expanding spiral, but a point of 
subjectification constituting the point of departure of the line. 
There is no longer a signifier- signified relation, but a subject of 
enunciation issuing from the point of subjectification and a 
subject of the statement in a determinable relation to the first 
subject. There is no longer a sign-to-sign circularity, but a linear 
proceeding into which the sign is swept via subjects (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988: 127). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Choreography of affect and movement - the territories of 
Body-Mind Centring 
This music rings out, thunders, vibrates Without speaking, 
makes noises or declaims without us being able to make out 
what it is that it is seeming to want to say: is it passion, 
ecstasy, pain, thunder ... ? Light, mobile, fluctuating, it 
dances the entire range of the possible. Using notes that 
never have a fixed meaning, the music expresses universals 
that come before words with meaning. (Serres, 1995a) 
How are the different members of the body to be agitated? 
(Garrick, 1744); quoted in (Roach, 1985: 10) 
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3.1 Introduction: spacing through movement 
By journeying both deep inside to our own experience and out 
through our own perceptions to the world we live in, we can 
begin to see who we may truly be, beyond conditioned self- 
images and habitual patterns of thinking, moving, and living. 
(Hartley, 1995: xlx) 
We need to work on new ways of apprehending the bodily experience that is our 
everyday fife, and to do this with a sense that this reveals the body, emphasizing 
that this forcefully shapes the knowledges that we create and five by. I want to 
distinguish tl-iis apprehension of bodily experience from accounts made by 
academics who use the term embodiment. This means aiming at apprehending that 
which is beneath signification, that which subtends the word and that which 
performatively strikes across and comes before meaning (the referential making 
sense of that which you have just done). Whereas, embodiment is about the fact 
that when we encounter another body through our body we always-already see it, 
name it, and anticipate its expressionsl: 
The body's articulation to the world is only possible under two 
conditions: it has to be oriented, if we understand the world 
divided up into categories, domains, spaces; and it must allow 
for the circulation of the body's energy into the world via 
specific apparatuses, which owe their own existence to different 
social spaces: this applies to the bow, to the spinning wheel, and 
to shamanistic procedures for communicating with the animal 
world. (Gil, 1998: 152) 
In this I am primarily concerned with a way of looking beyond embodiment 
towards an appreciation of the subjective experience of the body's movement, 
rhythm and energy. I want to move our thoughts of space towards a sensibility that 
attends to the 'kinesthetic, aural, somatic and spatial sensations' (Albright, 1997) of 
1 For example: "The body is always-already engaged in a specific social situation by means of techniques or rule 
governed practices which are historically and geographically contingent. In addition, ... the 
body's relations with 
itself and with other bodies are always mediated by such practices" (Crossley, 1996: 45). 
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the immediate, lived experience or eventhood we are witnessing, walking, speaking, 
living etc. 
Explicitly, this chapter is about mobilizing research carried out on the somatic 
practice of Body-Mind Centering (BMC), suggesting that its practice offers 
practitioners a new language, vocabulary or cartography With which to understand 
their bodied lives. In relation to the performing arts it offers a conveyance through 
movement of the most intangible emotional experience expressed in physical 
energy and rhythm as an unconscious communitas. And, as a somatic health 
practice it also works towards a therapeutic awareness of the emotional scars and 
blockages that are held within the bodies experiential tracings (from a cranial sacral 
understanding to the simple, but powerful injunction, 'don't touch me there). This 
alternative cartography of expression (ultimately understanding) facilitates a more 
precise awareness of our immediate, fluid and excessive somatic sensibilities 
enabling us to approach all our experiences With our physical as wen as our visual, 
aesthetic, and intellectual faculties. 
The body in tl-iis light is the new model for philosophy, the new centre for 
understanding human geography, and this philosophy needs a new language and a 
new method for understanding the practical awareness that it instils. There is a 
whole history of practices that present themselves for such experiential 
interpretation towards a new methodology, and what's more, all such practices are 
written out of the numerous spaces where people come together to immerse in 
such pastimes as yoga 2, dancing, shiatsu, naturopathy, acupuncture and BMC etc. 
These practices build off a growing emphasis pertaining to notions of 'self-care' 
and the need to focus upon the whole person - body, Mind, emotions, physicality 
and their environment. As such they become easily dubbed as one of the many 
activities making up New Age cultures, holistic and somatic healthcare, including 
that of Chinese medicine. Firstly, I want to focus upon the art of BMC. 
"The most elementary processes Within the living cell" are also a 
"writing" and one whose "system" is never closed. (Kirby, 1998: 
61; paraphrasing Derrida, 1984: 9) 
2 Where people occupy themselves in Asana (a series of exercises focusing upon physical posture) and Pran, ýVama 
(exercises stabilizing the rhythm of breathing). 
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Deleuze makes an initial track into his understanding of the body via Spinoza's 
thesis of parallelism which rejects immediately the body-rfýind split of the Cartesian 
subject. This significant moment within Spinoza's writing denies the dominance of 
either mind or body over the other, advocating instead that "an action in the mind 
is necessarily an action in the body" (Deleuze, 1988a: 18). In relation to the 
historical concerns of Descarte's mind-body subjecthood and Spinoza's 
philosophical conversation with him in Etbics, the principle of Morality founded 
upon the endeavour of controlling the body's passions by the mind's consciousness 
collapses. Increasingly, many writers place their discussions away from the 
problematic Cartesian subject but fail in their fashionable fervour to extend the 
implications of doing so into the impact that this might have on everyday instances 
of action. Sublimated within many discourses by which we operate day to day is the 
structural glue premised upon this moral rfUnd-body split. Instead of this prevalent 
mind-body dualism there does seem to be an argumentative divide between notions 
of what a body can do, morality implicated, and the workings of the body's 
different fluid and energy flows as they are differentially channelled throughout the 
distinct anatomical compartments and linkages. This latter corporeal realm speaks 
of the affective agency that is Within the body, and is indeed the body itself; and 
this space and its relation to our understandings of the mind, is that which is at the 
heart of BMC. 
BMC is a form of dance activity that explores the interrelationship of Mind and 
body in movement as it embraces the interplay between thought, feeling, sensation 
and emotion. As a recogn1zable practice it has its origins in the person of Bonnie 
Bainbridge Cohen. In the years between 1962 and 1972 she worked out from her 
profession as a dance teacher and occupational therapist in a quest to understand 
further, or through a different perspective, the haptic practices that facilitated the 
recoveries of her patients (see Cohen, 1993). This found her immersed in 
investigations of neurodevelopment therapy, neuromuscular reduction, the 
Japanese art of Katsugen Undo, Laban Movement analysis techniques, Bartenieff 
Fundamentals and dance therapy practices; whilst at the same time she engaged in 
yoga, meditation, vocal work, martial arts and cramosacral therapy (see Hartley, 
1995). One of her pupils, Linda Hartley, makes particular notice of the general 
demeanour of Cohen, especially with regards to her sensitivity and "unusual ability 
to perceive in depth the total pattern of a person's movement and postural 
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expression as well as the flow or obstructedness (sic) of the mind which the pattern 
reflects" (Hartley, 1995: xxv). 
For the purpose of explicating into the space of academic discourse my 
experience of practising BMC, two framing points need to be made. First, the 
ability to engage effectively With the processes involved depended on being able to 
stay present in the 'not-knowing' of the beginners Mind. You had to be open 
minded and courageous enough to trust the environment, and the new feelings that 
you become aware of Within your own body. Second, as Hartley notes in her book 
Wlisdom of the Body Mom*ýT, the principles and methods formulated by Cohen were 
deN-eloped as a language through which one could communicate and teach the 
somatic experiences uncovered. As such the techniques that are practised guide 
rather than instruct, and are attuned to the potentially unique expression of the 
individual body. 
What we experience and observe is a particular quality of 
awareness, feeling, perception and attention when we embody a 
movement pattern or body system; this is the 'mind' of that 
pattern or system, and is an expression of the integrated body- 
mind. (Hartley, 1995: xxvi) 
One of the first dilemmas to face me was the incongruity between my desire to 
investigate the active subjecthood of the body in opposition to the predominant 
mind-body split of the Cartesian subject. In the equation of the body-rrund 
experience that is at the centre of BMC it is noticeable that it is the body that is 
announced first. This comes out of the fact that BMC speaks of the 'Mind' as a 
body system. For trained practitioners it is an awareness synthesized out of the 
processes of the intellect, imagination, feeling, intuition, sensation and emotion, all 
of which n-dx to affect our body-mind experience. Under this notion of the body- 
nund our sense of whole being is understood as a set of complex interactions 
mutually intertwined. 
The chapter is divided into th-ree sections. The first is about situating this type of 
research in relation to an alternative methodological stance, one that is neither 
proscriptive nor descriptive but is instead ethological. This ethological 
methodology, to reiterate the introduction, is not about instancing empirically the 
way things are in terms of seeking validation for theory, nor is this about the raw 
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instance of empiricism 'effecting' an anything-goes contingent theoretical stance. 
Rather it is about understanding a way in which both empiricism and theory can be 
explicitly realized in the very enactment of the practice the research is 
encountering. In this fight, the second section is about taking up my research 
experience into the practice of BMC and translating it into a potential cartography 
through which to intimate the spatiality of the body-in-itself. (The research 
involved three intensive weekend training courses into one of the systems of the 
body distinguished by BNIC, that of the organs [the others being the skeletal, the 
muscular, the endocrine, the nervous and the fluid systems], and one weekend 
session detailing the foundational vocabulary for all work involving BMC, that 
which BNIC practitioners call the three planes of movement. In total this involved 
sixty-four contact hours. ) 
In conclusion, a third section makes an argument for validating the alternative 
concerns of this ethological methodology in terms of the fact that people are 
practising BNIC and using it to make sense of their lives. Placing such an argument 
within acadernia is to operate the syntactical space, or spacing process, as a 
transposable resource -a way of looking - that can begin to invest in an alternative 
logic for understanding the way in which the world, and our encounters With it, are 
literally 'going on' through our bodies before signification. 
SECTION ONE 
3.2 Thought spoken out of substance: 'What can a body do? ' 
lanefic proposition tells us that a body is defined by relations of 
motion and rest, of slowness and speed between particles. That 
is, it is not defined by a form or by functions .... The important 
thing is to understand life, each living individuality, not as a 
form, or a development of form, but as a complex relation 
between differential velocities, between deceleration and 
acceleration of particles. A composition of speeds and slowness 
on a plane of immanence. In the same way, a musical form will 
depend on a complex relation between speeds and slowness of 
sound particles. It is not just a matter of music but of how to 
live: it is by speed and slowness that one slips in among things, 
that one connects with something else. One never commences; 
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one never has a tabula rafa; one slips in, enters in the rmddle; one 
takes up or lays down rhythms. (Deleuze, 1989: 123) 
One never commences, one takes up or lays down rhythms: this is the subject of 
this chapter. Moving aside from the issue that the subject disappears as one 
understands that the agent of commencement is not within you, what can social 
scientists say about the connections and interferences by which we encounter and 
meet what we are about to become? This vexed question haunts our discourse; we 
are caught in the middling that is a becoming. So how might it be possible to 
intimate, and write with feeling, those forces that make us speak only of the 
rhythmic gerund of the verb - middling, talking, writing, dancing, moving, jumping 
etc. This becon-ung-space is an intensive place that figures the body in its 
connections; in its taking up and laying down of rhythms. In confronting this in 
thought I want to plug into two planes. The first is by far the primary focus of the 
chapter, and that is the plane that is the body itself - blood, organic cell, substance, 
fluids, flesh, organ structure, smell etc. This presents the research that I have done 
on the somatic and performative art of BMC, and this is laid out in detail and in 
advance of the latter culmination of the thesis in preparation of an ability to be 
attentive to all our performances in terms of the affective economy that writes 
them (Melrose, 1993). The other plane of thought takes up the question posed at 
the end of the last chapter - 'What does a body doý' - and uses it as the starting 
point for a new ethological methodology. This is the terrain of Deleuze-Spinoza 
(see Buchanan 1997a, 1997b; Doel 1999), an ethologically mapping of traces where 
action and affect takes precedence over an aetiology of cause and effect - where we 
speak of an effect and a zone of affect (see Taussig, 1992). Through this etholo ical 91 
stance I want to argue for the acceptance of the insights that the affective 
intensities uncovered in the work of BMC. 
Problem 3: Ethological mappings 
A couple of contextual observations should be made when 
utilizing Deleuze's specific reading of Spinoza, one in regard to 
its place in Deleuze's own philosophical oeuvre, the other to the 
qualities that this encounter, Deleuze-Spinoza, brings to thought 
in general, to thought as thought. Deleuze's two published 
works on Spinoza, E, %pressionism in Philosophy (1990b) and 
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SpinoýZci-- A Practic-al PIVIosoply (1 988a), do not present formalized 
wholes, but rather unravel in the style of "a series of 
interpretative strategies in the process of development" (Hardt, 
1993: 56). T his style is crucial as such serially ongoing and 
interpretative thought is the pathway necessary for an awareness 
of the intensities that perform our sense of being a body that is 
always on the move. So, first, in relation to Deleuze's 
philosophical world, Deleuze-Spinoza creates a flight into 
politics, a flight whose tra*ectory is biased by the previous 
encounters With Bergson's ontological positivity and Nietzsche's 
ethical affirmation. Now, with Spinoza, a new singularity of 
thought presents itself, and furthermore it achieves this thought 
by and through being immersed within a field of practice. This 
immersion is likewise important, for working on the body as an 
affective field is not to turn one's back on a politics and an 
ethics. The affective language that emerges out of working 
through the body is one that writes an ethically Mindful 
ontology of practice. 
Ontology inheres in ethics, which in turn inheres in politics. 
Spinoza's politics is an ontological politics in that, through a 
rich analysis of power and a conceptual elaboration of practice, 
the principles that animate being are the very same principles 
that animate an ethics and a practical constitution of political 
organisation. (Hardt, 1993: 57) 
To emphasize, and to shift focus away from the latter sphere of 
a practical constitution of political organization "the principles 
that animate being are the very same principles that animate an 
ethics" - Spinoza's universe begins from the bare indetern-unate 
form of predication, attribution or determination itself Goughin, 
1990). For example, stop here and now and think what is 
happening: are you sitting down, what does that feel like, how 
come you can be sitting down right now, what are you doing, 
what other things bring you to this practical moment in time, 
etc? Through this evolution of Deleuze's thought, through its 
drive and application, there emerges a space of thinking that 
unravels out of a contemplation of initial situations (as 
described by the loose questions above). Such unravelling 
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envelopes experience as it diverges from its immediate relations 
with other qualities or forces, breaking, as joughin deftly puts it, 
"out of that 'space' of relations and provoking a reflection in 
which Nve consider reorientations or reinscripfions of this and 
other terms -\,. ithin a 'virtual' matrix of possible unfoldings of 
these terms and their relations in time" (1990: 9). This fine of 
thought is very much leading us towards Deleuze's work on the 
philosophy of Leibniz as presented in The Fold (1993). The 
direction of this thought consequently searches out Wider 
concerns folding back upon our understanding of being the/a 
'subject', folding our being as "the locus of orientation of space 
of present appearances Within the virtual matrix of all unfolding 
in time" towards its "own practical activity of interpretation, 
evaluation or orientation of the terms of experience within the 
universal matrix it has itself unfolded" Uoughin, 1990: 9). 
From such foundations the chapter orientates the presentation of the study of 
BMC by asking the question: 'What is it to understand? ', 'What do we mean when 
we say that we understand something or comprehend what is happening? ' The 
philosophical tone of Deleuze-Spinoza widens the horizon of a possible answer by 
levelling the relationship between the commonly held notions of explication, 
emanation and expresSjon3. Consequently, the practice of BMC offers a legitimate 
3 As my intention is about opening up spaces for future theoretical and empirical investigation I do not want to 
dwell on this aspect of Spinoza's work. This is not to say that it holds huge importance especially upon the ways in 
which social science can utilize this parallelism to instance the ethical importance of what, to many, seem to be 
highly removed and esoteric contributions to the politics of the social. On this see Moira Gatcns excellent book 
ImqTinag Bodies., Etbics, Power, 6- Corporra&y (1996b) - especiafly Chapters Seven and Eght. For now this quote from 
Deleuze illustrates the potential in investigating this area fiirther: "The practical sigriificance of parallelism is 
manifested in the rcversal of the domination of the traditional principle on which morality is founded as an 
enterprize of the domination of the passions by consciousness. It was said that when the body acted, the mind was 
acted upon, and the mind did not act without the body being acted upon in turn (the rule of the inverse relation cf. 
Descartes, The Passion of the Soul, articles 1 and 2). According to the Etbics, on the contrary, what is an action in the 
mind is necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the 
mind. There is no primacy of one series over another I ... 1. There are no fewer things in the mind that exceed our 
consciousness than there arc things in the body that exceed our knowledge. So it is by one and the same movement 
that we shall manage, if possible, to capture the power of the body beyond the given conditions of our knowledge 
and to capture the powers of the mind beyond the given conditions of our consciousness" (Deleuze, 1988a: 18). 
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way into an understanding of our physiology and the affects this understanding has 
on our knowledge (where knowledge works as something that depends on being in 
a world that is inseparable from our bodies). Key issues are announced in this 
methodological move that sites the affective economy immediate to our 
embodiment as counter to more typical knowledge notions, those of realism and 
idealism. Firstly, speaking of affect in opposition to effect is to appreciate that the 
interpretations by which we make our moves onwards are moments of enactment 
the "bringing forth of meaning from a background of understanding" (Rosch, et al, 
1991: 149). And that secondly, affect is foremost because this bringing forth is only 
so in that it results from our "ongoing interpretation that emerges from our 
capacities of understanding" (ibid; see also Rabinow, 1997). Yet thirdly, continuing 
the fold of significance and substance from the previous chapter, the experiential of 
affect folds out after its duration as embodied action, which is to say that the fold is 
understood as a double movement, as follows: 
First, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that 
comes from having a body With various sensorimotor capacities, 
and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are 
themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, 
psychological and cultural context. (Rosch, et al, 1991: 149) 
In this regard, the chapter is concerned with promoting the exploration of these 
capacities as understood within the structure, fluids and viscerality of our being. This 
is about understanding that our embodiment is crucial to the world in which we live, 
in how we live it and in the way that our Viscerality and comportment discerns the 
knowledge production through which we come to know that we are in a world (see 
Lingis, 1994a and 1994b). The kinaesthetic beat at the heart of this embodied being- 
,g in-the-world is, as a technique 
for understanding what is geography, spacin - In terms 
of Deleuze and Guattan we are speaking here of the notions of becominT and movement. 
Edward Casey, in his bold book The Fate of Place. - A Philosophical Histog, instructs our 
thought not to overlook, as he believes Deleuze and Guattari to have done, "the 
placial potential of settled dwelling - of ... 'built places"' (1998: 
309). 1 don't quite agree 
or disagree with him. The aspect of Spinoza in Deleuze might explain: the encounter is 
all with Deleuze-Spinoza, so whilst it is not merely a question of pure becoming or 
movement, one should likewise caution against overemphasizing the certainty, fixity 
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and 'importance-through-pertnanence' of settled dwellinT spaces. Deleuze notions to an 
understanding through eventhood, that it happens in the settlin , in the body's ,g 
spacing and movement - rest and motion - as it encounters and seeks out continuity 
- 'the-being-able-to-go-on' - with whatever relations are etching out its present 
moment. It is important to emphasize the vital quality of our body in all of this; 
therefore we firstly ask 'What is it that drives us to settle, to have feelings, affections 
and intensities that nurture us and hold things still? ' There is a lived arcl-iitecture 
before there is a built one and it is this architecture that is the focus of BMC. 
SECTION TWO 
3.3 The visceral art of Body-Mind Centring: a new expressive 
language of the planes of movement 
Underlying the forms of our expression is the process of how 
our movement develops as an infant. Development occurs in 
successive stages and any interruption to complete a particular 
stage can lead to alignment or movement weaknesses, problems 
in sequencing, in perception and in creativity. Those different 
movement stages are composed of reflexes and basic movement 
patterns and they are the building blocks of our movement 
vocabulary. (Hossenlopp, 1999) 
The primafaa'e of BMC is the basic unit of organic life, that of the living cell. From 
the moment of its conception the cell contains inpotentia the whole development of 
its more differentiated form, and in the unfolding process that pursues its 
development there follows a pattern "that can be observed in the evolution of all 
animate fife" (Hartley, 1995: 24). This is expressed not only in terms of movement 
but also in synchrony with a "development of consciousness", with a "cellular 
awarenesS114, such that with "each subsequent stage of physical development" there 
4 The notion of 'cellular awareness' chimes in character not in biological terms but more in kinship with 
Deleuze's notion of 'a life' (1997). This likewise seems to emerge out of his encounter with Nietzsche, a 
moment intimated in Hcidegger's own understanding of Nietzsche's thinking: 
Niet. Zscbe's tbinks the 'biological', the essence of wbat is alive, in the direction of commandiq 
, g, of 
the perspectival and borizontal- , the direction offreedom. So tittle is and poe#Ziiý in 
Nietzsche's thinking in danger of biologism that on the contrary he rather 
tends to interpret what is biological in the true and strict tense - the plant and 
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is a manifestation and expression of "an increasingly higher degree of perception, 
awareness, and consciousness" (ibid). It is easy to conceive this quality if you think 
of our own growth from embryo to newly-born child through to adolescence. 
Firstly, I want to outline a possible sensibility - that of thinking through planes 
of movement - through which to intimate this non-verbal aspect of our expressive 
identities. The suggestion is that these planes of movement have inherent affective 
qualities that sketch out our corporeality with specific correlation to energy 
qualities, our use of movement and space, and our general relational demeanour 
and mood. 
Latitude and longitude are the two elements of a cartography 
Lafitude is made up of intensive parts fallin under a capatio, and 
longuitude of extensive parts fallin under a relation. Peleuze & IT 
Guattari, 1988: 261/256-57) 
3.3.1 Latitude: the horizontal plane of affect 
The sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given 
power or degree of potential (latitude). (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1988: 260) 
The important point is to ask whether something, some quality or affect, exists as 
knowledge beyond any particular performance or encounter? If so, where is it 
the animal - non-biolýTicalyl, that is, hA(manly, prc-en-iinently in terms of the 
determinations of perspective, horizon, commanding, and poctizing. (as quoted 
in Ansell-Pearson, 1997c: 114) 
Ansell-Pearson has provided excellent commentary to these historically uneasy passages of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, signalling the anthropomorphism not as a criticism of Nietzsche but as a particular quality of his 
writings that here significantly reflect modernity as "fundamentally metaphysical, resting on a voluntarism, 
subjectivism, and anthropomorphism" (1997c: 115). In this, and in Heidegger's reading in particular, the 
philosophy of life presented here dislocates itself from the "kind of 'machinic' conception of evolution that is 
necessary to free the logic of life from anthropocentric naivety and blindness", something which Deleuze's 
thinking realigns us to (ibid). However, Heidegger's critique of Darwin's theory of evolutionary adaptation - the 
serious underestimation of the relational encounter between animal and world created in Darwin's conception 
of an animal as something that is 'present-at-hand' adapting to a world also 'pre sent-at- hand' - emphasizes "that 
the 'environment' is an intrinsic feature of the becoming of the 'movement' of the organism (see Ansell- 
Pearson, 1997c: 117). 
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located - in the body? in expression? in the syntactical architecture of the event, 
materially or immaterially (felt)? Is the point of registration one of constraint 
(natural) and convention (cultural)? Do we have to accept the notion of shared 
cultural resources, a set of qualities that are instantiated in performance? Affect is 
not to be confused with emotion. Affect will often, in its intensity, be a floodgate 
to an emotional experience, but it is not, in its intensity, something that can be 
owned and recognized as such (Massumi, 1996: 221). When one speaks of emotion, 
as many practitioners of BMC do after working through a particular quality of the 
body, you are qualifying the intensity by working it through a semantic and serrliotic 
framework, allying it to "narrativizable action-reaction circuits", and giving it a 
function and a meaning (ibid). 
I want to reflect this latitude as the horizontal plane prevalent Within the 
practice of BMC. It speaks primarily of the mobile sensibility that we experience 
and affect in relation to out earliest years - immersed in our mother's womb, lying 
flat on our back before we develop the capacity to crawl. As a sensation it has a 
very full, drowsy quality often expressed through the image of wading into a sea to 
be submerged within its deep expanses. It has strong associations with our earliest 
rotational navel pattern of movement, and in terms of bodily comportment, it is 
appropriately described in the action of nursing, cuddling, resting deep within 
oneself etc. As such it is on this plane that evocations of our experience of trust 
and support are achieved, and in relation to an understanding of more general 
movement, it is from this plane that "we are able to give and receive weight, and 
relate positively to gravity ... (thus, this) is the plane of attention and the ground 
for the other two planes to develop" (Hossenlopp, 1999). 
Let me example this through what is known as the naval radiation pattern. If 
you observe an infant in the first few months of their fives you will notice a radial 
and horizontal pattern to their movement: "as it snuggles in, throws back its head, 
or thrusts out with an arm or leg, these actions appear to originate not locally, in 
the muscles of the limbs, but from the navel center of the infant's body" (Hartley, 
1995: 29). Movement radiates outwards through the individual body parts, 
differentiating the qualities of affect (to a greater degree as the infant grows up), 
and inwards as the body is integrated via the awareness garnered from whatever 
venture the body's movement has created. The body is continually in relation to a 
multitude of stimuh - touch, gravity, sound (sudden or soothing) - and crucially 
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responds to the stimuli by moving toward or drawing away from the perceived 
source. These two simple responses clarify a whole host of emotional reactions and 
acknowledgements that define us throughout the many encounters that make up 
our lives. In relation to the basic demands of life as exhibited in the unit of the 
organic cell, the desire, that is the 'immanence of a life' common to all (see Deleuze 
1997), to be nurtured and survive (and ultimately therefore reproduce), is expressed 
in this movement towards something for support and the potential for bonding, 
and the movement away in the act of defending one's personal survival. This 
tendency develops as a result of the omnipotent 'at-one-ness' experienced in utero 
where our early sensory experience is about being immersed in a self-sustaining 
universe; thus "it is in the womb that our potential to form loving and trustful 
relationships has its roots" (Hartley, 1995: 39). The complexity of relationships in 
later fife (and I speak here of relationships in terms of affects and forces as opposed 
to those describing the personal nature of our social narratives) implicate these 
simple but foundational movements in more chaotic and muddled formS5. 
However, at the heart of all movement this tendency of attraction and repulsion 
orchestrates every spacing that we make. This orchestration is prevalent Within the 
structure and presentation of space as theatrical art. Here space does not merely 
function in order to perform a setting or a socially specific locale for the expression 
of a story (see Garner, 1994) - as I hope to make clear I am not Writing here of 
functionality - but rather space is a performative exhibition of bodies encountering. 
In this way drama is an art of space, in it space emerges out of the five performance 
as an act of spacing. There is an uneasy mix here between the representational 
qualities as pronounced in theatre as an art form and the underlying emphasis of 
my argument for an embodied and felt performativity to ongoing action. The 
argument is for the development of an attentive empathy for the attraction and 
repulsion of bodies as they encounter. So, as Lotman outlines: 
Behind the presentation of things and objects that form the 
environment in which the figures of the text perform there is a 
5 It is in this way that the practice of BMC becomes a potential site of therapy: "In going back to re-experience 
the movements, sensations, and 'mind' of the early Navel Radiation pattern - to the extent that we as adults can 
do this - we have a chance to complete a stage that was 
incomplete before, or reintegrate where connections 
have been disturbed subsequently. Experiences of positive support, relationship, integration, and pleasure can 
be encouraged and strengthened" (Hartley, 1995: 39). 
63 
CboreýTraply qI-q&I and motemenl - The 
let7ilories oj'Boýv-Mind Cenlring 
system of spatial relations, namely the structure of topos. This 
structure is the principle governing the way the figures are 
organised and distibuted within the artistic continuum. (1972: 
330; quoted in Pfister, 1988: 257) 
Furthermore, this topos records and develops the affective intensities of our 
experiences, allowing our body to hold within it traces of previous experiential 
encounters -a tracing of intensity which, whilst asocial, is not pre-social. As 
MassUrni puts it, this intensity 'Vnclkides social elements, but rfuixes them With 
elements belonging to other levels" (1996: 223). Intensity is indpient, and this 
incipience exhibits tendendes. 
Although the realm of intensity that Deleuze's philosophy 
strives to conceptualize is transcendental in the sense that it is 
not directly accessible to experience, it is not transcendent, it is 
not exactly outside experience either. It is immanent to it - 
always in it but not of it. (Massurru, 1996: 226) 
In this abstraction a potential is unleashed, to develop an appreciation with the 
capacity to apprehend alternatiý, e meaningful spaces; it is not about subtraction, an 
uninformed, unempirical, irrelevant wordiness. Thus, Massumi strongly points out 
that "the implied ethics of the project is value attached - without function, with 
desire only - to the multiplication of powers of existence, to ever-divergent regimes 
of action and expression" (1996: 227). 
The aim is to see that the experience of the body as it is achieved in BMC is the 
tension that plays out the contention of Judith Butler's that whilst the subject is 
performed in submission within reiterable acts it cannot be reduced to it. The body is 
the excess, it is our unique experience, our unique desire (and there is a collective, 
empathetic space that does not assemble through meaning and signification but 
through intimate bodily acts). This is not to deride the huge significance of the fact 
that there are representational artefacts, discursive objects and material practices 
that are, to a greater or lesser extent, involved in producing effects of power and 
new types of subjectivity. A whole genealogy can be traced charting the emergence 
of the practice of BMC. But whilst the practice, the institution, has an historical 
edge, there are spaces where people do explore the body in these ways, but also, to 
reassert the transhistorical philosophical point, there are spacings that are the body 
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through which subjecthood is achieved and spacings that are the very dynamism of 
experience: movement, speed, rhythm and affect. Not something essential but 
something that is very durable, durable yet little explored hence the sense that it has 
so many unchartered qualities. To continue in breaking this down, it is not that 
these qualities have not been experienced many times before, many aeons ago, but 
that they have not been chartered consistently. This comes back again to the 
question as to what counts as knowledge and that is historically situated and 
geographically placed in those 'empty spaces'where these affects can be explored. 
But a question or vital problematic still remains: Where is affect situated? The 
force of sensation is often that which defines the notion of affect, sensation being 
the affect of an event eternal to the body 1 sub*ect. The and hence to the j 
notion of the stable subject is made untenable for things outside its control (too 
easily) sway it. The classical model of understanding premised upon the visual 
breaks down and mastery achieved through one sense, that of the gaze, competes 
with the subjective appeal of the other senses in a modality of subjectivity 
influenced by the materiality of the world itself (including the way out vision 
'touches' things). Affect then doesn't distil these senses, rather it speaks of the 
unique and polyphonic event of a combination of them all. And in its allegiance to 
sensation, its place is neither internal nor external, but is in the in-betweenness that 
is the world. Affect is a part of us, and it is apart from us, drawing us into ever-new 
connections that keep our subjectivity on the move: unlocalizable then, but not 
intangible nor unintelligible. It is this movement that performs the longitude of this 
cartography, a movement that is spurred into being through the vertical plane of 
relationality, the plane of intensity. 
3.3.2 Longitude: the vertical plane of relationality 
The sum total of the material elements belonging to it under 
given relations of movement, rest, speed and slowness 
(longitude). (Deleuze & Guattarl, 1988: 260) 
In BMC the vertical plane stems from the spinal reaching out movement where as 
infants we begin to discern and to desire the action of taking things in, to, in more 
expansive and social terms, focus our attention on other bodies and our immediate 
environment. BMC practitioners have termed this as the plane of intention, where 
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-in movement the vertical plane supports our ability to perceive and express 
ourselves in the outer environment and to other people" (Hossenslopp, 1999). This 
intention is less about thought, less derived from the mind of the subject, than it is 
about the body-mind interface of desire or appetite. Appetite or desire is not an 
internal, innate quality but an emergent onto-genetic expression of the realm of 
relations, connections, associations and couplings. Thus: 
We neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything 
because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge 
something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, 
and desire it. (Spinoza, 1996, Etbics, 111,9) 
Or: 
Now, the appetite is nothing else but the effort by which each 
thing strives to persevere in its being, each body in extension, 
each mind or each idea in thought. But because this effort 
prompts us to act differently according to the objects 
encountered, we should say that it is, at every moment, 
determined by the affections that come from the objects. 
Peleuze, 1988: 21) 
This appetite, or prompting to act differently through forms of relationality, is 
about the intensity of attraction or repulsion. Nowhere more obviously are the 
tendencies of attraction or repulsion seen than in the act of eating. This act signals the 
more general quality of 'plugging-in', the plugging-in to flows of sustenance (energy 
and substance), affection and information, and an Mustration of the desire to do so. 
In the space of BMC one can appreciate this action as an early developmental 
movement pattern, that of mouthing. It is in this pattern of our development that we 
as infants are conjectured to begin to initiate our own movement in a purposeful way. 
We begin to move our body With intent through space, developing our capacity to 
change within our. UnMediate environment and in response to our own actions (this 
resonates with the recent work of Alphonso Lingis, with his argument for imperatives 
[1998] and dangerous emotions [2000]). 
Significantly, the mouth and the sensory organs in the head are amongst the first 
to develop in utero, a fact reflected in the way many embryos show signs of sucking 
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their thumbs. This is in fact preparation for the vital few hours after birth, and 
henceforth, where the mouth, and body, searches for food now that the navel 
connection is severed - in other words sustenance has to be sought and we change 
from 'being' to 'doing'. This movement of the mouth connects with our immediate 
potential to develop overall body movement as well as the ability to vocahze our 
needs. Hartley describes this life-enhancing process in detail, and this clarity is 
worth quoting in full: 
Motivated by the need to find food to survive, the mouth will 
reach towards the source, drawing the head with it. Movement 
initiated at the mouth in this way will reverberate down the 
spine. The action is initiated in the jaw; while the chin or lower 
jaw is partially resting against the mother's breast for support, 
the upper jaw is primarily responsible for the action of reaching 
for and grasping the nipple. In this way the head rocks forward 
and back with the rhythm of sucking; as the mouth opens, the 
movement of the skull levers into the first vertebra and then 
sequentially down the spine to its tall ... this action underlies 
the first Push pattern from the head, down through the spine. 
As the mouth closes and the skull circles up and forwards again, 
the whole spine is released and lengthens in response. (1995: 47- 
48) 
This pattern exhibits an active searching that acts as a foundation for the 
subsequent behaviour that likewise reaches out for that which fulfils needs - 
attraction coloured with necessity and/or desire. 
This longitudinal realm choreographed through intensity explicitly starts with 
the body, in the body; or as the body emerging. Gil offers this emerging body as an 
ccenergy, as a kind of floating signifier that manifests life in its unpredicatability, 
diversity and spontaneity' (1998: 154). But he too asks, in order for there to be a 
body, that there be some metamorphosis of energy, that there must be some 
following of regular rhythms. He offers the idea that we have modes of correct 
behaviour and the observation that there seem to be 'implicit spaces' where 
creativity and individual expression are developed. I want to consider this notion of 
correct behaviour. First, what if we extend it and argue that it infers notions such as 
appropriate response, or channelled negotiation of an encounter that allows a 
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successful continuation or conclusion? This makes apparent that we ought to be 
clear whether this need for some metamorphosis of energy is because of an 
injunction or an imperative. It is a mixture of both for between these two a space 
opens up that allows for the development of 'singularities, the space of the life of 
the body' (Gil, 1998: 153). Thus: 
The singularity of the 'individual' is not that of an 'F or a 
distinct body - With its organs, skin, affect, and thought separate 
from the rest of the community - but that of a body in 
communication with the whole of nature and culture, and all the 
more singular to the extent that it allows itself to be traversed by 
the greatest number of natural and social forces. (Gil, 1998: 158) 
3.3.3 A synthesis of these two planes: the sagittal plane 
So, finally, these singularities are paced out on the saginal plane, a plane of 
movement that emerges out of the body moving: spacing out the terrain that unfolds 
through and with it. This spacing is the act that is moved by our desires. It is the 
plane of our affections, our affecting others (whereas on the vertical plane we are 
open to taking in the intensities of other bodies and are affected by them). In this way 
this is the realm of our dynamism: the movement through which we have the ability 
to push, pull, fift and jump. This dynamism is the desire to push against someone or 
something to feel the-ir/its affect more fully; it is the des-ire to take someone with you, 
to hold something close, to push someone away throqb Cboice rather than through 
need or attraction/repulsion. In this choice through semantic appraisal it is the 
metamorphosis of the energy of the body into tangible expression. This reflects our 
spinal growth pattern, that which is in effect initiated at and during the moment of 
birth. Again turning to Hartley, this process is described in the following way: "as the 
head of the birthing child pushes into and through the birth canal and the tail of the 
spine and the feet respond by pusl-ýing against the contracting walls of the womb, the 
push of the head transforms into a reaching through to the new world" (1995: 53). 
This pattern is intrinsic to all our future perceptual activity in that the extension of the 
spine, our vertical axis, occurs through the proprioceptive stimuli of our senses; 
although at this early, infantile stage of our development space is only actively 
experienced on the horizontal plane. This movement of push and pull integrates all 
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three of the illustrated movement patterns and represents the basis for all further 
body movements which, feeding out of the characteristics outlined above, effectively 
operate on three planes - the bon'ýqntal, the Pettical and the saTittal In co-ordination 
with each other these three planes present the three-dimensional expression of 
ourselves through movement: "the more fully we integrate these three planes, the 
more rich and rewarding our movement in all the dances of life win be" 
(Hossenslopp, 1999). Thus: 
You are longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses 
between unformed particles, a set of nonsubjectified affects. 
You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life 
(regardless of its duration) -a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a 
pack (regardless of its regularity). Or at least you can have it, you 
can reach it. Peleuze & Guattari, 1988: 262) 
3.3.4 Practising BMC: pathways to affect 
The habits we acquire from experiences of being-in-the-world channel our 
corporeality in set ways and this, I want to argue, deadens the potential of affect 
that we possess at the interface that is our capacity as a body. When we experience 
the heightened intensity of bodies through art - theatre, music, painting, dance - 
there is an empathetic yearning for connections that we too possess within; a 
possible world denied even as we make our next step forward. Unfulfilled potential 
is never completely lost, it is merely not yet experienced, or it has been experienced 
and then forgotten. In a sense, as adults, we have forgotten how to play. Thus: 
It is possible for us even as adults to remember these potentials 
for movement experience, thus clarifying and strengthening the 
foundations upon which our present movement, perceptual, 
psychological, intellectual and spiritual experiences are based 
We find that this re-education of underlying developmental 
patterns not only gives more inner strength, clarity, and 
aliveness to our movement and perceptual responses, but it also 
frees more of our energy for creative thought and activity. 
(Hartley, 1995: 91) 
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BNIC is about working at the deep level of the body where emotional feelings, 
memories and associations surface reawakenings of past experiences that have been 
stored within the tissues and fluids. Responses in tl-iis vein can be gentle and subtle. 
Also coloUring the affections that we experience are less comfortable bodily 
sensations, such as pain, nausea, or deep tiredness. In heightening your own 
awareness of these sensations through practising BMC you learn to appreciate that 
the body has an e, %pen'enfial anatomy as well as a physiological one. Charting and 
exploring this anatomical map of affect is the focus of the remainder of the chapter. 
3.4 Experiential anatomy 
The groundwork of BMC is based on our experiential anatomy, an awareness about 
our own body that combines an understanding of our various tissues and structural 
components - such as bones, muscles, organs, fluids, and our nervous and 
endocrine systems - alongside our personal experience of their individual cellular 
affections. The bodywork that goes to make up the BMC practice develops Within 
an individual his or her own differentiated awareness of embodiment. Catherine 
Hossenlopp describes this life process in these terms: 
Each tissue crystallizes a specific energy from which arises a 
particular quality of movement and a specific Mind state. BMC 
teaches you ways to contact directly those different tissues and 
to initiate movement from each of them. In doing so, we learn 
to get in touch with specific aspects of ourselves and learn to 
express them to others. (1999) 
Practising BMC is an individual process through which practitioners actively 
engage with their own body in a process that facilitates a change in their awareness 
of themselves and their environment. Using this way of knowing and being, 
practitioners promote change by embracing the energy Within and between bodies, 
focusing energy attention and creating movement in specific tissues of the body. In 
contacting through hands, in a hands on manner, two people can meet in their 
energy allowing each other to become aware of the individual's energy flow 
(harmonious or congested) in order to facilitate the ability to conduct attention to 
the different areas of the body's affective economy. My experience of the pattern of 
our everyday lives understands that these practices are often cautiously approached; 
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my own understanding of 'common-sense habit' meets any encounter such as this 
with scepticism. Perhaps a major cause of such apprehension lies in the fact that we 
don't have a language to discourse about the feelings of our affective body. Or 
more pointedly, we are not accustomed to using language to communicate these 
affections because intuitively our bodies are read out of the connections made 
with-in our affective economy; to reiterate from earlier, interpretation is enacted out 
in practice. In a way which exemplifies this, Golden comments that she got a sense 
of the practice when she understood what Bainbridge Cohen had called 'the art of 
embodying tissue: 
First we focus attention on and initiate movement from each f[Wd 
in turn, then we combine them. 'Now become more rarefied, 
change density: synovial With CSF. Now keep the lightness but 
allow some lymph to come in so you're no longer nonspecific'. 
Each time she gives a new direction, the quality of the movement 
- and of the energy in the room - changes. (1993: 86) 
In a similar manner, the BMC practitioner leading the workshops I attended, 
Catherine Hossenlopp, would embody in her bodily expressions (rhythm, gesture, 
motion) the quality of movement pertaining to 'being in', for example, the 
horizontal plane (in the contents /organs) or the lungs. By aligning this kinaesthetic 
expression with your own awareness of 'being in' the horizontal plane, or lungs, 
you begin to develop and expand the body's awareness and perceptual field. The 
rhythm and sensuality, the feeling of the space you are taking up and creating, 
focuses your being-present through the particular quality of a specific body 
component or plane. 
Once we sense that we have initiated movement in an organ, it 
is important to let go of the careful intending and sensing 
process. The energy of the organs needs to be released into full 
and spontaneous movement and the mind must also be able to 
move. At this point we simply move and feel the movement. 
Through their physiological functions (respiration, digestion, 
etc), flow of energy, rhythm, movement, and actual physical 
connections to one another, the organs form systems within a 
system. Through contemplating their structure, function, and 
movement we can gain some idea of the emotional attitudes that 
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individual organs reflect and support. Each organ embodies a 
polarity such as acceptance or rejection, love and fear or hatred, 
courage and timidity, joy and anger, sadness and sympathy. 
When we bring our awareness to a particular organ we may 
experience such feelings; we may also be able to perceive the 
relationship and attitude we have toward those feelings and the 
organ itself. (Hartley, 1995: 196) 
The task now is to open up a space of comprehension within the medium of 
writing, and I think it is best to do this by delving straight in. In presenting the BMC 
research into the organ system, I begin by mapping out the experience itself as that 
wl-j-ich was experienced by me [italics], folding this With a programmatic description of 
the methods involved [Roman], and illustrating the 'results' - the experience-in-itself 
- through the instruction of a trained BMC practitioner, Catherine Hossenlopp, 
[bold] and the vocal reactions of my fellow students ["Roman"]. 
Contact 
On thefirst day of the three-weekend BMC course I attended on the OrXan System Catherine 
led us in an exercise to enhance ourpresent awareness of our skin. The method býgan with a 
gentle way of stimulating this awareness by the simple act of touching the areas of skin on our 
gan to focus our attention on this realm of our bein . To g hands andface; thus in effect we be 
g up our sleeves and further this process we exposed more areas of our skin to the air, rollin 
g contact to making contact with our hands and slowly allowing the rhythm of this strokin 
dictate ourgeneral boýv movement - as we mere standing me started to make sweepinggestures 
with the air, swooping and caressinT its surfacel our surface. Cathetine invoked us to sense our 
environment through the sensation and energvjocus we were now e, %petiendng via our skin. The 
qua14 o7f the room felt light and spacious and as I moved around I felt I had a greater 
awareness of the whole room available to me. Through this movement itfelt as if we were 
becoming veg open to the surroundings and as Catherine vocally gestured to us to bting the 
movement down and on to the ground, where me started to roll upon the floor feeling the 
different surfaces (includinT each other - hair, skin, clothin ,e allowed our 
bodies to mope 
g freely with the sensations that contact evoked. Movin around in this way seemed to extend, 
whilst not necessarily to the same degree, the open and liTht quafiýl to all surface parts of the 
boýv. As we brought this movement to a close and regrouped, I certainy1felt a refreshing sense 
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of clanýy in m y awareness of the ipace about me and the Wbole 'group seemed calmer and 
somebow more tbere. 
The physical boundary of our body is linked to our skin. To many, an 
appreciation of contact with another person is held in the act of touching - In the 
physical sense of the word 'felt' one feels the differentiation of one's own body 
from that of others. As infants our early experiences of touch are often the first 
intimations of selfhood. Even as adults, therapy can be achieved through the 
stimulation of touch contact by way of defining what is self and what is other. Yet 
the skin is not a mere boundary, its membrane Eke quality acts like a 'Mobius Strip' 
folding the inside and the outside (here one might think of the membrane of our 
digestive tract that flows from the bps of the mouth down into the body in the 
form of our oesophagus and then out through the intestines into the rectum). 
Hartley describes this quality in the following terms: 
It is an elastic and highly sensitive organ that links our inner 
world to the outside world and enables us to perceive and learn 
about both simultaneously. The environment touches our skin, 
and its qualities are transformed into messages that we interpret 
as heat, cold, pleasure, pain, comfort, pressure, etc. (1995: 133) 
In this way the boundary associated with the skin is no longer termed in a 
restrictive way but rather comes to be seen as a medium through which the 
potential to exchange is boundless. 
The organs 
Our first sensations and experience of life can be understood as primarily 
organic - our involvement in the world emerges out of the sensations of 
feeding 
and digesting, breathing and moving. Our sense of being there is stimulated by the 
perceptions of pleasure, pain or comfort that these processes entail. 
They can evoke or reflect the pleasurably powerful state of 
fullness of being, the frustration of being unable to let go, the 
pain and fear of being empty or abandoned, the joy of being 
alive, and so on. The organs evoke and express the sense of 
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differentiated being in its myriad of feeling qualities. (Hartley, 
1995: 184) 
Method I- familiarization of anatomical placement and physiology 
At this point through the study of anatomical diagrams you accuston-ýze 
yourself with the location of the organ, visualising and feeling its presence via 
mentally placing it within your own body. Then you enhance the intensity of your 
sensing of its presence through touch and by way of breathing from the organ - 
mentally you focus your breathing and thought on the place of the organ. This 
breathing technique can then be instrumentally furthered by allowing your 
breathing to translate the sensations of the organ into hissing and into sound. Then 
with a partner you both focus on the organ as above, and once you both have a 
sense of having awareness of the organ's sensations, however vague, one of you 
places both their hands on to the area of the body around the location of the organ 
- above the organ, or with one hand on the front With the other on the back of the 
body. As contact is made in this way the recipient continues to breathe, hiss and 
sound through the organ. The benefit of practising BMC in this manner hes in the 
way "a partner's presence helps to keep the attention focused and will further 
concentrate the energy where directed" (Hartley, 1995: 205). 
Method H- holding 
This can only be effectively carried out With a partner. The supporting partner 
makes contact with their hands as above, and then focuses their attention upon 
feeling the 'weight' of the organ so that in effect they hold the recipient's organ in 
the midst of its surrounding body tissue as if it were a balloon filled with water in 
their hands. In this manner the next method of facilitating movement from this 
organ awareness can be guided and amplified. 
Method //I - Initiation of movement 
As you he on the floor, now reasonably attentive to the awareness of the organ's 
sensations, you start to allow your body to move with the rhythms that seem to 
emanate from the energy you have found in the organ. As illustrated above, the 
movement that emerges here extends into three distinct planes, the vertical, the 
horizontal and the sagittal. Allow yourself to let go and be moved by the subtle 
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initiations that now seem to slowly flood through your body ever more vibrantly; 
thus your whole body (or just your arms, your torso, etc) might start to rotate, roll, 
reach upwards, or curl up in stillness slowly rocking to an almost imperceptible beat 
etc. As you start to move via the sensation of the organ, its intensity, weight and 
rl-ivthm, you can "work with changing levels in relation to the floor, through lying, 
sitting, squatting, hands and knees, standing. Explore the dynamics of gravity and 
levity, support, and mobility acting on the organs as the organs initiate and support 
these changes" (Hartley, 1995: 205-06). 
Method IV - Dance and improvized movement (contact or solo) 
Here you extend the expression of the organ to its fullest potential, actualizing 
this quality of yourself and experiencing the energy that resonates from that place. 
In this way you enhance your body memory and understanding of what it is your 
body is capable of This movement expresses the full energy and power of the 
organs moving you through space to and from the floor with speed or deft touch, 
allowing you to freely jump, roll, run, balance and so on. As Hartley herself noted, 
and I myself experienced in my own body and through being with others, you 
"follow the organs' own momentum, rhythm, direction, and quality of movement, 
and let yourself be surprised" (1995: 207)6. 
Introduction by way of introducing the digestive tract 
In accordance with the Spinal pattern of movement, that of push and reaching out 
to take in or grab something, you can sense the impulse of the movement travelling 
through the digestive tract from our frontal mouthing posture through to the abdominal 
and pelvic organs. When breathing in and focusing attention on this pathway through 
your body (perhaps tracing with your fingers the course a piece a food takes, identifying 
the space of the stomach, the valves from the stomach to the small intestine and from 
the small to the large intestine, tracing the bulk of the colon as it moves up your body 
6 Another method that is having a growing impact (Method V- Expression in drawing and Colour) can be 
carried out as a temporary conclusion and reflection of your experience. This is the practice of drawing directly 
after or whilst still focused within the awareness of an organ, the energy you feel and have experienced in the 
dance. The style of such expression is naturally one of abstraction - the abstraction of a particular quaht-y of 
colour, mood, energy, feeling, even a personal image or landscape. This grounds the experience and functions in 
a therapeutic fashion. However, this is not something that my research had the opportunity or time to take in 
and investigate. 
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on the right side crossing behind the liver as it moves from your front to your back 
beneath the diaphragm, emerging on the left sidc before it angles down into your 
rectum) you can sense the feeling of the digestive tract and observe the many different 
qualities of movement contained there. The digestive tract is an open organ system that 
is continuous with the outside, reflecting our intimate relationsl-ýp with the external 
world. This quality exhibits the digestive tract's concordance with all levels of our need 
for nourishment - physical, mental, spiritual and emotional. 
How we accept or reject, digest, assimilate, integrate, choose 
(what is to be retained and what elirrunated), and let go in terms 
of food, are attitudes of the digestive process. Whether we enjoy 
our food, attack it, play with it, dislike it, or give it very little 
attention, may all be signs of our underlying attitude towards 
nourishment and nurturing and ultimately the meaning and 
value of life itself. (Hartley, 1995: 198) 
One can think here of how an actor preparing to play Falstaff Might, for an early 
intimation of his character, concentrate on his corpulent posture and its kindred 
appreciation of gastronomic excess and belief in the warming qualities of a good 
O'sherris- sack', in the hope of rousing gestures that might accompanying such an attitude. 
Liver 
The liver is considered by the art of Chinese medicine to be the 'General' of the 
body, being responsible for a lot of our decision making processes by facilitating 
the overall balance of our internal constitution. The liver, physiologically, 
synthesizes, stores and distributes the body's economy of nutrients, filtering the 
many unwanted waste products out of the body's system. These nutrients are then 
processed to the rest of the body as when needed, hence its 'General' status. 
In our openinTfocus session on the liver, Catherine explained that the quafiýy and energ of the 
liver, as it e, %presses aseýf in the work of BMC, IS one that speaks of independence and 
freedom. In this the affects that resonatefrom an access to its 'energv presence' is one of clario - 
it he4vyou as a beinS to have clear boundaries. Catherine described this as 'energy that is 
into the self ... an energy quality that 
is not heavy but more of weight, of 
confidence, authority" She evoked a sharper appreciation of this particular affection by 
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it as 'the spirit of support, it is not something that pu s you 
down 
... it is about getting things done whereby action is freer and you 
see them through" As such, in terms of our relationship with the world about us it 
speaks ofplannin ,g and takin ,g responsibiliýy- 
Gall bladder 
Whilst it is extremely difficult to physically locate the gall bladder by way of 
touch, my experience of focusing my attention on this organ illustrated the ability 
to feel an organ's location through the organ's unique cellular breath. This 
sensation is effectively the resonance coming off ftom the organ as the cells 
'breathe' fully into their own space in your anatomy. This effect can be clarified if 
you imagine a deflated balloon being filled with air. Physiologically the gall bladder 
secretes a host of enzymes particular to the digestive process. This biological action 
mirrors the gall bladder's relation to our ability to maintain a steady balance of 
overall well-being. Being located in the solar plexus, this characteristic is reflected in 
the way, when focusing cellular awareness in this organ, you can discern feelings of 
anger, frustration or despair in response to our ability to cope with the ever- 
changing array of everyday responsibilities. Within the map of the solar plexus the 
gall bladder is, as Catherine put it, "the moment of choosing"; 'to have gall' is to 
have the nerve to do something. Closely linked to the gall bladder is the pancreas, 
which likewise stimulates the overall maintenance of our bodily health by issuing 
enzymes into the digestive process, specifically those that break down fat. 
However, unlike the gall bladder it is more a soft tissue, and hence an expansive, 
organ existing anatomically as a flat, wide yet thin and long organ, all of which is 
reflected in the quality of cellular awareness that we receive from it. Catherine 
introduced the pancreas to us as that part of the solar plexus that is intimately 
bound up With the process of "taking care of yourself". 
idney 
As Catherine put it, the kidngs are about 'ýenerosiýy " 
The Iddneys are the anchors into our potential, our strength. They announce the 
fact that you are there,, that you are,, that you are you. They are about being 
honest, and honest with yourself, being congruent with yourself They are about 
respecting your limitations and taldng your strengths with you. Also there is 
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sometimes a very strong feeling of frustration attached, that you can't quite get 
out .... On top of the Iddneys rests the adrenals, the drive to get out - 
motivation, drive, addiction, but without the Icidneys there's no support ... you 
can easily go into overdrive, become run down, empty (yeh? You know 1poup. 
(she lets her whole upper body and head sag) ha ha! ). There is this drive and the 
fear of stopping because you know you are empty and you fear the collapse. 
Lungs 
In relation to Chinese medicine the lungs are seen as the channels into the body 
of prana or cb i, that is a major part of our vital energy. In this way these organs 
operate as a linkage between our inner and outer environment. The motion of 
breathing also pertains to our ability to think and meditate; thus breathing is often 
held as a natural pathway between a conscious and an unconscious state. On the 
plane of emotions the lungs express sadness and grief, the silver lining to such 
evocation is a sympathy for others as well as a belief in some new hope. These 
attached notions are derived from the general states of inspiration and exhalation: 
when we exhale we let go, we experience a loss in releasing life to death until we 
inspire again and renew ourselves with the oxygen required to sustain life. The 
exhalation also serves as a way of connecting ourselves to nature, we give back 
molecules, carbon dioxide, in a chain of viroid fife bonding us to the plant kingdom 
- hence the sentiment of sympathy. In summary: each breath represents the cycle 
of fife; each inspiration is a pause, a "space in which potential is manifest" (Hartley, 
1995: 202). 
At the begi . nnin of the middle weekend, some two months onfrom our last meefin ,gg and after 
reacquainting ourselves with each other in movement [dance and contact iMproVization] we 
came together in the centre of the room and share a quiet moment of reflection and of 'beiý,: g-where- 
we-are-now reflecting u how wefelt that morning comin pon our lives in the past two months, g 
from our different tempos of life and how we hadfelt in meeting each otherjust then: 
Catherine: Is there anything we'd like to share? (Pause) 
"It's nice to find some fightness" 
78 
Choreý_graplg of ajýcl and moiement - the ler7ilon'es of Boýy-Mind Centrin ,g 
"I feel a bit foggy from all the driving [She had driven down from the north of 
Manchester that morning to be in Bristol, a good four hours driving time before we 
-started at 10: 30]; but I am beginning to feel quite quiet inside, and contained" 
Catherine: How did you feel meeting people in movement? 
"I found it quite hard ... the transition into opening out. I feel as if the work with 
the organs has stayed with me, but ... it felt that I needed to be in that heart 
protector" 
Catherine: [Paraphrasing the main intent of Catherine's following words which are 
in effect answering the feelings just expressed and linking them more generally into 
the overall experience of BMC by way of direct relationship to this and the last 
weekend's work]. Right, having done some work on the organs, that quality of 
being in a specific organ remains with us, however faint. In relation to the 
organ we are working with today, that of the lungs, there is a relationship 
that links back to the quality of the kidneys [which we experienced last time]. 
The energy of the lungs translates into feelings via the kidneys. 
"I have been thinking about the expansion into the organs, it gives me greater 
clarity, but when I interact With someone else, part of me wants to withdraw ... to 
be more authentic to how I am" 
"I find it just about possible to work with two intensities, say like being in the heart 
and in the kidney" 
Catherine: The strength of oneself, of authenticity to oneself is stronger than 
this weekend, and it is important to know that strength, to know 'Ah, that's 
me' - the body supports you, and supports you in being open to 
relationships. So we are going to experience our lungs! 
[Now basic anatomical details are clarified: the left lung is smaller than the right, 
having only two lobes compared to the right's three. This we experienced by 
handling and examining the lungs of a pig. Herein we felt that the organ was non- 
79 
Choreqraphy oj'qjjýct and mopemeni - the terrilon'es of Body-Mind CenItin ,g 
contracting (ie not muscular), that its physical quality was 'sponge-fike' and soft, 
and yet with a strong, slimy membrane by which it was possible to discern the lobe 
compartments. In the body we are told that the lungs are protected by fluid, the 
pluras, and that we can feel the lungs directly - place your two main index fingers 
above your shoulder bone on your front torso and breathe in deeply - thus 
demonstrating that the lungs extend from your diaphragm right up to shoulders. 
We were also informed that it is the diaphragm that controls most of our breathing 
(around 60%) and is thus responsible for initiating the movement of the lungs]. 
Catherine: Their job is to take in information from the air - taking in new 
sensations from the outside ... and to have the courage to take this in ... we 
often have the choice to take in information. 
Thus the group paired off and worked through the methods outlined above. Once the paener 
receivinT the contact had cused their ener fi) xy in the lunTs and hadjound suffident impetus there to 
move them into dance, the roles were reversed. For a while all of us were moving in the space of the 
room to the ener , ýy 
levels and directions that wejound within us. This movement opened up spaces 
and led to encounters between us that met prima / rm w ri y in te s of rhythm. This d ynamic as 
enhanced as Catherine added music to the scene - in this case "Guantanamera " as peý`ormed by 
Pete Seeger. The dance and qualiýy of the movement was generally li C3 . 
ýghtyet with an undercurrent of 
potential, a verýiginousjorre. A couple of thegroup moved Peg slo / w y. Thy kept veg much within 
their own boýv space even thou , gh 
My moped slowly about the dimensions of the room. One of the 
, group 
bad nested themselves alonTside one of the side malls and was clearly overcome by some 
pn . Pate emoh . onal feelings. I had begun tojeel as if I was open to all around me, movin 'nit in ,gi 
iall 
I Cý y 
whatfelt likefree and tensionlessgestures, dancinT in sweeping moves, using my arms to arch my 




to feel overpowerinT, and the grace I felt movin openness, when e, %plored, be gh the 
yfeet seemed to loose its confinuiýy and the movement be an to balance of being on the balls of m :g 
feel increasing# aTitated within. IThis sensation was later experienced on myfinal weekend course, 
which worked speci/icall Th the three planes of movement. This time it occurred when in the y throu 
y on the peeical plane. Du * this fm midst of allowinT the focus o _y movement 
to exist solel n hT 
, gain 
had a hei fe experience I once a ýbtened awareness of all that was around - it It like I was 
,g 
bombarded by all the potential sensations that my bod y could la y me open to. I waspresented bein 
with an imaTe of a vibrant kaleidoscope of fiZ. Uv colours. As I moved via the energv of this 
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sensational force, the objects and the stnictural details of the room mere seeminUl announci q. 
themselves to me in the wei rp w ri g eeliq was much , ght of their 
'bound-tip' energv. The ope oenf 
stronTer thi's time, and as the movement became much more PITorous Ifelt that I had to make the 
consa'ous de6ision to stop - there was a stronTfear that I was going to be overwhelmed, and that 
the nausea that was sweepinT throu in , gh me xasgo 
*g to cause me to blackout]. Dun*n ,g 
the dance 
I. nitiated via the lunTs, my partner, bein a Sh' practitioner, picked up on my qTitalion as we ,g za/su 
Pocafi, -ed what we were jeefi, ý, T. Thus the attempted to anchor my dison*entafion by 
holdiq1touchin 
,g the confactpoints of the elbows andjoints of the thumb that are 
linked to the 
luqs in the anatomical map of Chinese medicine. Steerin the * ur andflow of the energv I was P190 
jeefiq, out and throuTh these points and with my partner, itfilt as if calmness returned and more 
important/ ri ya sense of control This wasfadlitatedfurther by Cathe ne askin us to add a little of ,g 
the di: *gesfiPe tract to the movement so as to experience the effect that that had on our movement. 
Wlhen combininT both, the movement began to feel somehow more purposeful It was slower, or at 
least itfelt it, therefore if the movement was still at the same speed, itfeltfuller and with more 
, ght the 
dance to a close wegathered once qTain in the middle of the room. presence. Havin brou 
"It felt wonderful, twinkling, as if I could go higher and higher - where's the ground, ha 
ha! " 
"The quality of the body felt like I iMagine being a parachute would, and yet also 
with the digestive tract it felt akin to a hot air balloon, where the lungs are the 
canopy and there is this need for some grounding in the form of the basket" 
C: Yes, I like that. You do need the anchor of the digestive tract, your basket. 
It enables you to say 'fine I'm safe, I can say no' 
"I had a sense of completion when we were in both ... it made me 
feel quite tall ... 
aware of the spine ... there to support me, a 
lengthening ... as if my structure was 
softer and yet very supportive, so it felt as if I could empty my lungs without the 
collapse, I could deflate them that much" 
"Yes, its sounds hke the buoyancy" 
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"I felt the support, the sense of interchange, an aliveness in the membrane, in the 
a1v eoh, a certain kind of tone ... and also 
having the support with my fiver, from 
the diaphragm-' 
C: There is an expansion, a breathing from your back, there is the support of 
the kidney and it is as if you are massaging your kidneys 
"I also felt, in the midst of my twinkling (1auThs) that the lungs gave me the space 
... to feel my tiredness ... I needed the earth so much, down in the ground, yet also 
knowing the vastness of space, the potential to swim with the air" 
"I was sensing my own need to protect and be quiet - after all that I've recently 
done; a lot of it has been in public, my work" 
C: I'm sure everyone will have a different sensation due to a different relation 
with the digestive system at the moment, and a different relation with the 
lungs at the moment ... both are to do with interchange, with heaven - 
knowledge - and earth - nurturing. 
Heart 
On the last Sunday of our three-weekend course, Catherine býTan the workshop in the usual 
manner and me sat tgetber in a circle in the middle of the room sharing the silience, our thoughts 
and each other's presence. 
Catherine: If I can ask the right question I have done half the job, if not 
more than that, for the power of the body does not lie in answers. By now we 
have all experienced the body as different layers - emotional, physical, 
spiritual and mental, all of which are ongoing. It's like a loop, if I touch the 
physical it can touch all the others; it might be the others that move. If you 
can think of them all it helps it to be total. So in a way we are talking about 
being in the different systems. If I touch one, all give you weight. If I touch 
you or see you, meet you I can ask your emotional and mental level; so you 
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be there with your feelings in the act of giving weight [this refers to one person 
having contact with the other in a similar way to that achieved in Method 11, and in 
the way you meet someone in movement through their comportment and stance 
towards you] and I'm looking for the whole person to be connected not just 
one part. In the harmony of the many different systems of the body, the 
organs and the fluid system speak of the emotional body, the nervous system 
speaks of the mental body, the muscular system presents the physical body 
and finally the spiritual body is in the endocrine system. So when you open 
up the pathway of movement [through the expression of the digestive system, 
etc] you can manifest your emotional or spiritual self within that. 
"I've found the sense of anaton-&al clarity really helps, to have this anatomical 
clarity and feel it ... it gives a sense of presence -a here and now (she Points to her 
torso, pushiq her hand into her stomach a couple of times as agesture to indicate thisfeeling) - it 
opens up a distinct space for the emotions ... which otherwise seemed to be 
confused, not knowing where they are or are coming from" 
"It's never once and for all - 'Oh I've got that now, I'll stick that in my pocket'. Its 
very changeable. " [This participant had had several previous experiences of 
working With BMC and had combined the insights with his own work as a 'Contact 
ImproVization' instructor] 
"This rich textual of planes -a celebration of diversity in the many ways in which 
we can access them, all the different levels" 
Catherine: To meet other people's energies is very important - that can 
change me - it's almost as if you've made a third thing -a meeting place. It 
can remind you of what you've got in your pockets! 
"I feel as if I've been knowing a bit more about myself. The intensity - that it's 
huge basically. I've felt enriched by that, in quite a humble way; but then who's an 
expert?! " 
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Catherine: Yes, as a dancer I was interested in integrating the mental with 
the emotional and physical. It is difficult to really embody and feel the 
experience for dance. Through the work of BMC I realized what was inside 
me and what was out there, and how to integrate this with my work, that I 
need not have very strong boundaries. My dancing and movement had more 
colour. It was more vivid. I was starting to ask could I do that, get that sense 
of colour, it is quite controlled, you could feel by it - so these different 
qualities of self. 'Oh, now I need to be more ... now I need the There is 
a whole repertoire of colours and the organs help us to get in there. 
"There are so many places in the body where that is located, that colour or quality. 
It is as if you can turn the tap on! There is this spiritual aspect, something almost 
within the organ, the divine architect, the creator, the structure - as if there is an 
exquisite hand behind it" 
"It's like a miracle; it's all inside; the structure -I am amazed at what is happening" 
Catherine: Yes, so this has been about the development of perception of the 
organs, of the body. 
"And we experience it from the intensity of probing the organs - is it? " (Many in the 
, group nod, murmur aTreement) 
Catherine: Yes. And also you then realize that where your intensity is is 
where you are. It is the presence of mind, but this isn't Shaman like for the 
presence is in the body. Sometimes the mind gets in the way. There are 
doubts, dislocated from experience, like a sentry guard, this figure from the 
past telling you that what you are feeling isn't true; it comes back in when 
you are not looking. 
"What do you mean when you speak of the mind? " 
Catherine: I call the mind 'liveness', where you feel authentic to experience; 
where you are at. It is that connection between you and the present moment. 
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Of course it means different things for different people. There is a way it can 
function as a 'ghost' saying Just don't be silly' - taldng you away from the 
present; yet I can feel it. At that moment my mind goes out of my body, thus 
part of my vital energy is then out there. 
SECTION THREE 
3.5 Legitimating the vitality of this research 
Let me legitimate the acadernic currency in utilizing the art of this somatic body 
practice through situating it within the apparatuses of subjectivation (so as not to 
get caught in the extreme of either biological determinism - that the body in 
sensing is all - or social constructivism - that the apparatuses by which we make 
sense are foremost). These apparatuses produce paths, the criss-crossing of which 
becomes the basis for modes and processes of subjectivation. Guattan identifies 
three distinct types. First, one ofpoxer the circumscription of human groupings 
from the outside, "either through direct coercion of, and panoptic grip on, bodies, 
or through imaginary capture of minds" (1995: 19). So, here I want to suggest that 
working With the body explicitly Within the acaderruc task of producing knowledge, 
makes for a disruption of the embedded processes of subjectivation. For example, 
think of the codification of the visual sense as the dominant sense of perception: 
Why is ability, as in the conception of an able-bodied capacity to 
a person, necessarily always premised on a visible 
categorization? We need to focus research on increasing our 
awareness of a continuum of abilities rather than on an 
either/or situation around the capacity of one of our senses 
(Albright, 1997: 35). 
Second, paths of knowledTe are articulated pragmatically. This is to present a 
deterritorialized and reterritorialized mode of understanding, one that emphasizes 
the ways we make sense of the immediate world around us. In particular 
association with the practice of BMC this is a sense making that is about being in 
tune with the feelings and energies of the body resonating not only from Within 
but 
from the proXiMate relationships to things, spaces and other bodies. This is about 
knowing what to do in the present moment, sometimes something that is quite 
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literally about going With the flow of the events surrounding you - going With the 
feel of the proximate spacings of rhythm, movement, intensity and rest. 
Finally, Guattarl identifies paths that are of seýflreference: the development of 
-processual subjectivity that defines its own co-ordinates and is self-consistent ... 
but can nevertheless establish transversal relations to mental and social 
stratifications" (1995: 19). The notion of transversahty is significant in the work of 
Mix Guattari. It is derivative of a psychotherapeutic concept for the 'group' 
describing the way a individual affirms himself/herself through the language and 
expression pertaining to a particular group thereby constituting a 'subjective' unity 
for the group in terms of the social (see Stivale, 1998: 19-20). Crucially, 
transversality opposes hierarchical groupings that sanctify and enable one person to 
speak on behalf of everyone else. So, Deleuze asks (as we do through this third 
pathway): 
What does it mean to speak for oneself rather than for others? 
It's not of course a matter of everyone finding their moment of 
truth in memoirs or psychoanalysis; it's not just a matter of 
speaking in the first person. But of identifying the impersonal 
and mental forces you confront and fight as soon as you try to 
do something, not knowing what you're trying to do until you 
begin to fight. Being itself is in this sense political. (1995: 88) 
So let me conjecture: the practising of BMC is not about discovering an absolute 
moment of truth - captivating some essential, natural, 
brute, biological fact from 
within your body. Rather it is about speaking for yourself through this vocabulary 
shared in the group practice of BMC, or indeed, in the vocabulary of the body 
performing (therapeutically or on stage). It is a personal attempt to work and 
identify With those impersonal forces that arise in the moment through being a 
visceral, fleshy and feeling body. It is an identification that is simultaneously 
transversallY associated with the wider organization of society. In the next section I 
want to illustrate how this can be argued. I will do this by making active these three 
pathways in talking about BMC, not only as a worthwhile practice in its empirical 
and practical existence, but also in the way it moves our understanding of the 
body 
towards a more general and open mode of representation. This is about unpacking 
and making instrumental the terms that I have borrowed 
from Guattari and his 
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work with Deleuze. This then announces the next problematic encounter with 
Deleuzian thought. 
Problem 4: Transversal pathways 
The four crucial terms for my argument not only strike against 
our geographical imagination as either familiar metaphors or as 
id-io syncratic ally obtuse, but will also construct the ladder that 
enables the theory I want to describe here; the four rungs are: 
paths, apparatuses, subjectivation, and territori'ali. Zation. 
In speaking of paths, and pathways, we are firstly ain-ung at 
pushing through the implications of the terms of becoming. 
Guattari frequently threads his thoughts through the belief that 
"there is no Being already installed throughout temporality" 
(1992: 30). He propels the alternative dynamic topography of 
becoming in the notion of pathic e, %pression- The point is to 
destabilize the notion of space and time existing as separate 
empty containers: the partnership of time and space is not 
imposed, and nor does it impose a grid or definition of the 
world as something already framed. Rather, thinking of paths, 
one appreciates the spacing of the world. Let's think about tl-ýs 
in terms of residing within a potential to lose a sense of 
ourselves. Thus we need to follow a path to a 'coming into 
existence'. The path isn't there yet, it has to be made: thus the 
subject and the pathway become through enunciation onto- 
genetically. 
Secondly, this onto-genetic element spins a net much like a 
spider's web, weaving a more durable consistency to the world, 
producing a netting that loosely frames our actions and channels 
the actions themselves. Consequently, we as social scientists can 
apprehend and work with the notion that there are apparatuses 
that strongly influence the production of the social and the 
sense therein of individual subjectivity. These apparatuses are a 
complex of activities that offer multiple exchanges between the 
nexus of individual-group-machine. They in many ways define 
the conditions of production in relation to meaning and 
subjectivity. It is vital that our understanding of these 
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apparatuses moves beyond just equating them with juridical 
laws, organizational contexts, familial habits and so forth. We 
need to include in our definitions here many of the following: 
"human inter- subjective instances manifested by language; ... 
institutional interactions of different natures; machinic 
apparatuses (for example, those involving computer 
technology); incorporeal Universes of reference such as those 
relative to music and the plastic arts" (Guattari, 1992: 9). 
However, here I want to focus primarily upon the final 
apparatus of incorporeal universes of reference. 
Thirdly, we must be clear about the term subjectitation. The 
distinction it heralds from the notion of subjectivity is that it 
requires us to think through the co-management of the 
production of subjectivity. Subjectivation is the virtual plane of 
potential subjective positions, wherein the actuality of such 
positioning is dependent upon the apparatuses in which we find 
ourselves, and the criss-crossing, polyphonic combination of 
such influences that produces specific pathways for subjectivity. 
Subjectivity is then an emphasis upon the founding instance of 
intentionality (Guattari, 1992: 22); in other words, an emphasis 
upon that instance when we understand how, and what it takes, 
to be able to 'go on'. It should also be clear that intentionality 
does not therefore reside in a pre-given subject(ivity) but is 
something that is enacted and brought forth in the actual 
perforn-ung of the task. For example: 
A child in the dark, gnpped with fear, comforts himself by 
singing under his breath. He walks and halts to his song. Lost, 
he takes shelter, or orientates himself With his little song as best 
he can. The song is Eke a rough sketch of a calming stabilizing, 
calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos. (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988: 311) 
The subject is not then an "ultimate essence of individuation, as 
a pure, empty, prereflexive apprehension of the world, a nucleus 
of sensibility, of expressivity" (ibid). Rather it is a performative 
mapping of a territory, and one that I want to emphasize is 
conceived out of our viscerality (on this see Grosz, 1994b). 
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Finally, it is helpful to recoup these disparate and unfamiliar 
concepts by appreciating the notion of tenitoriafiýZqfion. Following 
Deleuze & Guattari, the factor of transformation is defined 
through its two-fold biological distinction, with the notion of 
territonahty being a transformation of isolation or separation 
rather than the other definition, that of a process of mutation 
(1988: 548n2l). A deterntonalization -a geographical metaphor - 
and yet Within it a wan-nth of intimacy, of suspense, ofsubjectivit y 
that you grab to stay warm, to feel good, to feel sheltered (see 
Guattan, 1997). The bodies perfon-ning the dance, the movement, 
or the rhythm, are equivalent to a moment-by-moment senality 
that presents a sense of subjecthood. 
Through these pathways the perforrMng bodies - our bodies, the body of the 
performer walking across the empty space, and the bodies of the BMC practitioners 
- produce the enunciation of subjecthood as correlative to the emergence of a logic 
of non-discursiVe intensities and the incorporation of vectors of partial subjectivity- 
This is the logic of an alternative cartography, a cartography that charts the planes 
of movement through an understanding constructed out of the vocabulary of 
BMC. In witnessing a performance registered at the level of empty space, this 
opens up a space - the intimate space between bodies and the spacing through 
bodies - within which to apprehend the sense that makes us understand what is 
Cgoing on'. This is about witnessing our bodies through our visceratity and 
understanding empathetically the cartography of affect that a particular move 
makes. 
3.6 Conclusion: geographies of affects and relations 
This is a space of choreography; the spacing and choreographic presentation of 
immediate context. It is a landscaping of moves and relations that "can withstand 
the impact of 'text' .. - and not 
be reduced to an illustrative frame" (Pardo, 1998: 
20); that is not reduced to landscape. Rhythm, movements, feelings, affects, 
emotions, entering into conjuntions, conquering thet'r own plane, and becoming 
ccautonomous from dramatic action, impulses, and situations, and independent of 
characters and landscapes" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 319). An independence of 
character which offers the potential for you to be there outside the cultural 
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ascription of your body, thus no longer as disabled, as weak, as muscular, as tall, as 
white, as male, as handsome, as always-already defined. It is about making an 
apprehension of that outside. It is about being aware, of listening to the alternative 
non-discursiVe logic of making sense through your body. Close your eyes and feel 
the air, the environment, the other bodies, on your skin. Let knowledge breathe, 
feel and desire openly. 
What writer has not dreamt of fteeing himself from meaning in 
order to compose music? What is the point in wrifing if one 
hears nothing? (Serres, 1995a: 126) 
The des-Ire is to suggest a new way of becoming, one that is driven through with 
the blood of the body, made tangible by the excitations of touch, apprehended in 
the dynamic balance of movement and made actual in the affection of 
interrelational intimacy. We can now shift the boundaries of the apprehensions we 
are making in the witnessing of the performance held within the stage of the empty 
space and move beyond the initial register of the body into the realm of 
immateriality, that which the body delivers us to. 
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CHAPTER FoUR 
The materiality and immateriality of objects, or craftsmen 
and apprentices 
Before the Law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper 
there comes a man from the country and prays for 
admittance to the Law. But the doorkeeper says that he 
cannot grant admittance at the moment. The man thinks it 
over and then asks if he will be allowed in later. "It is 
possible", says the doorkeeper, "but not at the moment. " 
The doorkeeper i es him a stool and lets him sit down giv 
at one side of the door. There he sits for days and years 
The man, who has furnished himself with many things for 
his journey, sacrifices all he has, however valuable, to bribe 
the doorkeeper. The doorkeeper accepts everything, but 
always with the remark: "I am only taking it to keep you 
from thinking you have omitted anything" [ ... ] 
Now he [the man] has not very long to live. [ ... ] The 
doorkeeper has to bend low towards him, for the difference 
in height between them has altered much to the man's 
disadvantage: "What do you want to know now? " asks the 
doorkeeper; "you are insatiable. " "Everyone strives to reach 
the law". says the man, "so how does it happen that for all 
these many years no one but myself has ever begged for 
admittance? " The doorkeeper recognizes that the man has 
reached his end. [... ] "No one else could ever be admitted 
here, since this gate was made only for you. I am now going 
to shut it. " (Kafka, 1996: 3-4) 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to chart reconfigurations of the object through a theoretical space 
left in the wake of the dissolution of the subject/object divide. An attempt is made to 
Write the object at degree zero as it exists in the syntactical space of performance, and 
to show how, Within the space of their own scene, both the material ob)ect and the 
object of affection perform an opening into an immaterial realm. The aim is to 
present an enunciation that suspends the habitual ways in which we encounter time 
and space in order to sketch out, initially through the notion of falling in love, some 
potential openings apprehended and made apparent within the affective economies 
carried forward from the last chapter. Through the work of Walter Benjamin and 
Gilles Deleuze in particular I want to show that this speculative endeavour is not 
new, just (and this is a very unfortunate just) little appreciated within the confines of 
academia. I conclude by placing these thoughts back in the empty space of 
performance by illustrating how a particular theatrical performance, and therefore the 
latent potential of performance art in general, has the power to put us in direct 
contact with that which cannot be grasped, the immaterial. 
4.2 The object in general: Italy 1924 - an erotic event: dissolving the 
categorical distinctions which separate body, city and text' 
We live today in the age of partial objects, bricks that have been 
shattered to bits, and leftovers. We no longer believe in the 
myth of the existence of fragments that, like the pieces of an 
antique statue, are merely waiting for the last one to be turned 
up, so that they may all be glued back together to create a unity 
that is precisely the same as the original unity. We no longer 
believe in a primordial totality that once existed, or in a final 
totality that awaits us at some future date. (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1984: 42) 
By way of introducing the chapter we begin in Italy with Walter Benjamin, not Just 
any Walter Benjamin, but Walter Benjamin in love: "This street is named Asja Lacis 
Street" (1997: 45). As Missac comments, Benjan-uns pursuit of As)a Lacis, "who 
had become his muse while living with another man, leaves one astounded by the 
I Burgin, (199 8: 5 6). 
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behaviour of this bashful and obliging suitor" (1995: 5). Here is a man whose 
thoughts were becoming entrenched in the cultural-theoretical currency of material 
fragments and whose body was falling in love, becoming captivated in the 
immaterial. An early textual piece by Benjamin offers illustration of the erotic event 
that foregrounds, what commentators like Caygill (1998) have termed, Benjan-Un's 
speculatiN-e methodology: "eros, love, tends toward none other than the joint death 
of the lovers" (quoted in Missac, 1995: 5); death the ultimate expression of love's 
immateriality. The issue here is the relationship of (or between) materiality and 
immateriality -a sense of an immaterial Always and Ever-after held within a 
material, grounded Now. The ground of the Naples essay, an early experiment in 
Benjan-un's methodology (see Buck-Morss, 1989; Caygill, 1998), and walked 
through with Asja Lacis, is indicative of an early directive Benjamin had hoped to 
achieve in his critical writings. In preparatory notes for his Arcades Prqiect, Benjamin 
writes: "What the child (and weakly remembering, the man) finds in the old folds 
of the mother's skirt that he held on to - that's what these pages should contain" 
(quoted in Hansen, 1987: 185). You cannot describe what the material of the 
mother's skirt evokes, this evocation is immaterial and heartfelt. As I hope to work 
through in this chapter, our impressions of an object have two sides: "Half 
sheathed in the object, extended in ourselves by another half which we alone can 
recognize" (Proust; quoted in Deleuze, 1972: 26). What is clear is that the equation 
i mi of an object and subject is inadequate if we are to emulate the direct ve Benja in 
had hoped to achieve. In his remembrance for Benjamin's work, Nfissac portrays 
this affection for the immaterial in these terms: 
The things Benjamin says about the relationship between eros 
and sexuality in several short texts represents merely a new 
aspect of the dialectic of the near and the far that played such an 
important role for him in so many respects. This dialectic 
explains his interest in Baudelaire's poem 'A une passante' 
... which 
he discussed in one of his last texts: there is always 
something inaccessible about the woman one wants to love. 
(Missac, 1995: 5) 
This "always something inaccessible" quality Will theoretically link the chapter to 
Deleuze's work on Proust's 'apprenticeship to signs'; or, on a different level, the 
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contents of the chapter are united in their pursuit of the status of the object and 
sub)ect reconsidered in the fight of the state of being in love. 
Benjamin's writings at this time are on Naples, and, like the majority of the 
accounts he makes about his particular experiences of urban centres, the city and 
the experience itself are expressed through the experience of other cities (not least 
his home city of Bertin). The otherness of such experiences is not registered solely 
in terms of either spatiality (other places) or temporality (other times) but on other 
actualities (other virtual space-times): writing the experience of the city is a 
"negotiation not exhausted by actual past experiences of the city, but also of those 
experiences which did not ever happen" (Caygill, 1998: 119)2. This otherness 
echoes that "always something inaccessible", a quality that demands an alternative 
analytical framework than the all too easily assumed dialectical logic of subject and 
object. The theoretical nuances begun by Benjamin in Naples presents the first 
reconfiguration of this stale analytic that I want to present in this chapter. The 
critique of Benjamin's work is twofold, firstly the object will be presented as a 
dialectical im, ýge; these: 
images are not subjective impressions, but objective 
expressions. The phenomena - buildings, human gestures, 
spatial arrangements - are 'read' as a language in which a 
historically transient truth (and the truth of historical transiency) 
is expressed concretely, and the city's social formation becomes 
legible within perceived experience. (Buck-Morss, 1989: 27) 
Secondly, the object is composed out of the folds of "perceived experience" 
where, rather than looking for a phenomenological or physiological description of 
perception, the focus is upon the cultural-historically specific grounding of 
perception through concrete encounters. The argument here is that Ben)amin's 
writings on these images, especially in this precursiVe work of Naples (in Naples, in 
1924), are taken directly from the experience of walking through concrete, material 
spaces. The image is apprehended directly from the pulsational encounter of the 
everyday, and in attempting to inscribe this moment in posterity (as theoretical 
2 [An actuality that is so close to happening, so close in 
fact - in material concrete experience - that, in 
metaphorical terms, you could see it 
happening. That it did not makes it hover in sadness, perhaps regret: 'so 
sad, I lost my memory'. ] 
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critique) the desire captures, however transiently, an aspect of the immaterial 
quality of the moment. Thus, we: 
sentiently experience a window, a cloud, a tree not in our brains 
but, rather, in the place where we see it, then we are, in looking 
at our beloved, too, outside ourselves. But in a torment of 
tension and ravishment. [.. .] 
And no passer-by would guess that 
it is just here, in what is defective and censurable, that the 
fleeting darts of adoration nestle. (Benj'an-un, quoted in Taussig, 
1993: 38) 
4.3 Walter Benjamin: the viscosity of historical-cultural material 
Walter Benjan-un's touch upon the object is invested within a wider concern for the 
past. The intimations that lace his many fragments of writing unravel out of 
ruminations on loss - on a sense of loss that is felt through change and within 
memory, a loss felt in the present in preparation for going on in hope. Specifically 
one senses in Benjamin's descriptions or stories around objects the perception of 
loss as it emerges in (modernity's) 'Chokerlebnis: the disorientating indifference 
exhibited in the technological channellings of experience. As Will be presented 
throughout this chapter, subjectivity is finely woven into these configurations of 
the object and one recognizes a melancholic subjectification in, as Lash puts it, "the 
midst of jolting experiences of rapid succession of objects in the wasteland of 
technological culture" (1999: 313). But my interest is not With the status of the 
subject as it is caught in a maelstrom of socio-cultural change, an argument that is 
somewhat hyperbolic in any case, but With the processes of subjectification that, 
through materiality (people and things), speak of the immaterial. Etched into the 
encounter with the object is an intimation for the subject, an intimation of 
Benjamin's spiritual essence and of Deleuze's concept of univocity. This intimation 
is a space between and beyond the subject and the object, the here and the now. It 
speaks of hope. 
In the case of Benjamin, then: in his famous Arcades Prqlect the dream world of 
the c19th is presented (by itselo as "a mortified world of things, a world of 
relfications that are cut off from their origins" (Frisby, 1985: 210). The -ripping out 
of things from their normal connections - AbsmZen - is "a process of unraveuing 
and then recasting in fragments" (Lash, 1999: 325). The fragment is not an 
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objective quality, it is poetically spun out of an intimation of time, death and 
memory. These immaterial vectors are the processes that objectify the fragment 
producing the object not as self-evident thing With an essential quality, but as a 
moment of affective force. The immaterial aspect of the material thing is the focus 
here, that is not to say that if this is disregarded you cannot conceive the material 
object as something whose duration makes it appear to last for all time. However, 
consider this: is not the immaterial aspect of the material in evidence in 
qualification of the disused/unused/rrilsplaced/recast commodity; and is not this 
immaterial agency being evoked in the presence of the object itself'? The space of 
Benjamin's theoretical argument, this dependence on an immaterial aspect to the 
object, precariously alludes to an ideal totality for, in Benjamin's own appraisal, the 
task of Passa gen-Vork was to forage for "the crystal of the total event in the analysis 
of small, particular moments" (Benjamin; quoted in Buck-Morss, 1989: 74). 
However, it is not Benjarrun's intention to ascribe to a teleological topography of 
the world, rather, in consistently looking to the forgotten and the rejected 
Benjamin's narration exhibits signs of a messianic topography: 
The elements of the ultimate condition do not manifest 
themselves as formless progressive tendencies, but are deeply 
rooted in every Present in the form of the most endangered, 
excoriated, and ridiculed ideas and products of the creative 
mind. (Benjamin, 1999: 37) 
By turning to the cast-off objects of the 'History of Progress' Benjamin effects 
their redemption, correcting the loss violently acted out upon them by the 
dominant constructions of experience. The allusion to an ideal totality, of to a sense 
of the absolute, arises in the theoretical foundation justifying this attention to the 
ruins of time - what do such objects have to show us? Caygill sites this tension 
in 
Benjamin's early textual fragments: 
Benjamin's difficulty at this early stage consists in discovering a 
method by which it would be possible to present the immanent 
3 "A relationship to objects which does not emphasize their functional, utilitarian values - that is, their 
usefulness - but studies and 
loves them as the scene, the stage of their fate .... In this circumscribed area, then, 
it may be surmised how the great physiognomists - and collectors arc the physiognornIsts of the world of 
objects" (Benjamin, 1992: 62). 
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absolute without translating it into an ideal totality in the 
manner of Hegelian speculatiVe philosophy. (1998: 9) 
Benjamin's attention to the discarded is worked through by adhering to the 
belief in, what Caygill has called, a notion of speculative experience. Such 
experience requires that the transcendental subject is dissolved into the temporal 
landscape of its objects. So whilst this inevitably draw us towards an expression of 
an immanent totality of spatio-temporal experience, it also speaks of an experiential 
complexity that exceeds any opposition of subjective and objective temporality. 
From this, Caygill notes that the expression of an immanent totality figures in 
Benjamin's arguments in two distinct ways. The first understands the concept of an 
immanent totafitý, as something manifest in the proliferating and complex patterns 
of actual experience (spatio-temporal experience). Whilst the second demonstrates 
an implicit belief in the complexity of time and space as something that exhibits a 
dissolution towards a state of totality, towards an ultimate redemptive immanence 
such that "ail the conditions of possible experience [is dissolved] into emanations 
of the absolute" (see Caygill, 1998: 6). Caygill goes on to argue that, on the whole, 
Benjamin resists the latter figuration4, arguing instead for an immanent totality as 
speculative thought. The art of the speculative is the willingness to make out what 
has been excluded because of particular conditions of legibility or a specific set of 
conditions delineating possible experience. In this vein, an "m-imanent totality is 
manifest as a contour, a rhythm or a warp in experience from which it is possible to 
begin a reading, rather than a moment of spirit which would mark its seal and 
completion" (Caygill, 1998: 7). 
When we encounter an object, do we enact a moment of irreducible observation? Is 
there a law of objects that exists outside of the thing that confronts us? Is a thing partly 
objective in that it is in some of its ways of being-there independent of the string of 
chance actualizations that give it its material realization: is there a general movement of 
apprehension? Or, is a thing also partly subjective; does it possess apprehension by way of 
thought -a speaking beyond the register of the sensual encounter as sometl-dng particular? 
Illustrating the tendency of Benjamin to side-step the absolute notion of an immanent 
, guage of 
Man; the notion of 4 Except, significantly in the notions of voice in On La, ý: guqTe as Such and on the Lan 
divine violence in Critique of Violence; and the notion of pure lalýTuqTe referred to 
in On the Mimetic Faculýi (see 
Benjantin, 1997 and 1999). 
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totality he turns to the concept of an urpbenomenon which removes this part objective, part 
subjective equation by arguing "a timeless law within a temporal observation". This argues 
that the general reveals itself in a particular form: "the point of emanation is actually 
appropriated by the object" (Simmel; quoted in Buck-Morss, 1989: 72). 
The highest thing would be to grasp that everything factual is 
already theory. T he blue of the sky reveals to us the 
fundamental law of chromatics. One would never search for 
anything behind the phenomena; they themselves are the theory. 
(Goethe; quoted in Buck-Niorss, 1989: 72) 
The material, whether that be the molecules making up the sky or the contours 
of an actual object, speaks of the immaterial. In staging this fundamentalist and 
biological concept of Goethe in the realm of history, Benjamin's materialist 
emphasis flanks an all out advocation of an essentialist and transcendental 
metaphysics. Yet, his presentations of historical images or descriptive monographs 
still proffers a theory that shines through without interpretation. Buck-Morss 
suggests an attractive analogy for this problematic and paradoXical theoretical 
situation within Benjamin's conception, that of the crossing of switches: 
The method relies on juxtaposing binary pairs of linguistic signs 
from the language code (here history/ nature), and, in the 
process of applying these signs to material referents, crossing 
the switches. The critical power of this manoeuvre depends on 
both the code, wherein meaning arises from binaries of 
signifier/signifieds independent of the referents, and the 
referents, the materially existing objects, which do not submit to 
language signs meekly, but have the semantic strength to set the 
signs into question. (1989: 60) 
This strength for setting the signs into motion is the significant aspect within 
this conception of the object for the priority it gives to the object itself Lash terms 
the effect this conceptualization has on our theoretical thought as 'object-ism': a 
focusing of our intellectual and felt capacities upon the "speech acts of the material 
objects themselves" (1999: 325). But what are the theoretical foundations 
Benjamin 
uses to configure this 'object-ism'? I want to exan-une this 
further for this is not the 
commonly held understanding of the theoretical equation that is a 
'speech act' (this 
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analogy muddies the waters but I want to show that ultimately it is a useful one). It 
is possible here to turn to The Task of the Translator to witness an important 
extension of Benjan-un's basic line of thought: 
The concept of fife is given its due only if everything that has a 
history of its own, and is not merely the setting for history, is 
credited with fife. In the final analysis, the range of life must be 
determined by history rather than by nature, least of all by such 
tenuous factors as sensation and soul. The philosopher's task 
consists in comprehending all of natural life through the more 
encompassing life of history. (1992: 72) 
Firstly, this hints at Benjamin's conception of historical materialism, the "basic 
principle" of wl-iich, it is important to emphasize, quoting Benjanun from an early diary 
entry, "is not progress, but actualization" (see Buck-Morss, 1989: 79). History for 
Benjamin is not predicated on a social Darwinism - the historical charting of the speech 
act of the object itself is not considered in terms of its ability to channel, or perfect, 
social functioning. Crucial to an understanding of Benjamin's take on history, and the 
way he ascribes thoughts to modernity (and how social theorists might utilize his work 
to comment on such a term) are the implicationsin these following words: "hw-nans as 
a species reached the end of their development tens of thousands of years ago; but 
humanity as a species is just at its beginning" (Benjamin, quoted in Buck-Morss, 1989: 
64). Benjamin's interest in history is humanity's imperfect, chaotic assembling of 
experience into everyday worlds; here humanity as a species speaks of technologies of 
experience. Take Benjamin's "definition of 'modernity' as the new in the context of 
what has always been there" (Benjamin; quoted in Frisby, 1985: 207), in a 'having- 
never-been-modern' world, d-iis is experience through objects: for example, mechanical 
reproduction, rhythmic channelling of energy through experiments with electronic 
sound, the channelling of new spaces through virtual image-scapes, or the many organic 
comportments we undertake (often within the guise of ntual). My point here is to argue 
that 'object-ism' is a theoretical focus on a non-linear trajectory of hui-nanity5, or in 
other words, an interest in the obscure technologies (understood in its broadest sense) 
through which experience of the world is constituted and understood with no necessary 
outcome perceived. (Such thoughts should chime with the presentation of BMC made 
5 Beside the point and non-teleological. 
99 
The malen*afiýl and immalen'akýy of objects, or craftsmen and apprenlicer 
in the previous chapter. ) This broader currency of humanity, of the cultural-historical, is 
encapsulated within the material itself; a belief in this is exemplified in Benjamin's most 
central concept, that of the dialectical image. 
4.3.1 The Dialectical Image 
The concept of the dialectical imaTe "refers to the use of archaic images to identify 
what is historically new about the 'nature' of commodities" (Buck-Morss, 1989: 67). 
Under this conception a dialectical image does not exist as such, it is only so by way 
of some critical practice - "the Ilse of archaic images". 
An uncomprehended symbolism enslaves us Without ceremony 
- sometimes, on awakening, we recall a dream. In this way rare 
shafts of insight illuminate the ruins of our energies that time 
has passed by. (Benjamin, 1999: 6) 
The work of Benjarrun's later, more famous Arcades Pry'ect, embodies the same 
theoretical stance as this extract typical of his earlier essays, but differs in many of 
its modes of expression. One such difference is in Benjamin's use of image; a shift 
in use that effects a "small (repugnant) machinery that allows the coincidental, the 
discontinuous, and maten`a14 to be incorporated into the very roots of thought" 
(Foucault, 1981: 61). This shift in use is the practice that produces the dialectical 
image. What we need to ask is what does this dialectical image speak of in socio- 
theoretical terms? Firstly, it presents the counterevidence to the idea of a 
progressive course of history. The image is itself a material re-view of the wreckage 
of the material destruction acted out in the past. It is, in its affect, a face turned 
towards the past where, metaphorically, it represents the 'Angel of History': "where 
a chain of events appears to us, be sees one single catastrophe which relentlessly 
piles wreckage upon wreckage, and hurls them before his feet" (Benjamin, 1992: 
249). The image is analysed as that which has actually taken place and acts in 
opposition to the mythology of futurist emancipation that writes history as 
progressive, irreal perfection. Secondly, 
What differentiates images from the 'essences' of 
phenomenology is their historic index. (Heidegger seeks in vain 
to rescue history for phenomenology abstractly, through 
historicity). These images must be thoroughly marked off from 
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humanistic categories, such as so-called habitus, style, etc. For 
the historic index of images doesn't simply say that they belong 
to a specific time, it says above all that they enter into legibility 
(Lesbarkei6 at a specific time. And indeed this entering into 
legibility constitutes a specific critical point of the movement 
inside them. Every present is determined by those images that 
are synchronic with it: every Now is the Now of a specific 
recognizability .... It isn't that the past casts its light on what is 
present or that what is present casts its light on what is past; 
rather an image is that in which the Then (das Gewesene) and the 
Now (derjetýZt) come together into a constellation like a flash of 
lightning. In other words, an image is dialectics at standstill ... 
The image that is read, that is, the image at the Now of 
recognizability, bears to the highest degree the stamp of that C) 
critical, dangerous impetus that hes at the source of all reading. 
(Benjamin; quoted in Fynsk, 1992: 116) 
From this lengthy quote I want to remark upon two distinctive attributes 
assigned to the notion of the dialectical image. First is the concept of legibility, a 
concept of relation: the coming together of the Then and Now as a constellation, 
as a dialectical image. Significantly Benjan-un designs this conception as something 
constituted by a "specific critical point of the movement" inside the dialectical 
image itself, in other words legibility is independent of any mediation to an 
intending consciousness. It is possible to see in this independence, despite an 
assertion away from the 'essences' of phenomenology, a contemplation of the 
notion of essence. As Lash (1999) observes, Benjan-un demonstrated this concern 
in some of his earlier essays, particularly those on language - for example, On 
L. aq. Uqge as Such and on the LangouqTe ofMan. It is evident that Benjamin is ascribing to 
an ontological assumption that humans, events and things have a spiritual essence. 
In opposition to sermotics, Benjamin argues that the essence is communicated in 
language, by which he means in language itself and not merely through language 
conceived in solely instrumentalist terms. Therefore, for Benjamin the sign in 
language does not merely refer to a meaning but carries the meaning within it. So, 
to borrow Lash's words, we apprehend "that this essence as mediator lies in what is 
left over after language plays its instrumental function" (1999: 321). In pursuing the 
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direction of Benjamin's thought and influences here, Lash goes on to note the 
cabbalistic dimension to Benjan-un's concept of this spiritual side of language. 
Through allusions to the cabbala Benjamin portrays the communication of essence 
in language as the moment when man names a thing. Thus: 
The previously hidden essence of a thing, ie the deeply mediated 
essence of a thing, becomes immediate in the cabbalistic, the 
magical dimension of language. (Lash, 1999: 322) 
Such thoughts are also employed in Benjamin's essay The Task of the Translator 
It is plausible that no translation, however good it may be, can have 
any significance as regards the original. Yet, by virtue of its 
translatability the original is closely connectedV. 7ith the translation; 
in fact, this connection is all the closer since it is no longer of 
importance to the original. Wl'e m,? y call this connection a natural one, or, 
more spedfzcaý, ý, a tital connection. (1992: 72; my emphasis) 
The original, here of course a written text but by extension a work of art, an 
object, has continued life by way of its translatabihty. This quality of translatability 
is the original's vital connection such that "even in narrowly prejudiced thought 
there was an inkfing that He was not limited to organic corporeality" (Benjamin, 
1992: 72): there is somed-ling more than the material now. So, the concept of 
legibility - 'true translation' - "does not cover the original; doesn't put the original 
under the light, but lets pure language, strengthened through its own medium, only 
more fully reflect onto the original" (Benjan-un, 1992: 79). 
Second, I want to unpack the concept of relation that underwrites Benjamin's notion 
of historic index of images: to recall: "the historic index of the images doesn't simply say 
that they belong to a specific time, it says that above all that they only enter into legibility at 
a specific time" (Benjamin, 1992: 80). The possibility of relation (that between a translation 
gn. o, it defines "the and its original for instance) is a moment of createdness (Relationsbe ' 
,g of relation" 
(Fynsk, 1992: 118). Furthern-iore: structure of the openin 
The very notion of a Relafionsbe: griffis clearly proposed in order 
to differentiate the communication that occurs in the essence of 
language (where language communicates itseýf and not the some 
signified content) from any act of signification or 
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communication effected by an intending consciousness or 
depending in any way on such a consciousness'. (ibid) 
The concept of relation is the immediate expression of the thing itself, this is the 
object's speech act. The particularity of this object formed speech act is perhaps 
best illustrated in a fragment from Benjamin's earliest commentary. Shortly after 
completing The Otins of the German Mourning Play Benjamin started to write about 
the space between the divergent manners of two German Romantic novelists, 
Adalbert Stifter and Gottfried Keller. What interests me here is the revelation of 
the object in this space between their two styles of writing, it is this space that the 
object (speech) acts. Benjamin notes how Stifter's writing creates 44only on the 
visual plane" (Benjan-un, 1999: 112; see Caygill, 1998: 65); this is then seen to 
contrast With Keller's writing style which depicts a sense of revelation as something 
"that must be heard" beyond that which is seen. In Keller's configurations such a 
revelation is consequently not something fully understood. Benjarruin talks of this 
revelation as the "sensual pleasure of description ... because in it the object gives 
back the gaze of the viewer, and in every good description the pleasure involves the 
two gazes wl-lich seek and meet each other" (Benjamin, 1927; quoted in Caygill, 
1998: 65). Out of this Benjamin conceives of the notion of a community of 
recognition - the space of the gazes between object and viewer, a space emerging 
out of a field of recognition - which stands in opposition to the auratic, given that 
the auratic speaks of a space before recognition. And it is this community of 
recognition that gives to Benjan-un one of the vital characteristics delineating the 
concept of the ep'c, that it describes the intertwining of the Limited individual with 
what is far reaching. This configuration of the object through literary exposition is 
then transposed as a conceptual tool for an exposition of modernity through the 
analysis of the cultures of early and high capitalism: 
The immanent critique of literary modernism required an 
analysis of the experience of modernity, just as the latter 
provided the condition of possibility for the immanent critique 
(Caygill, 1998: 63). 
6 Fynsk goes on to clarify this: "A name does not designate a thing external to it (it 
does so only after it has 
fallen into the structure of signification, which for Benjamin is the fall itselo" (Ibid. ). Included as fink to the 
thought from outside, to the limits of thought as conceived in relation to the Fall. 
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SigtUficantly, it is the concept of a modern epic that gives to Benjamin's analysis of 
modern experience the notion of montage that so defines Benjamin's writings on 
experience as situated and orientated through the period of c19th to early c20th. In 
effect this concept configures a way of understanding, and thus conceiving, modern 
experience. For example: 
Marfeilles - the yeflow-studded maw of a seal With salt water 
running out between the teeth. When tl-ýs gullet opens to catch 
the black and brown proletarian bodies thrown to it by the ship's 
companies according to their timetables, it exhales a stink of oil, 
urine, and printer's ink. This comes from the tartar baking hard 
on the massive laws: newspaper kiosks, lavatories, and oyster 
stalls. The harbour people are a bacillus culture, the porters and 
whores the products of decomposition with a resemblance to 
human beings. (Benjamin, 1997: 209) 
However, Ben)amin intimates something more lived than recognition, usurping 
the community of recognition with Proust's 'convoluted time' of memory (1992: 
200). Here Proust is initially cast recounting a life lived through an individual's 
remembrance of the experience of a life. Yet the e, %perience of this, and its 
configuration through the practice of Writing (Proust's idiosyncratic tempo and 
detail), is not spun out of a condition of remembering but rather out of the actual 
experience of having forgotten: 
When we awake each morning, we hold in our hands, usually 
weakly and loosely, but a few fringes of the tapestry of lived life, 
as loomed for us by forgetting. (Benjarnin 1992: 198) 
As Caygill observes the "infinite is present in this experience" of remembering: 
"For an experienced event is finite - at any rate, confined to one sphere of 
experience; a remembered event is infinite, because it is only a key to everything 
that happened before and after" (Benjan-un, 1992: 198). Let me put this differently: 
the convolution of the time of experience is in the fold of the material and the 
immaterial, there is something more than the bare now. 
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4.3.2 The absolute, the mystip, the invisible, the immaterial as univocity; 
or, "No one else could ever be admitted here, since the gate was made 
only for you. I am now going to shut it"7 
What should be there is missing. Quietly, almost painlessly, this 
discovery takes effect. It afflicts us in a region we cannot 
identffi-, as if we had been stricken by the separation long before 
realizing it. (de Certeau, 1993: 1) 
In The A4sfic Fable, de Certeau's theoretical encounter With the Christian mysticism 
of the c16th and cl7th, creates, and/or uncovers, a poetical annunciation of 
perpetual departure within language itself- "What should be there is missing". The 
space of this "region we cannot identify" is the figure of desire. It is an expression 
of the want to be fulfilled, the expression of holding, but for an almost, and an 
intangible, fleeting moment, the constellation of a Now and Then. Whilst there is a 
sense of a lack of a One that cannot be found, I do not wish to emphasize this 
aspect, for in many ways it is less relevant than two other components of this 
poetical annunciation of perpetual departure. First, in the qualities of mourning, 
bereavement and melancholia that haunts the mystic discourse, there is a sentiment 
of nostalgia, but one which does not wish to reflect a celebrated past, an Eden, 
which you want to return to; nor does it find its topography Within the recesses of 
our memory, of an individual's memory. Rather, de Certeau understands that these 
mystic authors bring to the world "statues erected to mark the boundaries of an 
'elsewhere' that is not remote" (1993: 2). We do not lack this 'elsewhere' but we can 
have no clear expression or representation of its existence; we are immersed in it 
already. In an allusion of himself as the "man from the country" in Kafka's Before 
the Law, de Certeau finds himself "near the door" guarded by the doorkeeper who 
presents the situation of it being possible to enter, "but not at the moment". Is this 
a messianic hope that one day soon, some 20 years later perhaps, he will be able to 
go through the door. Or is it eschatological, the desire to go through the door 
comes from "elsewhere", but not in a remote way because it has already happened: 
It is a testamentary: a kiss of death. It appears only at the 
moment when the door closes before the dying man, that is to 
Kafka, 1996: 4: Before the Law 
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say, at the moment when the demand is extinguished, not of 
itself, but from the lack of vi II forces to sustain it. (de Certeau, 
1993: 3) 
It has happened already because it arises out of the moment of your birth when 
your name is written down. However, we need to take a step to one side of this 
argument for it is not my intention, nor was it de Certeau's, to engage in issues of 
theodicy. The death of the man 'before the Law' speaks of materiality, but the 
death itself harnesses the forces of immateriality, the line that is Outside of 
thought8. 
just as in Chapter Two, where thought and substance are intertwined such that 
the gerund of all verbs speaks of an arcbe-icriture; just as theory and practice are 
evoked in the moment of the performance in Chapter Three where in practising 
the somatic art of BNIC meaning arises by being playful in a childlike ability to be 
'open-minded', so here materiality and immateriality are mutually bound. The 
immateriality is apprehended in that state of it 'being possible to enter but not at 
the moment' - it is our materiality that allows us to know/ sense/ apprehend the 
immaterial, but we never actually hold it, not yet at least. This connection can be 
discerned in Benjamin's latter, diluted sense of a spiritual absolute pertaining in the 
material fragment whereupon his conceptualization of the "magic of language was 
no longer confined to the lofty heights of romanticism and symbolism, but came to 
inhabit the lowest, basest levels of the material world" (Lash, 1999: 324). So too we 
have the thematic consistency of the chapter: Eros, the kiss of death, the joint 
death of the two lovers. The testamentary quality of this moment of death is in 
evidence in Deleuze's latter work. In 'a Life ... ' Deleuze writes of the witness of 
the dying of a living thing: 
No one has related what a life is better than Dickens, by taking 
account of the indefinite article understood as the index of the 
transcendental. A good-for-nothing, universally scorned rogue is 
brought in dying, only for those caring for him to show a sort of 
8 "The thing is, Bichat put forward what's probably the first general modern conceptualization of death, 
presenting it as violent, plural, and conextensive with fife. Instead of taking it, like classical thinkers, as a point, 
he takes it as a fine that we're constantly confronting, and cross in either direction only at the point where it 
ends. That's what it means to confront the line Outside". (Dclcuze, 1995: 111) 
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ardent devotion and respect, an affection for the slightest sign 
of life in the dying man. Everyone is anxious to save him that in 
the depths of his coma even the wretch himself feels something 
benign passing into him. But as he comes back to life his caters 
grow cold and all his coarseness and malevolence return. 
Between his life and death there is a moment which is now only 
that of a life playing With death. The fife of an individual has 
given way to a fife that is impersonal but singular nevertheless, 
and which releases a pure event fteed from the accidents of 
inner and outer life, freed, in other words, from the subjectivity 
and objectivity of what happens: Homo tantum With which 
everyone sympathizes and which attains a sort of beatitude. 
(Deleuze, 1997: 4) 
"Taking account of the indefinite article understood as the index of the 
transcendental" - is this not the kiss of death, the revelation that appropriates all 
but that which is your particular gate? That "something benign" that passes into the 
wretch is common to all, it is a life, and it needs no subjectivity nor objectivity to 
discern what happens. This quality of a life that evokes affection from all is the 
immaterial mist that is immanent in everything; it is Deleuze's concept of univocity, 
it is, for example, the condition of falling in love, it is the failing in love itself- 
"Imagine a piece of music that expresses love. It is not love for 
a particular person .... The quality of love will depend upon its 
essence and not upon its object. " Although personal, it is not 
individual; transcendent, it is like the God in us. "When music 
cries, it is humanity, it is the whole of nature that cries with it. 
Truly speaking, it does not introduce these feelings in us; it 
introduces us rather into them, like the passers-by that n-uight be 
nudged into a dance. " (Deleuze, 1988c: 110) 
Why does the performance of a piece of theatre, a piece of live performance, a 
moment of choreographed dance evoke an empathetic and affectual economy? It 
is, I argue now, because these are arts that intimate those 'of-itself' qualities in fife. 
The danger is that this is romantic and idealistic, in that it speaks of there being an 
essential, universal and even transcendent, metaphysicality in the world. In turning 
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to Deleuze in more detail, again starting with the ob)ect and the state of being in 
love, I intend to show that this is not so. 
4.4 Gilles Deleuze: the sensation of attachment 
4.4.1 Lines of apprenticeship 
The analysis of the object is carried out in the style of an apprentice. The task is to 
encounter the object not in relation to the past (its past, our past, the past) but to 
the future Journey that is our apprenticeship. Deleuze instructs us in his own 
absorption into the 'Search' that is Proust's A la Recberche du temps perdu: Proust and 
Sýgns (19 72): 
The Search is given a rhythm not simply by the contributions or 
sediments of memory, but by a series of discontinuous 
disappointments, and also by the means employed to overcome 
them Within each series. (Deleuze, 1972: 26) 
There is no linear progression to our apprenticeship-, it is a journey of setbacks, 
regressions and disappointments. It is a journey where nothing is certain at the 
start; there is no Logos to this world, no departure points inherently validated in 
their capacity to imitate, already, the goal (Deleuze, 1972: 97). The chapter turns to 
Deleuze to assist in learning a capacity to misapprehend the dialectical concept that 
seemingly pervades use of Benjamin's dialectical image. The 'Search' is this fine of 
apprenticeship, and the first rule is: beware the law already known before its 
application, before actualization, "this is the dialectical trick by which we discover 
only what we have already given ourselves by which we derive from things only 
what we have already put there" (Deleuze, 1972: 94). Like the man before the Law, 
don't forget for one moment that you are always aiming to go through the door, 
but also don't not realize that this might never actually be possible. An adequate 
starting point to this apprenticeship is "to be sensitive to signs", "to attribute to the 
object the signs it bears" (Deleuze, 1972: 26). 
Problem 5: The symptomology of signs 
We have an habitual tendency to turn to the object in order to 
seek a decipherment of the signs it emits - our passion, our 
intelligence, our perception and our self-worth, actiVely 
encourages this way of slipping into an encounter (ibid). 
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Deleuze calls this inclination objeah)ism. The impression between 
'subject' and 'object', the betweenness of an encounter, is "half 
sheathed in the object, extended in ourself by another half 
which we alone can recognize" (Proust; quoted in Deleuze, 
1972: 26). This is a sign, it half designates an object, the other 
half signifies something different; one half is the material actual, 
a sensational designation, the other is that something beyond 
the Now, the immaterial. The former is the objective side, "the 
side of pleasure, of immediate delight and of practice" (Deleuze, 
1972: 26). This objective half of the sign speaks of recognition, 
through it we recognize things but do not know them. The 
performative space of this part of the encounter is the site of 
pleasure, the site of immediate delight - immediate in the sense 
of seeing the object, of recognizing the object, of identifying 
who/what is designated (a lover, a friend, an apple, a revolver). 
The object is not touched, smelled, tasted; it is not known. This 
side is the "splendor of the sign" to which our expressions of 
the object can be nothing more than our homage to it. 
Initially in our apprenticeship we concentrate on this half, "Missing the finest 
encounters ... the imperatives that emanate from them" (Deleuze, 1972: 26). This 
sight is the sighting of a first love: 
I told myself that this was indeed the woman whom the name 
Duchesse de Guermantes desi ýgnated for everyone; the 
inconceivable fife this name signifiedwas actually contained by 
this body. (Proust; quoted in Deleuze, 1972: 27) 
The objective side sees this love as unique and in this uniqueness it is cast as 
mysterious. The sign the loved one ennts belongs to that person and only they truly 
understand and possess it. The apprentice must move from seeing this mysterious 
world as something to discover: disappointment in the quest to uncover its 
mysteries teaches us that the world is mysterious and no amount of homage to the 
object will "restore to the beloved what one believes belongs to it" (Deleuze, 1972: 
27). Thus the "hero of the Search" does not know at the start of his apprenticeship: 
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-that the truth has no need to be spoken in order to be 
manifest, and that it can be attained perhaps more certainly 
without waiting for words and without even taking them into 
account, in a thousand external signs, even in certain invisible 
phenomena, analogous in the world of characters to what 
atmospheric changes are in the world of physical nature". 
(Proust) (quoting from Deleuze, 1972: 28) 
But the young lover must not despair in the tasks of the apprentices I-lip, for love 
itself is hinting at the other side: "the sign is an encounter rather than an act of 
recognition, and it can only be felt or sensed: signs act directly on the nervous 
system" (Marks, 1998: 38). The state of disappointment draws the apprentice, 
through experience, into the art of signifying something different; drawing them to 
a fleeting appreciation of the anti-Logos of the world: 
The following experience will be familiar: if one is in love, or 
just intensely preoccupied with another, his portrait will appear 
in almost every book. Moreover, he appears as protagonist and 
antagonist .... And from this it follows that the faculty of 
imagination is the gift of interpolating into the infinitely small, 
of inventing, for every intensity, an extensiveness to contain its 
new, compressed fullness. (Benjamin, 1997: 75) 
This is the irrational hue of the lover's world; a portrait that exemplifies the anti- 
Logos. And yet, in the infinitely small one is drawn out into the larger world, 
hoping to take from this moment of intensity some meaning. In other words, the 
lover is attempting to find recourse in the extensive exterior of the world, to find 
empathy in his or her predicament. According to Deleuze, these intense moments 
are sensuous signs that set up the potential of failure, they actualize our 
disappointment by inviting us to seek meaning in the object that bears them. 
However, the compressed fullness is there in the moment, not before nor ever- 
after: It is possible but not at the moment. No one else could ever be admitted bere. The 
disappointment is the abandonment of interpretation. (Deleuze, 1972: 31). 
Disappointment is a fundamental moment of the search or of 
apprenticeship: in each realm of signs, we are disappointed 
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when the object does not give us the secret we were expecting. 
(Deleuze, 1972: 33) 
And thus with all objects the subject intervenes: '! /or the disa , 
ppointment of the object, 
be attempts tofind a subjective compensation" (ibid). The sign is more profound than the 
object ernitting it, but it is still grounded in the object. And in similar tension, the 
sign's meaning is more profound than the subject interpreting it, but it is half 
incarnated in a series of subjective associations. But what is there except the object 
and the subject? 
Problem 6: The essence of the phrase of the sign 
In Proust's A la Recherche du tempsperdu, the hero goes to the 
theatre to hear Berma's talent in her performance of Phedre, but 
what he experiences is neither Berma (her talent in isolation) 
nor the character Phedre. "Phedre is a role, and Berma unites 
herself with this role; not in the sense in which the role would 
still be an object or something subjective; on the contrary, it is a 
world, a spiritual milieu populated by essences" (Deleuze, 1972: 
36). Deleuze proposes the essence as the alternative to the 
object and subject. It is, however, "only on the level of art that 
the essences are revealed" (1972: 37). 
Again, we should be cautious With this advocation of essence. 
Firstly, Deleuze is not proposing some essential, transcendental 
quality that will have existed and always Will exist. In direct 
continuation to the previous quote, Deleuze writes, "But once 
they are manifested in the work of art, they react upon all other 
realms; we learn that they were already incarnated" (ibid. ). The 
incarnation has to happen, it has to be actualized once; in other 
words it takes place in the material concrete world. Secondly, we 
are asked to consider why it is that the essence exists only in art? 
Why are the signs of art different? Deleuze suggests that it is 
their immateriality that gives them their superiority. This 
argument leads up to what is one of the central theoretical 
gns, all of which is contained in pronouncements of Proust and Si 
this following phrase from A la Recherche du tempsperdu- 
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As if the performers not so much playcd the httlc phrase as 
executed the rites neccssary for it to appear. (quoted in Dclcuze, 
1972: 39) 
The 'little phrase' is that of a piece of music (Vinteull's). As 
Deleuze points out it can be "decomposed materially: five notes 
very close together, two of which recur"; likewise the notes, 
themselves material, are "merely the 'sonorous appearance' of 
an entirely spiritual entity" (1972: 39). But the 'it' that appears is 
immaterial. It is immaterial because you cannot uncover the 
sign's meaning in something else - the something else always 
pertains to matter, and as such the meaning conceived is 
refractory to this sense of spirit, of immateriality. The signs of 
art provide the unity of the immaterial sign and its spiritual 
meaning; this is Deleuze's interpretation of Proust's 'essence'9. 
This definition makes it clear that he is not talking of a universal claim for 
essences, there is no such thing as an essence for all things. As Marks observes, 
Deleuze "compares Proust's essences to Leibniz's monads", the shared assertion of 
different Viewpoints expressing difference in such a way as to undermine "the 
privileged value normally associated with conversation, communication and 
friendship" (1998: 20). The monad, or the essence, "has neither doors nor 
windows: the viewpoint being the difference itself, viewpoints toward a world 
supposedly the same are as different as the most remote worlds" (Deleuze, 1972: 
42). There is no link - you are unique, this is unique, that is its essence. There is no 
such thing as intersubjectivity because there can be no communication. There is 
only the 'in-between-space' where there is no you or me, or subject and object, but 
only the encounter, the situation. Take into consideration friendship: friendship is 
not thrown aside, rather it is reconfigured in relation to the emission of signs. As 
Marks Writes, "we all know that we 'click' with some individuals and not With 
others", we are charmed through our sensitivity to the signs of friendship 
functioning "at a level of perception which occurs prior to signification" (1998: 38). 
9 In other words, "What is an essence, as revealed in the work of art? It is a difference, the absolute and ultimate 
Difference. Difference is what constitutes being, what makes us conceive being". (Dclcuzc, 1972: 41) 
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Prior to signification because there is no shared map of meaning with which to 
communicate, it Just happens and it feels right, it is a happy or a sad encounter. 
It is easy to comply With a gross misconception of this argument, and this error 
works on two accounts. One understands the Leibnizian world of monads as a 
relativistic world. This is a world of absolute non-communication, one that is 
chartered by individuals of irreconcilable difference. Deleuze's argument does 
begin with the notion of an individual subject expressing an absolutely different 
world, a world which "so expressed does not exist outside the subject expressing it)) 
(1972: 42). But, Deleuze continues, "what we call the external world is only the 
ýgf all 
these morlds e, %pressed' (ibid; my disappointing pny'ection, the standardizin limit o1 
emphasis). In extrapolation towards the concept of the essence, the essence: 
does not exist outside the subject expressing it, but it is 
expressed as the essence not of the subject but of Being or of 
the region of Being which is revealed to the subject. (Deleuze, 
1972: 43) 
The subject does not come before the essence but the concept of essence is 
implicated in the subject. The subject does not therefore constitute the world for it 
is the essence that constitutes the individual by a process of individualization, by a 
process of subjectivity actualized in the essence's implication with the subject. In 
this way the individual matters - the theatrical space is Chekov's The Cber7yOrchard- 
the cherry trees are chopped down, how do you deal With that loss? How do you 
deal with lossý The world is never the same again. Individuals matter. 
At first the piano alone complained, like a bird abandoned in its 
vi - It countrysi the iolin heard, replied from a neighbouring tree 
was like the beginning of the world, as if there had been, as yet, 
only the two of them on Earth, or rather in this world closed to 
all the rest, constructed by the logic of a creator in such a way that 
only the two of them would ever exist: this sonata. (Proust; 
quoted in Deleuze, 1972: 44) 
Only the two of them would ever exist, eros: the death of two lovers, the 
material and the immaterial. 
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4.5 Conclusions: The dialectical moment/image/object - Arcadia 
As a conclusion, I want to pull all the threads of the chapter together through a 
theatrical example that serves to illustrate how, in the location of performance, a 
space emerges Within which it is possible to site the presence of the immaterial. 
This a-rises out of the ability of performance to put in the same space characters 
that do not share the same timeframe. So in the extract that follows, from Tom 
Stoppard's Arcadia, note that Valentine, Hannah and Gus do not interact with 
Septimus and Thomasina because they do share the same time in history: 
(Tbe draiving room, Sidley Park-) 
SEPTIMUS: This is not science. This is story-teffing. 
THOMASINA: Is it a waltz now? 
SEPTIMUS: No. 
[ ... I THOMASINA: Yes, we must hurry if we are going to dance. 
VALENTINE: And everything is mixing in the same way, all the time, irreversibly 
SEPTIMUS: Oh, we have time, I think 
VALENTINE: ... till there is no time left. That's what time means. SEPTINWS: When we have found all the meanings and lost all the mysteries, we will be 
alone, on an empty shore. 
THOMASINA: Then we will dance. Is this the waltz? 
SEPTIMUS: It will serve. 
,g 
truant from the paq. She pours herseýý more wine. The (FIANNAH, goes to sit at The tabk, plqyhý 
, g, 
Hannah's research books, table contains tbegeometrical solids, the computer, decanter, glasses, tea mu 
Septimus ý books, the two portfolios, Thomaxina's candlestick, the oil lamp, the dahlia, the Sunday papers 
gmstus; per, ps ... GUS appeari- in the doorway. 
It takes a moment to realize that the be is not Lord Au ha 
not until HANNAH sees him. ) 
SEPTIMUS: Take your essay, I have given it an alpha in blind faith. Be careful with the 
flame. 
THOMASINA- I will wait for you to come. 
SEPTIMUS: I cannot. 
THONUSINA- You may. 
SEPTIMUS: I may not. 
THOMASINA: You must 
SEPTIMUS: I will not. 
y on the table. ) (Sbe puts the candlestick and the essa 
THOMASINA- Then I will not go. Once more, for my birthday. 
(SEPTIWS and THONUSINA slarl to valt. Z together. 
GUS comesforward, stallfihg HANNAH-) 
HANNAH: Oh! - you made me jump. 
ftiff-backedjoko fastened with a g an old and somemhat tattered (GUS looks mýplendent, He is carghl 
tape tied in a bow. He comes to HANNAH and thrusts thispresent at 
ber. ) 
Oh ... (She lays thefolio down on the table andslarts to open it It comixts of only two boards hiqed, containing 
Tbomasina's draviog. ) 
, sepdmus with Platus'. (To GUS) I was looking for that. Thank you 
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(GUS nods several times. Tben, ratber awkwarýly, be bows to her. A Regeng bow, an invitation to dance. ) 
Oh, dear, I don't really ... (After a moments hesitafion, she gets up and thg bold each other, keepig a decorous distance between 
them, and start to dance, rather awkwardly. 
SEPTIMUS andTHOMASINA continue to danceflaentý, to tbepiano. ) 
END 
We are in the midst of a theatrical illustration of Stoppard's characteristic 
style of 'double vision' where the action of the play is filtered through two 
different framing devices: two different perspectives, or different levels of 
thought, are presented in one moment. There can be many different 
perspectives (this is an example of Deleuze's Leibnizian world) but, even in 
theatre's aesthetic and structural polyvocality, this complexity requires skilful 
handling when dealing with Just two: the temporal division where Septimus and 
Thomasina are in 1809, whereas Valentine, Hannah, and Gus are in the 
present. Hannah, an historian, is one of several academics who have descended 
on Sidley Park in the hope of finding archival evidence to support a current 
historical thesis. Specifically, she is looking for proof of the 'Sidley Hermit' as 
he is to be the "peg for the nervous breakdown of the Romantic Imagination. 
I'm doing landscape and literature 1750 to 1834" (Hannah in Arcadia, Stoppard, 
1993). There is evidence that the 'Sidley Hermit' existed - fragments of 
material, letters, shooting records, estate bookkeepings - but nothing definite. 
Immateriality takes its place, not only in the present of the historian's task, but 
in the situation of the past for at around the same time as the hermit Sidley 
Park was damaged in a fire which is about to be caused, in the time of the 
theatre performance, by Thomasina, the candle and the dance. 
The object Gus brings to Hannah is a drawing by Thomasina of Septimus, it is 
theatrically a presentation of her state of falling in love (with Septimus). She draws 
Septimus with his tortoise 'Plato', the same tortoise Hannah finds in the historical 
fragments alluding to the existence of the hermit. It is clear then to the audience 
that the hermit is Septimus, an existence brought on in his distress after 
Thomasina's tragic death in the fire that is about to happen/or has happened. This 
drawing is, in these terms, a dialectical image of that 'always something inaccessible' 
quality that is the immaterial, both in its creation through the state of falling in love 
and through its historic importance in the present. A material object possessing two 
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immaterial resonances. This revelation, not actual for the character's but virtual and 
apparent to us the audience, is like being nudged into a dance -a movement that 
connects both the Then and the Now, a movement beyond the here and now of 
materiality. 
In this scene, and in the scene of the chapter, the space of performance evokes 
three openings into the immaterial. The first opening is the achievement of the 
dissolution of the object/subject and material/immatenal divide, a blurring of the 
boundaries of orientation such that the body, the material and the force of 
utterance fold into a moment of immateriality. This has been portrayed throughout 
the chapter in the example of falling in love where it can be argued (Ideally) that 
both space and time are folded such that Here and Now feels like an Always and 
Everafter: the poignancy of Septimus's dance with the soon fated Thomasina - 'we 
will have time to dance/until there is no time left'. Only having established a 
topography for this almost vertiginous state of immateriality can an encounter with 
performance move back from the immaterial to the material towards an 
appreciation of the scene of the object itself. This movement is that of the second 
opening: a speculative apprehension of the material world no less grounded than 
the fact that the material world is incorporated into the very roots of thought. 
Materiality is necessarily shown to be folded with the practice of thinking. This is 
the performance of thought as it encounters the object - in other words, it is the 
act of the dialectical image, the image that Thomasina's drawing gives Hannah; a 
dance to the music of time. This is both the gap within which sensing switches to 
sense making (this doesn't Just occur on one plane of thought it happens 
simultaneously). Performances are therefore full of profane illuminations, the point 
is they need to be folded into our academic stories - 'This is not science'. Finally, 
there is an opening onto a sense of opening itself, the opening that is the power of 
the sign. This is a symptomology that is clinical in the way it indicates that which is 
not apparent; the fact that what is there is missing - the characters on the stage of 
Arcadia who cannot interact; a mystic fable; an elsewhere that acts directly on the 
senses but cannot be recognised for correspondence. This is disappointing: we will 
only ever have a partial apprehension of the immaterial, that is its nature. 
All of us carry invisible dreams around us; .... The dance 
begins. Our hands slide off one another; our glances meet, 
laden, emptying themselves out and smiling from the ultimate 
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heaven. Our bodies make careful contact; we do not arouse each 
other from our dreams .... We have bound everything in gay 
colours, masks, alternately Withholding and promising naked 
flesh. In everything there is something monstrous that we have 
to keep quiet about. But we hurl ourselves into the rhythms of 
the violins .... When was time ever overcome? Who knows who 
we will meet at this hour. Otherwise (were there an "otherwise") 
we would be just here, but already complete .... The music 
transports our thoughts; our eyes reflect our friends around us, 
how they all move, surrounded by the flowing night. We are 
truly in a house Without windows, a ballroom Without world. 
Flights of stairs lead up and down, marble. Here time is 
captured. It sometimes resists, moves its weary breath in us, and 
makes us restless .... We know that all the merciless realities that 
have been expelled still flutter round this house. The poets With 
their bitter smiles, the saints and the policemen, and the waiting 
cars. From time to time, music penetrates to the outside world 
and submerges them. (Benjamin, 1999: 16-17) 
Following this music to the outside world, the next chapter sets the scene to 
make the argument that, despite the disappointment, academics need to become 
better Witnesses of the immateriality of the world. 
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Events: witnessing the inhuman 
The bright fields look dazed. 
Their expression is changed. 
They have been somewhere awful 
And come back without him. 
The trustful cattle, with frost on their backs, 
Waiting for hay, waiting for warmth, 
Stand in a new emptiness. 
(Ted Hughes, The Day He Died, 1995: 190) 
"Event(s), 64,65,132,171,176; and accident, 53-54; communication of, 
174,185ý 214; communicating the univocity of being to language, 248; 
compatibility of, 177-78; conjunction of, 183; death as, 156; difference 
from things and states of affairs in Carroll, 9-11; distributed in two series 
constituting metaphysical surface, 241; double structure of, 151-52; 
effects in, 5,210; castration of, 351n3; Epicurean notion of, 344n4; eternal 
truth of, 161; as the expressed of proposition, 184,186; and experience,, 
170-71; Freudian theory of, 226; heterogeneous series of, 70; 
ideational. /Mcorporeal, 8; infinitely divisible, 8,113,114; lack of present 
in, 63-64; and language, 3,181-185; logic of, 111; and metaphysical surface, 
221-22; modality of, 33-34; movement and, 276-77; nature of, 94,95; 
Oedipus and, 212; phantasm, 213-214; in proposition, 12,34; problematic 
as mode of, 54,56; reahzation of, 87,104; relation of, 33,171; 
representations of 245; sense as, 22,107,167,176,180,211; series of, 37, 
38,148-1535,226; signifier as, 37-38; singularities as, 53,56; singularity of, 
152-53; in Stoic ethics, 143,144,146; surface-, 167; symbolic relation with 
state of affairs, 240; and thought, 220-21; unique, 178; see also 
Actualization of event; Communication of event; Pure event. " 
(Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 1990a: 376-77; my emphasis) 
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5.1 Introduction: The wooden horse of representation 
There's a profound link between signs, events, life, and vitatism: 
the power of non-organic life that can be found in a tine that's 
drawn, a line of writing, a tine of music. It's organisms that die, 
not tife. Any work of art points a way through life, finds a way 
through the cracks. (Deleuze, 1995: 143) 
The performance in the empty space is an art that points a way through the cracks of 
our organic organization of life, a way through the organization - representational 
(systems of signification and validation), social (Capitalization) and biological 
(survival)' - that keeps that 'always something inaccessible' away from view. This is 
the limit of representation but not representation's limit; the latter is the space where 
representation leads us into an encounter with that which is always inevitably 
somewhat inaccessible. It is the space where we apprehend that 'inaccessible quality 
but for a fleeting moment and through a personal register, which means that after the 
experience we find it difficult to testify and be it's witness - the organization of 
representation lets us down. And yet there is the hope that in such felt capture we are 
not alone, that it can be made to make sense for other people, that there is a line of 
non-organic life that can be drawn. If representation at its present limits misses the 
reality that we seek to capture through it, maybe art, and performance in particular, 
"stands as both the medium of this failure and the agency for the hope of its 
restitution. In the moments of representational crash performance opens meaning 
and sends the spectator elsewhere" (Fleathfield, 2000: 21). This said, I have been 
struck by how this human geography, that which looks to the condition of what I 
think can be appropriately described as the 'living through of life', escapes due 
emphasis. The efforts made 2 to map the emotions, passions, responses, perturbations 
and forbearance that come with the encounters and events that life brings are 
I don't want to be misunderstood here: by each of these I mean the way their importance overrides at a social 
level the personal level. For example, instances of this personal level include: the Mability to Put into words a 
personal felt reality (representation); the need for personal space and time away from the orchestration of 
Capitalism and the 'rat' race mentality (social); and finally the needs of the individual to feel a sense of 
belonging aside from the obvious hand to mouth requirements (biological). Of course this is a caricature 
because performatively we utilize the social level to invent such spaces for personal investment - Capitalism 
quickly colonizes this though! 
2 See for example, Tuan 1977, and in particular Chapter 10, Seamon, 1979, and Buttimer and 
Seamon, 1980. 
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underacted and underprized. You only need to think of what has been achieved in 
the arts - the lilt of music, the brilliance of pamt and form, the lyrics of novels, or the 
light fantastic of dance - to appreciate that there is a world of feeling to be extracted. 
This is not to say that practising geography should be a cathartic experience; more 
that these seemingly ephemeral, intimate moments should be given the right place in 
the geographer's consideration. There is an urgency here: Cassandra like - thin in 
number but powerful in voice - Nigel Thrift urges geography to stop looking at 
things in the usual way and to focus instead on i ing the right place to description giv 
(1998). And he provides a legend for this alternative mapping: 
The difficulty -I might say - is not that of finding a solution 
but rather of recognismg as the solution something that looks as 
if it were only a preliminary to it ... This is connected, I believe, 
with wrongly expecting an explanation, where as the solution of 
the difficulty is description, if we give it the right place 'in our 
considerations. (Wittgenstein, quoted from Thrift, 1998: 221) 
In many ways, and in several places, this thesis is all about responding to this 
call. The stance of this chapter is the argument that the geographer's art should 
have the ranTe of description to encompass the 'dazed look' of the fields, and that 
cnew emptiness' of the world experienced and expressed by Ted Hughes and so 
many others. This task is begun by moving aside from our 'habits of thinking' 
(Deleuze, 1994). One of the reasons that geographers have avoided the field of the 
human condition, as described above, comes with the accepted practice of 
rendering the individual as a knowing subject of rational occurrences and rational 
choices of which emotions can take no part. Additionally, the assumptions 
contained within this practice are accompanied and performed by a host of 
methodological technologies: for example, focus groups, interviews, questionnaires 
and, potentially more deviant, the ethnography of participant observation. These 
technologies are ill-equipped, or misused in the name of convention (a hidden 
agenda that ratifies what an empirical study can be), to deal with the world of 
individual emotions. Thus the task of researching human feelings, the immaterial 
registers discussed in the previous chapter, are deemed too subjective and hence 
unverifiable and unscientific. But I want to argue that there is an alternative space 
upon which to focus and lay out the importance of these immaterial feelings, and 
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that is the space of the event. So the task of thinking otherwise can be presented 
with more definition: to become better witnesses, better 'describers% of the spaces 
events bring into relief - spaces such as that 'new emptiness' which the poet 
suggested hangs 'affectively' over life. But I have to make a further claim: that as 
Nvell as description we need experimentation and this brings us back to geography 
as an art or as a discipline that can offer so much to the question of the human 
condition by way of the arts. Experimentation is needed in part because we do not 
yet have the experience, as a discipline, of the skills capable of accomplishing the 
finer details of description that are more attuned to these event spacings, and partly 
because such description in itself requires the courage of experimentation. It is a 
question of style rather than of competence: 
In each case style is needed - the writer's syntax, the musician's 
modes and rhythms, the painter's lines and colours - to raise 
lived perceptions to the percept and lived affections to the 
affect. (Deleuze, 1994: 170) 
It is a question of looking at things in an unusual way: to look instead at the 
spaces between individuals; to seek responses beyond the lived perceptions or 
affections; and to make our perspectives Vibrate in order to rend the percept from 
perceptions and the affect from affections (see Deleuze & Guattan, 1994: 176). So, 
this chapter charts the move from an interview that asks about the lived 
perceptions of the knowing subject in a specific place - 'What do you feel about 
your body when you sit down for a meal? ' - to a method that aims in media res and 
towards a documentation of the percepts that shape the events spacing the 
particularities of a place - 'Can you tell me about a room and something that 
happened there? ' 
Affects and percepts are thus the generic and immanent 
elements constitutive of a life .... 'life' is constructed on an 
I. mmanentplane of consisteng that knows only relations between 
affects and percepts, and whose composition, through the 
creation of blocks of sensations, takes place in the indefulite and 
virtual time of the pure event (Aeon). (Smith, 1998: xxxv) 
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The alm is to turn to the notion of the event to show that the difference 
between geography as a social science or as an art collapses when the validation of 
what counts as knowledge is rethought. In particular, I have my sights on the 
representational understandings that have predominated geographical imaginations 
- those views that restrict knowledge by attaching its validation to either an 
essentialism that ignores the post-structural developments in c20th philosophical 
thought, or to an empiricism that does not question its own foundations. In the rest 
of the chapter I begin by working out of these two attachments In order to reveal a 
space in which to think anew alternative geographical imaginations worthy of 
witnessing the event. Subsequently, in the space cleared by this opening discussion,, 
the chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I seek to show how 
the concept of the event has haunted many of the c20th continental philosophers, 
and how, for our purpose now, this haunting involvement reveals an ethical 
argument and injunction for the inclusion of ways of witnessing the 'inhuman'into 
our research practices. Next I situate the space of another piece of research shaping 
the directions of this thesis and the particular concerns of the thoughts delivered to 
us by an encounter with the event itself This research took the shape of observing 
the processes involved in the creation of a space of performance. This is the art of 
devised theatre (see Oddey, 1998; Etchells, 1999,2000; and Ghoulish, 2000). This 
involved four days observation work of a two-week residential workshop by a 
newly formed live art performance group Uninvited Guests - Paul Clarke, director; 
Jessica Hoffman & Ben Slater, actors; Thomas Keller, computer programmer; Liam 
Fahey & Jessica Marlowe, sound. The residential was a part of the process of 
devising a live art digital performance entitled Guest House: "a tour of an 'impossible 
building' composed of rooms gathered from elsewhere; a fragile place where stones 
are continually told, traced and rubbed out (Paul Clarke, 1999). Their own 
research for, and subsequently content of, the piece comes from recorded 
interviews conducted with members of the public where they simply started by 
saying: 'I'm going to ask you to describe a room and something that happened 
there'. I present the observation through the fold of my empirical, first person 
notes and the interventions of theory that make sense of the capture of these 
observations, observations that are ostensibly about witnessing the inhuman, non- 
organic line of life. In this light, the final section pursues the concept of the event 
to bring consistency to the experimentation on show, an endeavour that attempts 
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to reveal how working with Deleuze's philosophy produces a conceptual space for 
evaluation. 
5.1.1 The problem of the transcendent set-up; an essentialism 
Thanks to an arrangement which is like the symbol of all 
perception, each one feels himself to be the centre of the 
theatre. (Proust, quoted in Bennington, 1988: 12) 
One of the main consequences of this predominance of representational 
understanding is that there is a totalization of thought In the very artifice through 
which we present that which we are attempting to understand. In his earlier work 
jean-Francois Lyotard used the term of a theatrical set-up or dirpositif to act as a 
motif for much of his critique of this representational system of Western 
philosophy. The theatrical metaphor portrays his view that the representational 
system operated like the theatrical machinery that hes hidden from the spectator 
off-stage: 
For the sign is, as Pierce said, something which replaces something 
else for someone. Hide-show: theatricality. (Lyotard, Des Diposififs 
Pulsionnels, 1979: 95; quoted in Bennington, 1988: 14) 
That someone includes us - the social scientists, the researchers and the writers. 
In some way we are all false witnesses to what is there'. So, even though the 
philosophical drive moves against the apparently sterile set-up of totalising 
representations, the presentation of ideas is trapped within the structure it is trying 
to critique. In my opinion, this sterility is only apparent. Significantly this 
appearance is valid from both sides: from the side of representational theory 
because of the belief in the representational structure as being able to give an 
account of everything; and from the side of non-representational theory because of 
the danger of getting carried away with an absolute critique of representations. 'The 
3 For example, Lyotard uses the example of the historian who "is supposed to undo all the machinery and 
machination, and restore what was excluded, having knocked down the walls of the theatre. And yet It is 
obvious that the historian is himself no more than another director" (Lyotard, Des Dispositifs Pulsionnels, 1979: 
180; quoted in Bennington, 1988: 10). 
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apparent sterility comes from this last point, that in getting carried away with 
critique you fail to appreciate that the building blocks of representation ate not 
sterile in themselves; it is only when they are used as part of a system. In other 
words, not all theatre is 'realist'; and hence the research of this chapter into the 
performance art of devised theatre. The representational system, its structure and 
regulation of meaning, is not complete - it needs constant maintenance, loyalty and 
faith by those who practice it. In this regard, its power is in its pragmatic functions: 
easy communication of ideas (that restrict their potential extension), and 
sustainable, defensible and consensual agreement on understanding (a certain kind 
of understanding, and hence a certain type of knowledge). The non- 
representational argument comes into its own when it sets out to suggest that we, 
as academic thinkers and researchers, are lazy if we don't revisit the performative 
space of representation in a manner that is more attuned to its fragile constitution. 
For me the project of non-representational theory is to excavate the empty space 
between the lines of representational meaning. The representational system is not 
wrong. Rather, it is the belief that it offers complete understanding - and that only it 
offers any sensible understanding at all - that is critically flawed. 
As there are evident gaps in the representation of our understandings, there are 
also many uncharted, or perhaps forgotten, cartographies for orientating out 
appreciation of the world in which we find ourselves (Links can be made here to the 
cartography of BMC made in Chapter Three). Modestly, we should not forget that 
the task of the researcher,, the academic, and the philosopher is one that only 
arrives at a partial apprehension of the 'eventhood' of the world. Assessing this task 
therefore lies less in the 'truth' that comes with a belief in absolute knowledge, and 
more in the spirit in which we focus upon the gaps of knowledge hidden behind 
representation's claim to have covered all possible eruditions. As Deleuze puts it, 
there ij- 
A theatre of multiplicities opposed in every respect to the 
theatre of representation, which leaves intact neither the identity 
of the thing represented, nor the author, nor spectator, nor 
character, nor representation which, through the vicissitudes of 
the play, can become the object of production of knowledge or 
final recognition. Instead, a theatre of problerns and always open 
questions which draws spectator, setting and characters into the 
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real movement of an apprenticeship of the entire unconscious, 
the final elements of which remain the problems themselves. 
(1994: 192) 
In other words, this is about the researcher's task to invent concepts that have 
the potential for making coherent grasps of the world's theatre of multiplicities and 
that have the power to deal with these open questions. (As I mentioned 'in the 
introduction, this task is something that I think is overlooked in human geography). 
As researchers the task is not to be found wanting in relation to the open questions 
that this unconscious movement of the world asks of us. Rather it is about 
attempting to be worthy "of what happens to us" (Deleuze, 1990a: 149) -a clear 
indication in Deleuze's work of not separating theory from practice. 
In turning to the potentialities of the Invented conceptual sphere of the event, 
this chapter therefore asks the question, 'How do we figure this task in relation to 
the use of performance research as an academic space of investigation'? It is 
important to keep in mind that whilst we are seeking to investigate those empty 
spaces of meaning that exist as gaps in the representational system, we will still not 
reach a point of absolute knowledge: there is no Origin to go back to, and there win 
always be more than we can tell. However, in place of this Origin I want to argue 
that there is some other space for thought M which things cohere: that space of 
univocity evoked in the last chapter. Univocity hangs over this spacing of the event 
as if the event where like a mist, like the silence of nature, those sounds of the 
'unworded world' and the unsaid 4. Following Michel Serres' lyrical wording of 
sound, we are dealing with three levels of thought: in Chapter Three I noted the 
level that emerges as the non-linguistic voice of the body; whilst in Chapter Four I 
intimated the immaterial, un-signifiable and silent vibrations of the world; whilst, 
entertained in Chapter Two, there is this 'garbage noise' of that always-already 
signification common to the human collective (the mob) (Serres, 1995b: 
91-92). 
The argument of this chapter is that this third level, that of the theatre of 
representation and its crowd of signification, dulls our sense to what 
I am will end 
up showing is the 'pure Event'. As Assad writes, paraphrasing 
Serres "the tourist 
collective surrounds itself with its all-invasive 
language, as if the latter were a safe 
These thoughts echo those of Michel Serres (see Assad, 1999: 77). 
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ship keeping the unknown and illogical world at bay behind its protective hull" 
(1999: 77). The task of inventing concepts is in this case clear: to becorne better 
witnesses of the event. 
5.1.2 The problem of empiricism 
In the earlier chapters I have covered the ground of the body, or substance, or flesh 
and viscerality, and the way it produces, just as the convex produces the concave, 
the concept of the sensible, the concept of affection, and the concept of intensity 
(of movement). Taken alone, and in conjunction with signification, this seemingly 
presents a way of thinking a human geography based on the principle that the 
intelligible comes from the sensible, that "everything in the understanding comes 
from the senses" (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 54). This principle is often understood 
as empiricism. We know how to read and understand this philosophy. We know 
that in principle we can comprehend that it makes sense, that it is an acceptable and 
workable starting point. The question remains then, 'How to act upon this principle 
in principle? ' In other words, in tbeog it makes sense, but in praaite Wbat does it mean to 
do researcb in this way? Investigating this philosophically, the belief that the intelligible 
comes from the sensible is no more than an abstract first principle from which one 
poses all future investigations. For example, 'Where and how does the sensible 
come into existence? ' - 'From Being? ' or 'From an intentional embodied Ego? ' or 
'From the brute reality of the forces (of perception - light, sound, etc) that are the 
Sensible? ' At what point and how does sensing become a moment of having made 
sense? This is not however the point of empiricism for Deleuze, for: 
It is not the question 'Does the intelligible come from the 
sensible? ' but a quite different question, that of relations. 
Relations are external to thei*r terms. Peleuze & Parnet, 1987: 55) 
Deleuze illustrates this variation with the example that 'Peter is smaller than 
Paul' arguing that this relation of siZe (smallness) is not predicated on the minate 
essence of either Peter or Paul but is rather in the middle and exists as such. 
In 
arguing for relations that are external to their terms, 
Deleuze is arguing against a 
totalizing image of the world where understandings of relations or individuals are 
all based upon a first abstract principle that transcends the actuality of 
life - for 
example, that the intelligible 
'comes' from the sensible (see Deleuze, 1991). Recast 
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in Deleuze's empiricism the emphasis is not that the intelligible, or indeed the 
sensible, comes first, but that it is the 'comes' as such that matters: it is the spacing 
of connection, the place between sensing and making sense, that is important. If 
relations are internal to their terms (where terms can be understood as the sensed 
that is encountered), two problems arise: firstly, the relation will inhere in the term, 
for example Paul or Peter, and can not therefore be distinguished from the term. 
Secondly, if there is to be a change in relation then there will have to be a change In 
the term. This set-up neutralizes difference: 
In that the relation must always rernain identified with, and 
therefore reducible to, its tertn(s); any alteration on the part of 
one is met with an equal alteration on the part of the other, such 
that a thing's essences and its properties maintain the 
equilibrium of a constant identity or generalized equilibriurn. 
(Hayden, 1995: 286) 
Thus, to take Deleuze's empiricism forward into human geography we need to 
focus on relations by thinking space in-between things. We need to look more 
purposefully at the conditions, transformations, and distributions of relations 
actuafi. Zed within the social world'. To understand what is at stake, consider the 
'corporeal geography of consumption' suggested by Gill Valentine. She argues that 
bodily practices are 'inflected by wider sociospatial relation? (1999: 329; my 
emphasis). The argument that she makes begins from the principle that the body is 
a tactile space that is "always sensing and actively engaging with itself (the inside) 
and the world (the outside)" (1999: 331). The equilibrium is already set, and thus 
Valentine is able to argue (to already interpret) that "our understandings of our 
bodies and attempts to manage them are therefore predicated not only on visual 
information - what we look like - but also on sensual information about how we 
feel inside, about the relationship between the inside and the outside - about out 
spatiality" (ibid). She then goes on to outline a conventional set of qualitative 
techniques through which to practice an empiricism that validates the tenets of 
5 For an example of these actualizations think of the way an encounter is negotiated through action (the 
gestural movement of rejection as detailed in Chapter 
Three, or in the way a dog trught turn its nose away at 
your hand if you don't let it smell it first); or through the way we categorize things and enable them to be traced 
through time translating what it is they actually do, and therefore are, in the time of their occurrence. 
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such a spatiality. From this she uses the empirical 'findings' to construct 
conclusions (I quote here to set out the tangent at which the research of this 
chapter wiU cut across these conventional traditions of doing geography): 
An individual may experience multifaceted, overlapping, and 
flWd understandings of how they should be producing and 
regulating the space of their body ... For example, Jackie, a lone 
parent living with her son and working as a child nunder, wants 
to produce her body in a disciplined - what she considers men 
will perceive to be sexually attractive - way, yet at the same time 
her body is also inflected by the stress of her domestic fife, her 
son's preference for 'Junk' foods, and the pleasures and 
comforts she takes from eating when she is at home alone. 
(Valentine, 1999: 348-49) 
The question is What if she had instead practised the empiricism of Deleuze, 
the geography of relations not the geography of reason (see Deleuze & Parnet, 
1987: 56; Hayden, 1995: 284)'? The first response is that the emphasis would be 
clinical in approach in that it is about writing a world partly as an "attempt to make 
life something more than personal, to free life from what imprisons it" (Deleuze, 
1995: 143). Second, what if the empirical evidence had been *interpreted from the 
point of view of external relations? Deleuze's argues that, "it is not enough to 
create a logic of relations, to recognize the rights of the Judgement of relation as an 
autonomous sphere, distinct from )udgements of existence and attribution" 
Peleuze & Parnet, 1987: 56-7). So whilst we can agree with Valentine's argument 
of multifaceted experience, we need to question the ground upon which the 
relationship between the body of Jackie and the bodies of the 'Man', whom Jackie 
apparently believes to have an innate evaluation of her body, is founded. As it 
stands the interpretation is justified through an autonomous sphere separate from 
actual experience because no investigation is made here of the attributions 
(attribute = sexually attractive body) as they are played out. This is not to say that 
Valentine's research is wrong, nor that Jackie's personal narrative and appreciation 
of her situation should be ignored, but that there are equally valid ways of looking 
at the same problem; or, more significantly, of creating the problem in the first 
place. The question is 'How do we witness the playing out of attributions, the 
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actualization of life as it happens in all its complexity? ' This i 1 is not a task that can be 
fully accomplished; it is more an alternative research ethos that touches upon the 
small intricacies of life. In the philosophy of Deleuze we fmd a set of instructions: 
Substitute the AND for IS: A and B. The AND is not even a 
specific relation or conjunction, it is that which subtends all 
relations, the path of all relations, which makes relations shoot 
outside their terms and outside the set of their terms, and 
outside everything which could be determined as Being, One, or 
Whole ... Thinking with AND, instead of thinking IS, instead of 
thinkingjbr IS: empiricism has never had another secret. Try it, it 
is a quite extraordinary thought, and yet it is life. (Deleuze & 
Parnet, 1987: 57; my underline) 
Crucially then, thinking in this alternative fashion between things in themselves 
disrupts the Justification for conventional qualitative techniques. This in- 
betweenness, the place of interrogation in this chapter, is the space of the event; or 
rather I want to argue that this in-betweenness can be apprehended if we think in 
terms of events rather than foremost in terms of individual people. It is also, as I 
hope to show, the reason that Deleuze writes, "I have always felt that I am an 
empiricist, that is, a pluralist" (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: vii). 
SECTION ONE 
5.2 Beyond limits of thought 
It happens by means of answers and questions. It is not argued. 
(Lyotard, 1997: 117) 
In his essay The General Line jean-Franýois Lyotard, quoting from the Nina 
Berberova's novel The Revolt, writes that everyone has their own 'no-man's-land', a 
domain that is theirs and theirs alone, a domain that consists of living in "*intervals 
unchecked" (1997: 115). Three aspects of this 'no-man's-land' resonate here. First, 
humanity is only human if people are allowed to have this 'no-man's-land' (ibid 
116). Second, this 'no-man's-land' is not a secret despite its "secret ex-istence" 
because it is not a question of you not saying what you know about it as "you don't 
know what should be said" (ibid). Third: 
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These moments "are crucial to demarcating any sort of 'general 
line"'. The 'general line' is not the line of life in general, of life 
"such as it is". The second existence is nonetheless sweet in 
relation to "the fife everyone sees". It suspends it a little, it 
dwells within it ftom time to time and sweeps it away, but 
without one knowing anything about it. The second existence 
does not really wrong the first; it opens little parentheses within 
it. (Lyotard, 1997: 117-118; quoting Berberova's novel) 
We don't know what should be said about these "little parentheses", but it is to 
the task of illuminating and being able to witness them that we now turn. It is in 
fact the reason why thinking through the event is so important, and why eventhood 
features pron-unently in the concerns of several philosophers of the c20th. In 
particular these concerns are naturally drawn towards and refracted through the 
event of Auschwitz, not least because the attempt to make sense here through 
recourse to a transcendental realm beyond representation finds our reasoning 
"'always already' defeated by Auschwitz because no pre-existing Idea is adequate to 
it and any Idea we may cobble together afterwards is going to reek of this original 
(suppressed) failure" (Buchanan, 2000: 75). Noting the adjudication of juridical law 
by this representational philosophy, Giorgio Agamben writes of the space left in 
the wake of Auschwitz that the "law not presume to exhaust the question" (1999: 
7). Now, I do not want to be misunderstood when I follow some of the lines 
through this work. In no way do I want to equate the significance of Auschwitz 
with events in general, nor am I suggesting any importance in my thesis in citing 
Auschwitz'. Rather it is that I cite the work on Auschwitz In the way it illustrates 
the philosophical mechanics involved in the concept of the event. In other words, I 
am concerned here in investigating the remnants of experience and the way they 
produce a space of testimony for eventhood. And that this is a space that openly 
questions our ability to make sense of the event and a space that requires us to 
invent concepts adequate to this enunciation of experience that is beyond the law 
(of reason). 
6 Although this might serve to illustrate the potential political and ethical importance involved in thinking 
through events in themselves. 
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Whoever assumes the charge of bearing witness in their name 
knows that he or she must bear witness in the name of the 
impossibility of bearing witness. But this alters the value of 
testimony in a definitive way; it makes it necessary to look for 
meaning in an unexpected area. (Agamben, 1999: 34) 
There can be no witness of the event itself; it is impossible to represent. It exists 
in representation as a wrong exists in the economy of justice. For example, in these 
terms of justice: 
This is what a wrong would be: a damaged accompanied by the 
loss of means to prove the damage .... Either you are a victim 
of a wrong, or you are not. If you are not, you are deceived (or 
lying) in testifying that you are. If you are, since you can bear 
witness to a wrong, it is not a wrong [because in bearing witness 
you are in the process of righting that wrong and achieving 
Justice], or you are deceived (or lying) in testifying that you are a 
victim of a wrong (Lyotard, 1988: 5). 
This does not mean that there is no event. just because you cannot prove that 
something happened, or that something is happening, does not mean that it didn't 
happen, or that it isn't happening. This is the expression of the 'double bmd'. As 
Agamben notes, the impossibility of bearing witness to the event has a double sense 
in "that it is impossible to bear witness to it from the inside - since no one can bear 
witness from the inside of death - and from the outside - since the 'outsider' is by 
definition excluded from the event" (1999: 35). Agamben proceeds to argue that the 
double sense of Witnessing produces a "threshold of indistinction between inside and 
outside" (1999: 36) that can be evident in the testimony that the witnessing calls 'into 
being. Thus: 
What makes the power of testimony ... is not the words 
but the 
equivocal, puzzling relation between words and voice, the 
interaction, that is, between words, voice, rhythm, melody, 
images, writing, and silence. Each testimony speaks to us 
beyond its words, beyond its melody, like the unique 
performance of a singing. (Felman and Laub, 1992: 277-78; 
quoted in Agamben, 1999: 36) 
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The space of art takes the place of the logical impossibility of expressing 
through representational systems of meaning the experience of the witness who 
bears the impossibility of bearing witness. If you consider the body of the witness, 
and the state of affairs that it is witnessing, then you can make the distinction that, 
in relation to the timing of the event, bodies and states of affairs exist only in the 
present. It follows then that it is impossible to provide testimony of the 'present' of 
the experience. However, there are relations between bodies and states of affairs 
that exist as effects - much as I mentioned earlier that there are affects, zones of 
affect, that exist between lived affections. These effects then "are not bodies, but,, 
properly speaking, 'incorporeal' entities"; that "are not things or facts, but events" 
Peleuze, 1990a: 4-5). Being beyond the present these effects exist as lacunae to the 
actuality of that present: 
This is why what is borne to witness cannot already be language 
or writing. It can only be something to which no one has borne 
witness. And this is the sound that arises from the lacuna, the 
non-language that one speaks when one is alone, the non- 
language to which language answers ... The language of 
testimony is a language that no longer signifies and that, in not 
signifying, advances into what is without language, to the point 
of taking on a different insignificance. (Agamben, 1999: 38-39) 
This 'different insignificance' leans towards an alternative logic of sense that 
requires novel ethical consideration. Questions at the heart of Deleuze's 
philosophy, the development of concepts exhibited in Difference 6- Repetition and The 
LoTic of Sense, have a particular value in working upon the ethics needed here. 
Between these event-effects and language, or even the possibility 
of language, there is an essential relation. It is the characteristic 
of events to be expressed or expressible, uttered or utterable, in 
propositions which are at least possible. There are many 
relations inside a proposition. Which is the best suited to surface 
effects or events? 0: -)eleuze, 1990a: 12) 
The answer that Deleuze gives to this question is this alternative 'logic of sense, 
and he means this literally: the answer is sense, that "mysterious fourth dimension 
of the proposition" (Buchanan, 2000: 77). Propositions exist alongside the material 
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world of things, including the human body as it is caught in the present. A 
proposition is an inquiry as a happening, as a problem, and as a subject of thought. 
In thinking towards an appreciation of the logic of sense, Deleuze presents the 
concept of the proposition through four dimensions. Other than sense, the three 
dimensions ate denotation (or indication), manifestation, and signification: 
denotation is the relation of the proposition to an external state of affairs (the 
selection of particular images "whiCh ought to represent the state of affairs"); 
manifestation concerns the relation between the proposition and the person who 
speaks it ("it is the domain of the personal'); signification "is a question of the 
relation of the word to universal or (general concepts, and of syntactic connections to 
the implication of the concept" (Deleuze, 1990a: 13-14). Sense is thus 'in many ways 
what is left unsaid by the other three dimensions, given that the unsaid does not yet 
make sense. In Deleuze's terms, sense is the "expressed of the proposition ... an 
incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event 
which inheres or subsists in the proposition" (Deleuze, 1990a: 19)'. Again sense 
does not exist as such because we have no means to express it directly. If Agamben 
has asked us to "look for meaning in an unexpected area" (1999: 34), much as 
Deleuze urges us to be worthy of the event, I think that we need to pay attention to 
the space of the event and to the logic of sense that subsists within it. We therefore 
need to create concepts that extract sense worthy of the event. Seen in this way, the 
soliciting of the event - its surface effects and its pre-personal non-language - is a 
question of ethics. 
But how might we begin to do this? What we have achieved so far is the 
realization of the problem that representation brings: an awareness that accepts that 
some aspects of the world are misrepresented, underrepresented and even 
inherently non-representational. The problem of representation is thus 'invented -a 
formulation of Bergson's philosophy that is underrated: "The truth is that in 
philosophy and even elsewhere it is a question of finding the problem and 
consequently of posifin: g it, even more than of solving it ... The stating and the 
7 The question is as follows: is there something, aliquid, which merges neither with the proposition or with the 
terms of the proposition, nor with the object or with the state of affairs which the proposition 
denotes, neither 
with the 'lived', or representation or the mental activity of the person who expresses 
herself in the proposition, 
nor with the concepts or even signified essences? 
" (Deleuze, 1990a: 19) 
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solving of the problem are here very close to being eqwvalent" (1946: 58-59). Such 
a stance is verýy close in style to the demand for description to be given the right 
place in our geographical stance towards understanding the world. Thus in 
following Bergson's 'Method' and the tenet of Wittgenstein's thinking we have 
already begun to extract sense worthy of the event by inventing this problem of 
representation and by refining the statement of the problem through the 
descriptions we make possible. In other words, if representation fails to capture 
aspects of the world, and if it neglects the non-representational aspects, we need to 
situate the understanding that representation brings alongside the understandings 
that it denies. In this way we can recognize one of the reasons why Deleuze finds 
Leibniz's theory, that each individual is a monad that expresses the world, so 
instructive: in a given moment of representation, or signification, or performative 
action, in the unfolding duration of the life of an individual entity, the world is 
actualized (see Massun-11,1997). 
In each world, the individual monads express all the singularities 
of the world - an infinity - as though in a murmur or a swoon; 
but each monad envelops or expresses 'clearly' a certain number 
of singularities only, that is, those in the vic7*nity of whicb it is 
constituted and which link up with its own boýv. (Deleuze, 1990a: 111) 
It is from this that I can make the central point of the chapter, that: 
A world can be viewed from two perspectives: that of the 
individual which actualizes and incarnates in its body 
singularities which 'evolve' through forms of folding 
(envelopment, development, etc), and that of the singularities 
which continue to persist and subsist over and above their 
particular incarnations and actualizations Within an individuated 
body and self. (Ansell-Pearson, 1999: 87) 
In what follows,, I want to fold three lines of thinking that underpin this chapter 
to make both a theoretical and empirical space for the enactment of such inhuman 
witnessing. The first line presents the space of performance art and the field of 
performance studies as a worthwhile research intervention into the concrete 
richness of the actualized world; an intervention that sites the 
immaterial richness 
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of meaning in the concrete. The second charts the implications of the call to bear 
witness to non-representational aspects of the actualized world as suggested in the 
Deleuzian etl-iics of transcendental empiricism and counter-actualization. And the 
third, illustrates the relation of both these lines of thought through the presentation 
of the research into the practice of performance art. In true fashion to folding, 
these lines develop contrapunctually so that whilst they are each individually needed 
to hold together the argument of the chapter they function independently by 
making separate equally salient points. The weave begins with the third line: 
witnessing the making of performance art. 
SECTION TWO 
5.3 The art of Performance Art: Uninvited Guests -'Guest House' 
Wednesday 27"' January 1999 
1. An event it itself could be a time of day, a place, a draft, 
It is ten thidy in the morninT and I am beating my body attempting to bring forward m 
destination as I make my way along the cobbled ri'mrside walkway within an urTeng' not to 
g i/seff at the end of the be late for the rehearsal. The warehouse buildingý broadly priyedin 
, gh theglass 
doors1I am caught sli; ýpin throug g gible and as Ipush throu wharf, isfinalyl tan 
g the guest, perhaps a consumer, bul theglass into the modernistfiger. I am a body becomin 
definitely a spectator and a witness. I am a male body that hasjust walked into the Arno#ini 
galleg. 
Wl'bitewasbed walls, silver trimminTs, industrial doors, red carpet and slate floor. Tbrougb the 
y morning hubbub of the arts centre -a coupk glass doors becoming distracted by the earl 
browsing in the bookstore, an attendant sitting with a chunky red book manning the latest an 
exhibition (a thought cuts across this attention, that book remi . nds me of those old hymn booki 
g ofglassesfrom the cqfiýfilled with the cadence 0) we had at church); then there is the clatten'n 
gi pulliq and disfilliq attention. g that is chopping and chan at least three voices in a mixi .n 
2. The fissure of irrational intervals - subjectivity is unhinged in the unfolding of 
these singularities - I'm also 
distracted because I'm at the point where I have got to gain 
Y ,g 
the process at work. I am not here this time to bu a book, y disturbin access without undul 
y ima 'nation transposed in the e ta le of a peformance; I am here to see a film, have m sP ccr T, 
witness an event, to witness the makinT of an event. 
A couple of bodies man the desk that 
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backs into the cashier point oj'the bookstore (a book here 
could be a box containingftq , gment ý offierforMancef. - pieces 
oj paper with ptinted lexl; a tape recordinV a polthene bag 
containing fillicle e. %fohations - well thy are taged as 
such). I deliberately (jpeech) act my moment of 
subjectýicafion revealing in/brmation about the work in 
progess that is bein y assembled in the Arnoýfz ,g 
loosel ni's 
Walking into a theatre means walking into a 
different sort of space ... Within the theatre 
comes a second limit or division, separating the 
stage from the audience, marking off the place 
observed and the place from which it is 
observed ... A third essential limit separates the 
stage from the wings or the backstage, this space 
is invisible to the spectator and is the place of 
everything that might be called the theatrical 
machinery" (Bennington, 1988: 10-11). 
performance space. This time I am an invited witness: thus acceptance. 
No Ion 
, ger that any 
boýv that walked throu , gh the glass 
doors, I am instructed togo to two larXe 
white doors, doors that I have passed throuTh on many occasions, over severalyears. Thi's is the 
Rubicon to those expetience. ý that have scarred my boýv with the `eNpen'enfialyl visceral' traces 
that reverberate and seemiiýýl house mg possession of many live art performances. The space 
be ond is not an empýy spacefor me: I have been here before. Andyet, whilst it IS of course a 
space for time reTai . ned and e, %penences foretold, there is more to it than that. 3. Flows, 
sequences, chains, series, processes,, connections, and distributions: the 
continual vectors of singularities. I stand bffore this entrance, much like a modern 
van'ant of those twinned doors whose centralpartiq greetsjou asyou ar7ive at many of our 
church buildin , gs, and enter. 
5.3.1 Event arts and the art event 
Performance isn't a game but a symbolic machine ... using the 
most ordinary, everyday resources for the most unheard-of 
purposes. Uorge Glusberg; quoted in Kent, 1998) 
Live performance is an event art in its immediate capture of attention framed 
within a specific co-ordination of time and space. Performances of this kind play 
explicitly upon rendering visible the particular physical, emotional and culturally 
warped experiences that make up that sense of 'living through life'. In performance 
terms this visibility takes place in the qualities that make performance of all kinds 
the most immediately expressive art form (see Albright, 1997). These qualities 
include movement (the physical presence of rhythm and affect), the mise-en-scene 
(the architectural spacing of things), textual inscription (of voice,, stutterings or 
silence), and the energy of sound 
(vibrant, repetitive or nauseating). Through all of 
these qualities performance art can be seen as a model for another representational 
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rom overly deterministic moorings. economy, one in which sense is unleashed f 
Meaning is given more freedom to move in conjunction with the action of the 
performance, thus undermining the assurance of the reproduction of that which we 
do not fully understand (the Other) with that with which we think we do (the 
Same). In this I believe performance art offers a space in which to think the non- 
representational; you could even argue that it is the laboratory for non- 
representational prototypes - the art of unbeard-of purposes. In particular, it plays 
off at a tangent many of the more innovative developments within the social 
sciences and the humanities - for example ANT (Latour, 1988,1993; Murdoch, 
1997; Bingham, 1996), cognitive psychophysiology (Rosch et al, 1991; Varela, 1996, 
1999), and embodied accounts of the social (Radley, 1995,1996) - by directing 
attention towards the undetermined location that is the immateriality of the world. 
As critical theories of cultural reproduction become increasingly 
dedicated to a consideration of the 'material conditions' that 
influence, if not completely determine, social, racial, sexual, and 
psychic identities, questions about the immaterial construction 
of identities - those processes of belief which summon memory, 
sight, love - fade from the eye/I. (Phelan, 1993: 5) 
Taking up this trajectory towards the poetic, spectral and emotional murmur 
seemingly located between everything, I want to suggest that performance art offers 
four methodological openings in which to begin to think an alternative 
geographical practice. First, it is a liminal space, "a space we might call the tension 
of the present tense" (Phelan, 1999: 224). This is a question of the duration of 
performance and the fact that it takes place in 'real' time. However, the significance 
here lies in the way this tension asks us to bear witness to an invisibility or 
inexpressible space; as Bergson puts it, there is here "an incomprehensible reason 
why phenomena are seen to succeed one another instead of being set out all at once" 
(1960, Time and Free WIN. 219; quoted in Deleuze, 1988c: 48). In other words, the 
present has already divided into the past and the future before you have time to 
grasp it in its own instance and yet performance makes an art out of the 
fact that 
you do witness its passing 
(these aspects are picked up in the next chapter). The 
importance of bearing witness to this tension of the present tense resonates 
strongly within Lyotard's notion of the event as 
"the face to face with nothingness" 
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(1991: 17). Thus confronted, performance leads us towards a research sensibility 
that accepts that "there are many events whose occurrence doesn't offer any matter 
to be confronted, many happenings inside of which nothingness remains hidden 
and imperceptible" (Lyotard, 1991: 18). This first opening is therefore conceived 
within the task of becoming: 
competent in listening to the sound underneath silence or noise, 
to become open to 'It happens that' rather than to the 'What 
happens', [which] requires at the very least a high degree of 
refinement in the perception of small differences. (ibid) 
The distinction between audience as spectator or as witness has increasingly 
preoccupied the invention of contemporary performance, "since to witness an 
event is to be present at it in a fundamentally ethical way. To witness is to feel 
the weight of things and one's own place in them" (Etchells, 1999: 33). In more 
concrete terms, and in relation to the actual practice of performance art, it 
follows that: 
As a live structure, perceived in relationship to larger aspects of 
culture, the event promised to escape the limitations imposed by 
the conventions of the arts as commonly understood, be they 
theater, literature, the fine arts, dance, music, architecture, or 
whatever. (Foster, 1988: 5) 
Second, as its position within the cultural psyche and socio-political 
developments of the last century testify, it has been seen as an art form of our 
times' in that it has offered an intense engagement with the fundamentals of social 
experience - questions of the subject and the world in which the subject is made. 
In this vein, performance has been aptly described as "a writing of cultural 
biography in neglected physicality" (Etchells, 1999: 34). Performance achieves this 
writing by operating c4a crucial paradigm of subjectivity as occurring at two places at 
once: both for the subject itself (the performer or spectacle) and for an external or 
social agency (the audience)" (Noveck, 1995: 66; see also Scheifflin, 1998). This 
8 For example: "Work which came to 
be called live or performance art emerged most powerfiffly in Europe and 
the United States at moments of artistic or social crisis, when formal aesthetics or social structures were 
perceived to be inadequate or 
had actually collapsed" (MacRitcl-, ie, 1998: 21; see also Auslander, 1999), 
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simultaneous siting leads to a continual shift i 1 in meaning, a dynamic that etches out 
a tangible, albeit abstract, presentation of the space between things. In siting this 
verý, dynamic as an art it has often been used with the intention of facilitating 
potential alternative modes of experience, not least in the ways we come to 
understand experience. Let me clarify this point through an example: take a line of 
dialogue from a performance. This could as easily be performance without words 
(eg two bodies touching, a body dancing, a stage being left empty by a departing 
body) "because speaking in/as performance is rather more a somatic act involving 
muscular work in the mouth, throat, face, eyes, body tensions, gestuality, than it can 
be called a linguistic act" (Melrose, 1993: 252). Indeed, in the line of dialogue I 
want to example, such somatic qualities are vital: 
PHtDRE: I thought his eyes were stone - she found tears in 
them. (Hughes, PNdre, 1998: 60) 
The point is, as a witness to the event of this performance, we become "bound- 
in" through an empathy that cuts open a new spatialization between the Particula 
action of the speaking character and the uniVocal sense of this emotion of being 
rejected. In part then, the real power of performance art hes in taking this tension 
of the present tense and using it as a violent tool to extract from the everyday 
aspects that have been overlooked. Artists, according to Deleuze in his following of 
Nietzsche,, are clinicians in the way they group the symptoms of civilization 
through the creation of their works of art as a novel constellation of signs (see 
Deleuze, 1990a: 237; and Sn-uth, 1998: xvi-xvii). Deleuze therefore sees criticism as 
the art of declension (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 120), which I think we can 
understand as the variation of the signs, or symptoms, of life according to the case 
in hand. These cases function in the same fashion as medical cases: the case of 
Parkinson5 or Alzheimer, where the doctor, whose proper name comes to designate 
the group of symptoms, "has created a new grouping, a new individuation of 
symptoms, a new haecceity, has broken up regimes which have up to this point 
been mixed together, has reunited sequences which up to this point were separate" 
(ibid). The work of art, as a new case or potential grouping of signs, thus also 
obtains a critical purpose by bringing into view a potential world - an alternative 
take on what is already there which had hitherto been taken for granted as fixed, or 
as unseen, and therefore as incurable. 
In other words: 
139 
Events: wilnessiq the inbuman 
The use of the event as a 'given' in social and aesthetic 
communication gave to art a working access to real or functional 
aspects of culture which it had heretofore only been able to 
represent. This is not merely the erasing of distinctions between 
art and life, but the use of the everyday and historical structure 
of the event, real or imagined, as a vehicle of artistic and/or 
critical purpose. (Foster, 1988: 5) 
Third, performance as an art is a tool for doing research. It is a methodology of 
evasions in that it escapes from the conventional allegiance to disciplinary fields of 
conducting and legitimising systems that produce knowledge. In being a witness of 
a performance the researcher is not merely a spectator, or a passive voyeur, who 
puts to use tried and tested methodologies and ways of seeing. To be a witness you 
affect the performance and you are affected by it. The performance affects the 
researcher's interpretative assumptions bringing us towards an appreciation of the 
fact that "the present for us is always filled with possibilities, is always processual 
and unfinished"; it raises us to question "How can we say we are writing what men 
and women actually experience if we dehumanize them into a past-participled 
world? " (Dening, 1996: 17). It is for this reason, amongst others no doubt, that: 
In the eyes of its adherents, performance studies was able to 
combine new work in critical theory, literary studies, folklore, 
anthropology, postcolonial. theory, theatre studies, dance theory, 
and feminist and queer studies while forging a new intercultural 
epistemology. (Phelan, 1998: 4) 
To put it succinctly, performance art can operate within geography as an 
epistemology that brings into focus the complex traces of the world unmarked by 
conventional means of representation. This would be an epistemology that 
proceeds by making an account of the "singular stock of retained images, muscular 
contractions, feelings", particular to a situation where, as I demonstrated earlier 
with the example from Pbedre, the generalization of which comes in the spaces 
between things; a "work that figures, but does not explain" (Melrose, 1993: 
251/253). 
Fourthly, performance is an event in itself In performance it is made explicit 
that you are not standing back 
from life, that you cannot be anything other than 
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completely immersed in it (see Kaye, 2000). Of even more significance howeverl is 
the way performance uses the very qualities of life to reach, or present rather than 
represent, the level of understanding that you seek. To understand performance as 
an event in itself you need to grasp the fact that, for you (singular and only human), 
the event is more than just something that happens: it stretches beyond the present 
moment carrying within it the preconditions for its happening and the potential for 
future actualities; and it is an entity in its own right. Too often these aspects are 
overlooked because the event is commonly defined as a watershed in a related 
series of incidents - you only have to think of the way we work the distinction 
between everyday events and those that are 'newsworthy'. To hold to this 
distinction is to miss the point of my argument. Imagine the conceptual structure 
of the event in a historical context. Here, events require "a purposeful action or an 
intentionality (in the acting or in the perceiving of an action) that matters as apoint 
from wbich one eNplains and that has the capability of identifying what appear to be 
consciously worked out causal chains between reasons and actions" (Foster, 1988: 
7). Needless to say, these events are socially constructed because our definitions of 
what count as historically important frames how we perceive something as an 
event. I am not looking at the event as something that is prerequisite upon there 
being a suitable situation for its operation - even in the deliberate framing of 
performance art. My focus is upon the belief that events just happen. They are 
about happenings, happenings that have a life of their own. Here, badly conceived 
questions naturally anse out of social science's commonly held habits of thinking: 
'But when does an event begin? ' 'When does some situation have the quality of 
eventhood? ' Let me illustrate a simple, and an immediate, answer to both these 
questions: the answer is 'all the time'. There are two ways to explain this. First, to a 
degree the event has already begun to happen because consideration is pre- 
emptively given to expectation (audience and in general) and to the potential impact 
of the event. What happens to the account of the action when you consider that 
many unexpected things take place? The framed sense of eventhood has already 
denied the essential dynamic of fortuity that creates an event in its spuriously 
assembling embrace of a whole host of things. So much goes into creating an event, 
in 1 in is more in fact than we can be naturally aware of A s" gle viewpoi t of an event i 
woefully inadequate. 
A single way of conceiving the forces that create events is 
more deficient still. The second explanation, and this is the philosophical heart of 
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the chapter, is that events are virtual: they are real but not always evident; they take 
on many forms, but have a univocal character; and they have an agency that is often 
ascribed solely to ourselves. Thus, before I return to the Arnolfini I need to explain 
what it is I am looking for. 
SECTION THREE 
5.4 Events and the virtual 
In order to have an appreciation of an event as something that has a consistency of 
its own - in other words to make out the event as something that can be intimated 
as an entity in itself - we need to be aware that we are doing philosophy. If we 
follow Deleuze, this doing of philosophy is made up of three elements: "the 
prehiston*calplane it must lay out (immanence), the persona orpersonae it must invent and brin ,g 
to life (insistence), and the philosophical concepts it must create (consisteng) (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1994: 76-77). So let me attempt this: 
Problem 7: Thought worthy of the event 
Immanence 
The event itself, as a separate entity, is laid out on the 
prehistorical plane of 'duration', where duration is a plane of 
immanence that has the power to separate itself into different 
fluxes and/or into single currents according to the nature of 
attention occurring (see Deleuze, 2000: 50). Duration in this way 
is not divisible in that it changes in nature in dividing itself In 
other words, the event happens and that is it, you can't 
subdivide it. This plane of duration is indeed immanent because, 
in wording that is hugely significant for the doing of Deleuze's 
philosophy of difference, Deleuze argues that this differentiation 
is vital "even if its concept is not itself biological. Life is the 
process of difference" (2000: 50; my emphasis). 
Many philosophers had already said that the whole was neither 
IM given nor giveable: they si ply concluded from this that the 
whole was a meaningless notion. Bergson's conclusion is very 
different: if the whole is not giveable, it is because it is the 
Open, and because its nature is to change constantly, or to give 
rise to something new, in short, to endure. 'The duration of the 
universe must therefore be one with the latitude of creation 
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which can find it in place'. So that each time we find ourselves 
confronted with a duration, or in a duration, we may conclude 
that there exists somewhere a whole which is changing, and 
which is open somewhere. (Deleuze, 1986: 9; quoting Bergson, 
1954: 359) 
Being differs with itself internally; this is Bergson's concept of 
ilan vital, which Michael Hardt instructively describes as linking 
the "pure essence and the real existence of being" (1993: 14). 
When Deleuze's philosophy aims at thinking of life it is clearly 
not just biological life that Deleuze has in view. Furthermore, 
this philosophy is not anthropomorphic; thus by extrapolation, 
Deleuzian human geography is not just about the human, nor 
the organic. 
Not all Life is confined to the organic strata: rather, the 
organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit 
itself, and there is a fife all the more intense, all the more 
powerful for being anorganic. There are also nonhuman 
Becomings of human beings that overspill the 
anthropomorphic strata in all directions. (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1988: 503) 
The use of the word vital, and its biological links to the 
differentiation of the species, is not to be seen as an analogy for 
use as a philosophical thought; rather it is philosophical thought. 
This dimension of Deleuze's philosophy is affiliated to his 
interpretation of the work of Henn Bergson, in particular in the 
way that it expresses this new vital ontology: an absolutely 
positive movement of Being. It is because of this that this 
vitality has implications beyond the biological realm: "No doubt 
differentiation comes from the resistance life encounters in 
matter, but it comes first and above all from the internal 
explosive force that life carries within itself' (Deleuze, 2000: 51). 
In this sense the vital (ýIan vitaý, and the event and duration, 
cannot be figured as a simple determination: "a determination 
can be accidental, or at least its being can only be attached to a 
case, end or a chance, it thus implies a subsisting extenonty" 
(Deleuze, 2000: 50). Thus the process of difference, or life, or 
the 'internal difference', is indeterminable (Deleuze, 2000: 51). 
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Insistence 
Possibilities of fife or modes of existence can be invented only 
on a plane of immanence that develops the power of 
conceptual personae. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 73) 
Having laid out the plane of immanence presented in duration, 
and having produced an appreciation of the sense of 
indetermination it is now possible to introduce the persona: the 
virtual. The virtual is most familiar within Deleuze's work as a 
consideration of time and I will be turning to this aspect in the 
next chapter. However, in relation to the event, Deleuze cites it 
as a kind of repetition: "the repetition of an internal difference 
which it incorporates in each of its moments, and carries from 
one distinctive point to another" (Deleuze, 1994: 20). As 
mentioned above, duration is not divisible in that it changes in 
nature in dividing itself The 'what' that changes in nature in 
duration is the virtual. Or putting it another way, the internal 
difference of life itself develops in divergent directions and it is 
through this divergence, or 'disas s ociations- of-its elf', that 
virtuality comes to realize itself Following Bergson's thought in 
reproaching the traditional and antecedent philosophical 
conceptualizations of Being, Deleuze presents two aspects of 
being: the virtual and the actual. The unfolding of the virtual in 
the actual - in other words virtuality realizing itself - is the 
process of differentiation, or, as Deleuze also refers to it, the 
process of actualization9. 
This relationship between the virtual and the actual opposes the 
machinery of thought produced through the representational 
belief in the relationship between the possible and the real. 
Deleuze uses this possible-real habit of representational thinking 
to make apparent the new directions in thought made viable 
through the virtual-actual connection by detailing "that the 
transcendental term of each couple relates positively to the 
9 In another direction, the virtual is, in the burgeoning number of works on Deleuze, something of a signature 
concept (much like discourse is in accounts of Foucault's pro)ect): note that pages of commentary have been 
given to the conceptualization of the virtual and the actual: Badiou (2000: 42-52); Buchanan (2000); Hardt 
(1993: 14-22). 
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immanent term in the opposite couple" (Hardt, 1993: 17). 
Several points then unfold. First, the virtual is to be 
distinguished from the possible. The possible is not real as it 
operates as a function of an Ideal such that the real is that which 
resembles, and not that which is, this 'pos sible- Ideal'. In this 
sense, the possible operates as an abstraction and as a limitation 
because conceptually it follows that there will always be 
'possibles' that do not pass into the real. This is not to say that 
the possible, as a concept, does not have an actual existence; it 
can be actual in that it can have effects. In opposition to this the 
virtual, and I quote Deleuze quoting Proust's formula, is "real 
without being actual, ideal without being abstract" (1988c: 96). 
The virtual is part of the object of thought where "every object 
is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble 
one another" (Deleuze, 1994: 204. Therefore the object of 
thought has both a virtual and an actual side. For Badiou, the 
object in its entirety is a mere simulacrum. (One of the main 
disagreements I have with the 'philosophy-contra-Deleuze' that 
Badiou presents in The Clamour ofBein , g, 
is that it is he that states 
that the virtual and actual are combined to both equal a 
simulacrum of a universal One, not Deleuze). Not being fully 
actual the object can be played out in an immanent theory of its 
double; in other words, it is possible to think of a plane of 
immanence when explicitly thinking through encounters with 
the concrete, empirical 'real'. In other words, the encounter 
actually occurs but only as something achieved (actualized) 
through a duration (immanent). It is this relationship with 
duration that intimates the immanent virtuality of all things. The 
crucial point is that this immanent relation of the object, its 
transcendental quality if you Re, is not located beyond its 
actuality, rather it is constituted because o its actuafiýy. This )f 
transcendental quality is, for Deleuze, that which is beyond the 
human, but this 'beyond' does not denote the transcendent 
because it is still empirical. Deleuze puts this in another way, in 
terms of the Outside: "something more distant than any external 
world. But it's also something closer than any inner world" 
(1995: 110). This reflects both the clinical power of performance 
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art mentioned above and the capacity to view the world from 
two perspectives at once: 
It is the peristaltic movements of the outside which serve to 
destratify fixed and stable identities and produce through 
doubling processes new possibilities for an intenser and more 
creative existence. (Ansell-Pearson, 1999: 84) 
In many ways Deleuze's philosophical meanderings through 
Bergson set out the effects of thinking in two planes of thought 
at once - you have to think in "two dis symmetrical )ets, one of 
which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves 
all the past" (Deleuze, 1989: 81) - where the preservation of all 
the past is the virtual. This is the 'Open whole', the 
transcendental part of transcendental empiricism, and where the 
present passing on is the realm of the empirical. It is also the 
ethical-practical motivation, or dream, of Deleuze's philosophy: 
the encouragement of "the creation of new values and senses in 
the affirmative constitution of He and human existence" 
(Hayden, 1998: 6). Thinking in this way is not dialectical because 
it does not signal a pro ession of thou t towards the I gr gh 
realization of a synthesis that is the 'truth' or the final solution. 
Again it is not dialectical in that it is not the mechanism of 
thought - thesis and antithesis - that makes thought possible. 
Rather thinking two planes at once is so because you cannot 
think one plane without the other. This is the 'mutual image' of 
thought that thought gives itself (see Deleuze, 1989: 81). 
Virtual being is pure, transcendental being in that it is infil'Ate 
and simple; actualized being is real being in that it is different, 
qualified and limited. (Hardt, 1993: 14) 
it is here that we can see the importance of the empirical in 
Deleuze's work and the insistence that it is the empirical, "the 
concrete richness of the sensible" (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 54), 
that explains the conceptual not the reverse (see Baugh, 1993). 
The ethical implications here are in the unsettling of the 'given', 
the unsettling of the concepts that representation assumes to be 
naturally and always apn'on*. This philosophical intervention is 
the perspective to think differently that Deleuze presents in the 
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wake of his criticism of representation. It is the new image of 
thought - or rather it is thought without representational image, 
the thought from the outside, that Deleuze calls transcendental 
empiricism. Liberating thought from the representational 
economy in this way allows the conceptualization of experience 
to be set free from the reductionism that centres all meaning in 
the interiority of the self-constituting subject: "The fault of 
representation Les in not going beyond the form of identity, in 
relation to both the object seen and the seeing subject" 
(Deleuze, 1994: 68). Only when you allow thought to go beyond 
representation is the empirical made a central feature of the 
theoretical;. in moving away from the unnecessary divide of 
empiricism and theory "the empirical IS the 'transcendental' 
condition of botb actual experience and concepts" (Hayden, 
1998: 7; my emphasis). So: 
At first glance, the sensible can be said to differ from the 
concept insofar as the concept determines the possibility of 
repeatable experiences that are identical in respect of their 
organizational form, whereas the sensible is the actuality of any 
given experience, and as such is the non-repeatable basis for the 
difference between actualizations. The sensible as the reality of a 
specific actualization falls outside of the concept: the concept 
determines the equivalency among actualizations (they are all 
actualizations of the same concept), the sensible is the ground 
of their difference. (Baugh, 1993: 15-16) 
Let me example this in the abstract (with concrete 
demonstration being intimated in relation to the research into 
performance art and the performance of Guest House): Take a 
moment of action -a syntactical instant of a performance - and 
consider the form any understanding of this moment takes. The 
moment and the understanding of it are not achieved 
beforehand. Rather, meaning arrives experientially aposten*Ori. 
This is in the actuality of the empirical. As well as foregrounding 
the empirical, Deleuze is at pams to distinguish these 
experiential and actual understandings from being no more than 
an utterly indeterminate here and now "identical to nothing" 
(Baugh, 1993: 17). There is, and there has to be, an abstract or 
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transcendent realm to this actuality. As Deleuze puts it "the 
abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained; and the 
aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find 
the conditions under which something new is produced 
(creativeneff)" (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: vii). These conditions are 
the concrete richness of the sensible; and they are the states of 
things, the actuality or singularity, that "are neither unities nor 
totalities, but mulfiplit'ifie? ' (ibid). Understanding that it is the 
abstract, the conceptual, which needs to be explained, is also to 
appreciate Bergson's argument against the 'badly stated 
problem'. Presume, for example, the abstract notion of order. If 
we evaluate the empirical using this notion - it is common for 
researchers to interpret empirical data with such abstractions in 
mind - we are dealing With a 'false problem' by already assuming 
that order precedes itself, that it precedes "the creative act that 
constitutes" it (Deleuze, 1988c: 18). This is not a quest to 
unearth a grounding for all experience in general, but an 
experimentation for dealing with "experience in all its 
peculiarities" (ibid: 28). This sentiment is inferred when Deleuze 
and Foucault argue that "theory does not express, translate, or 
serve to apply practice: it is practice" (1977: 208). Theory, "is 
not therefore a totalizing instrument, but one that multiplies 
potentialities" (Hand, 1988: viii): 
The real causes of experience, unlike universal concepts in 
relation to representations, need not resemble their effect in 
any way, any more than an organism need resemble its genetic 
material, even though the causes are 'virtually' or implicitly 
present in their effects. (Baugh, 1993: 22) 
We can look at this in relation to performance in two ways. 
First, by taking this on board with regard to performance itself, 
in which case "the empirical is the here and now actuality that 
differentiates between performances and which makes repetition 
of the same work possible" (Baugh, 1993: 16). For example, take 
a performance of Hamlet what is performed (the concept "that 
determines the possibility of repeatable experiences that are 
identical in respect of their organizational forms" (ibid: 15), in 
this case the form and content of the text of Hamle6 is identical, 
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but the actual performances differs as they are the empirically 
actual of the experience and as such are "the non-repeatable 
basis for the difference between actualizations" (ibid). Second, 
picking up the philosophical implications of the first, you can 
use the theoretical design of transcendental empiricism to link 
the performance, in this case an artistic performance such as 
Hamlet or that of Guest House, to show how it can work as an 
arena for social scientific research. In the representational 
tradition the research endeavour is to unearth and present a 
ý,, eneralijy of the particular; in other words, to investigate an 
empirical actuality - for example, the memory of an event by a 
particular group of people - for the purpose of extracting some 
general conditions that can then be transposed as knowledge 
worthy of instructing education or government. In effect, a 
concept is constructed, which is often deemed subconsciously 
by adherents to the representational system as something 
essential and innate. Here Deleuze gives the example of the 
concept of the 'human': whilst it becomes something different 
in, say, Peter and Paul, it still remains fixed to the concept such 
that evaluation is always made on the basis of resemblance 
(1994: 10). On the other hand, thought without this image 
works to present the universality of the singular. Instead of 
transposing research findings under the legend of resemblance, 
you align the findings With the notion of repetition. Repetition 
only makes sense in relation to the singular and hence the 
unrepeatable. This sounds contradictory, but consider this: if 
nothing were to change then there would be no sense in 
repetition as everything would be once and for always. Equally, 
in this case, repetition of the same seems nonsensical. In actual 
experience repetition is the spacing of difference and not the 
return of the same as engendered in the representational 
economy of resemblance; it is the dynamic of the singular that 
prevents it from being equivalent to any other. Through this 
working of repetition and difference it is possible to grasp the 
principle proposition regarding Deleuze's notion of 
transcendental empiricism, namely that "difference must be 
shown differini' Peleuze, 1994: 56) in a nonconceptual empirical 
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manner. In this, uniting these last two points, "the work of art 
leaves the domain of representation in order to become 
'experience', transcendental empiricism or science of the 
sensible" in such a way as to reveal "the very being of the 
sensible: difference, potential difference and difference in 
intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity" (ibid: 56-57). 
The task is now clearer: 
For the reason that representation seeks to mediate difference 
in the identity of the concept in general, thought becomes 
limited and cut off from its sensible source. Transcendental 
empiricism, on the contrary, continually strives to discover 'a 
pure concept of difference in itself and thereby overturn 
Platonism and restore the life of difference to Ideas. (Hayden, 
1998: 16; quoting Deleuze, 1994: 59) 
Consistency 
Finallv, then, we come to the creation of the philosophical 
concept. The laying out of the immanence of duration and the 
invention of the virtual come together in the creation of the 
concept of the event. The event is strung through the virtual and 
is therefore composed by the virtual's "fundamentally open 
whole as the immensity of the future and the past" (Deleuze, 
1986: 46). Let me example this through snapshots of the event's 
creation. We arrive in the empty space. First, a proposition is 
made - there is an encounter that 
forces thought to occur. Thus, 
using Deleuze's example, in this empty space there is an 
encounter with a tree. From this a subject of thought emerges 
and an idea is formed: the treegreens. Second, something is 
affirmed or denied of this subject of thought in that the 
proposition also contains attributes. The attribute of the 
proposition is the predicate - "a qualitative predicate likegreen" 
(Deleuze, 1990a: 21; my emphasis). Thirdly, there is the attribute 
of the thing, in this case the attribute of the tree: "the attribute 
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of the thing is the verb: togreen, for example, or rather the event 
expressed by this verb" (ibid)III. 
The attribute has an entirely different nature than corporeal 
qualities. The event has a different nature than the actions and 
passions of the body. (Deleuze, 1990a: 94) 
The line that Deleuze is drawing here places the event on the 
same side as the attribute. An attribute is not an event in itself 
because it cannot be abstracted or separated from the corporeal 
plane of bodies (and things) II despite being of a different nature 
than them. Think about the nature of an attribute, for example, 
cthe green of the tree' or 'the warmth of the fire', without the 
particular tree that green doesn't exist. The event, however, 
"expresses what is happening" and is therefore not reliant on 
one particular body (Deleuze, 1990a: 277); it describes the 
movement of the composition and decomposition of 
'happenings'actualized through and around bodies. Whilst the 
event results from the corporeal plane and the mixture of 
actions and passions of bodies it is not reducible to them. This 
irreducibility is the force of the incorporeal appreciated as that 
'different nature' that cuts across those 'events' staged and 
understood as (a combination oo discrete instants. Being on the 
other side of the line means to look beyond the cause and effect 
equation of a state of affairs resulting from/along the corporeal 
plane of bodies and things. The incorporeal is beyond the state 
of affairs announced in the present moment of the event: 
"When time passes and takes the event away, there is always a 
meanwhile to restore the event" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 158). 
A phrase haunts me here - 'think again'. Something forces me 
to think again, or rather, to keep on thinking. That is the nature 
10 Further still: "The attribute is not a being and does not qualify a being; it is an extra-being. 'Green' designates a 
quality, a mixture of things, a mixture of tree and air where chlorophyfl coexists with all parts of the leaf 'To 
green', on the contrary, is not a quality in the thing, 
but an attribute which is said of the thing" (Deleuze, 1990a: 
21). 
In a somewhat clumsy fashion I want to signal 
here that when Deleuze speaks of the corporeal level and of 
'bodies' this also leaves space for the material force and architectural channelling of things, objects, winds, 
smells etc - eg the tree. 
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of problems for Deleuze; the task is not to aim for solutions but 
to be worthy of thinking. Additionally, 'to think again'is 
intimation of the eternal return, and of difference and repetition; 
it is that which indicates the will to (keep on) thinking. Thinking 
again I am caught by the criticism that the irreducibility of the 
event to be staged in the corporeal action and state of affairs of 
bodies is to suggest that the event is somehow transcendent to 
these bodies. Deleuze signposts a line of ffight for thinking 
beyond this critique by way of the concept of the 'pure event'. 
The 'pure event' is another phrasing for Deleuze's conception of 
the event. He doesn't always use it (it mainly appears in The I-V it, ,g 
of Sense) but when he does it is to both counter the above 
transcendent criticism of the event and to distinguish his 
conception of the event from those predicated on the event as 
solely 'the birthday party', 'the tennis match', 'the battle' etc, that 
denies the force of the event itselfI2. The concept of the 'pure 
event' works by signalling the relation of the event to the virtual: 
"while the event may appear transcendent to the state of affairs 
to which it relates, it must be conceived to be an entirely 
immanent movement" (Ansell-Pearson, 1999: 124). 
At this point I can return to the empty space of the Arnolfini. 
In what follows I pick up the preparations of Unintited Guests some eight months 
later. Refracting the mechanics" of my own description of a room and something 
that happened there, I present the observations that I took then and fold theoretical 
asides in amongst the notes. 
12 "The battle bovers over its own field, being neutral in relation to all of its temporal actuahzations, neutral and 
impassive in relation to the victor and the vanquished, the coward and the 
brave ... Never present but always 
graspable only by the will of anonymity which It Itself inspire- yet to come and already passed, the 
battle I 
(Deleuze, 1990a: 100). 
13 'T An event it itself could 
be a time of day, a place, a draft -- "2. The fissure of irrational intervals - 
subjectivity is unhinged in the unfolding of 
these singularlties"; "3. Flows, sequences, chains, seriesl processes, 
connect-Ions, and 
distributions: the continual vectors of singularities". 
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Wednesday 20th October 1999: a work in progress ... 
The art of spacing - bow does that work? A pre-occupation of some kind like a narrator that 
never appears, never speaks and never acts. "Spatiý "- I am /b *k* about the performance ,g in ing 
that is beiq devised, How might ipacing work?. Firstyl, I write in my notebook, 'in relation to 
the materiaho oi, sociaho "-I am presupposing these terms alreaýv; I am pre-occupied by 
themyou mýgbt say. Secondly, I continue to wrýte, "in relation to the objects themselves". And 
thirdly, another way that spacin ,g works 
is somehow more than thefirst two, not a gnthesis 
that accretes power, but tbefact that "it takes place " both in terms of time, a duration, and in 
the actualiZation of the potential vilytialit of all of the proliferatiq couplings. Touchin Y g, 
bearingý seei smelliq - the spaciqs of the boýv, not so much because the delised 
performance has live bodies performiq, but because the witnessing of the event is registered 
througb the boýv, my body spectatin , g. 
Actual e-ýperience is beinT put on show, so in terms of interpretation consider that wben 
0 DeleuýZe talks of pure difference he speaks of the intensi_0 that awakens each jacul oj 
, g. 
To put this a different way, difference itseýf 'ýs that which s ensed andgives understandin i 
n. se to sensibilio in the encounter. Eachfaculo is different and apprehends its own exclusive 
f,,, one of the intensive beiq of the sensible. The faculties are able to communicate with one 
another, but thg are notgoverned by the necessiýy of a common sense because difference always 
inhabits andfractures sensibilio " (Hqyden, 1998: 3 1). 
Room - the middle term between place and space. <ýýS 
Ofa 
There is a geometric continuum of bodies-in-places 
filling that 
fold, displace and interact wIth other bodies. 
rMc 
cabinet The Stoics described tlýiis world as "an island 
clum embedded in an infinite void"; an island of sense in 
f= c Oat E 
the ocean of events, of indifference. The dynamic 
r lable connecting 
these separate places is the room (Casey, 
1998: 87). 
So in terms of touch there is no contactyet between the bodies. There is a chair however; it's 
positioned on the left near to some bottles. There is another chair behind a table that isfaiqly 
fe rm T more because its position i es it proximate to the first chair. The first chair is per o in 'g v 
, greater nodal 
densiýy in the scene, and it is to this chair that I am drawn: touchiq it Ifeel its 
event - canvas, chrome, cold, andfoam. 
The chair makes me ask, as the perfomers move 
around awat . ft . ng instructions 
before the scene beTins, 'Does someone have a specific chair, and 
bow does that alýTn them to the others? 
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On anotherplane, in terms of sound, Uninvited 
Guests are splitiq segments of recorded interviews and 
edifing them to produce background noise. But througb 
For eacb jaculýy there is alwqys sometbin ,g 
Mal 
forres it to coýfront its limit., imperceptible 
differences, the unima , ginable, the 
immemoria4 
and the unIb' kable (I la in yden, 1998: 32). 
this edifinýý this noise and znteýference, moments of order emeýTe - 'Durin a pause the sound ,g 
of aglass being put down on the little table can be beard" This is an art of apprehension: on 
show I*S motion andplay; sbadowsgasps, andgesturespeople the empýy stqTe making roomfor 
a moment rendered. Is thi's the moment Uninvited Guests are tgi q. to wrestle out of the 
noise? It is an apprehension of eý-, perience. It is a memog of room. It strikes me, Sitting here in 
the Arno#inz auditorium that memog is a more altenh . ve recordinýg machinefior the 'noise' oj 
the event. In this ipace an object punctures the mise-en-scMe. Further still, the faint 
representations of the corporeal plane - maskznýg tape traces out a space for the presence of a 
suitcase, or a fur coat - possess the ipectator more violentjl, leading them towards the 
ungaspable real' of the i-emembrance of a state of affairs that once was. So it i's that Deleuze 
mrites: 'We ask, for example: Wl'hatforres sensibility to sense? Wlbat is it that can onjl be 
sensed, jet is imperceptible at the same time? Wl'e mustpose this question not onlyfor memog 
, ght, 
but also for the imqginafion " (1994: 143). The sensible multiplicities that are and thou 
the conditions of actual e, ýperience force tbouTht such that it too i's open to van . ah . on. There are 
faculties ýýet to be discovered, whose existence i's notjet suýpected" (ibid). 
2. The fissure of irrational intervals - subjectivity is unhinged in the 
,gSss unfolding of these singularities. 
The breakdown in dialo ue, the repetition , the hifit 
in sound and noise, and the irrational intervals in place as you move from one room to the 
next, all present the energv of space as fissures of -reation. This is not a performance of a 
finisbed work; it is more a work of performance that'gives jp-ace to that virtual realm of the 
event in orderfor van*ous occupah . ons to emerge. So itý not a question of veqýiýTplaces but in 
sbominT wbat space gives place to. Acce T tbis, the bouse functions less as an ambiledural pfin 
,g 
for thin s to desaiption of the rooms than as an arrhitecturefor 'eventual'space, the makin room g. 
<fae, a mode of an which makes ap ce 
for the happen. This is architecture as 'ý7 writing o -p C, SP 
d, 'T 
la 
event " (Der7ida, 1,986: section 3. The spectatorfinds the room not as somethinT coViete and 
representable, but as somewhere between place and space. Here a room is that which makes mom 
and clears pacefor thinTs to happen. 
Philosophically, it acts as the chora, the iVossibk location 
,g where void andplace merge in ipace in the room pacefurnishes 
(Caxg, I-9P8: 87). In searchin 
in in for evidence of lucý fllrllisý Ts, the performers 
' terrogate the happeniqs, or the singularifies 
(the interactions of organic and nonorganic bodies as combinations of actions, passions, and 
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cirrumstances that bave no oý, Tin in the consciousness of the knowing subject), in tbeir attempt 
to trace out these rooms witb the remembrances of the marks the left bebind- blood, 9 
pboto, graphs, footpn*nts, fur coats, pieces ofJz armance is put in place and now , gsaw, etc. 
Theperf 
awaits its own event. 
5.5 Offering up interpretations 
For a doctrine in general, there is nothing regrettable in this 
uncertainty about the outcome of research, this complexity in 
the study of the particular case of each faculty: on the contrary, 
transcendental empiricism is the only way to avoid tracing the 
transcendental from the outlines of the empirical. (Deleuze, 
1994: 144) 
If thought, and hence understanding, arrives in the actual multiplicity of experience 
itself, doesn't this mean that essentially meaning emerges in an irrational, quixotic 
and ad hoc fashion? To put it another way, how can we conceive of difference in 
itself Without falling foul of the charge of atomism? How can we consider the 
making of difference in terms of the practices and activities of real experience with 
some form of consistency? And what do the observations of the processes involved 
in devising, and the affects achieved in, a piece of performance add up to? I want to 
suggest two routes through these questions - the first is through Deleuze's Spinoza 
and the composition of singularities; and the second is in Deleuze's folding of the 
philosophy of Leibniz and the communication of unity. 
Problem 8: Univocity part one 
Singular being as substance is not 'distinct from' or 'different from' 
any thing outside itself; if it were, we would not have to conceive it 
partly through another thing, and thus it would not be substance. 
And yet, being is not indifferent. (Hardt, 1993: 62) 
The philosophical problem Deleuze finds in Spinoza helps us to 
define the difference in being (difference in itselý whilst 
maintaining a being that is absolutely infinite and indivisible. 
Here we are confronted with the theory of the singularity of 
being; or the theory of singularities. A singularity isin absolute 
relation to the internal difference of all things; thus it emerges 
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out of both the notion of that process of differentiation in all 
things and the notion of being of all things, which in the 
philosophical case of Spinoza is the being of substance (see 
Deleuze, 1990b). In this Deleuze is then able to argue that being 
is remarkable in that it is both infinite (substance) and definite 
(internal difference). Or, as Hardt puts it: "The singular is 
remarkable because it is different in itself" (1993: 63). In terms 
of doing of social science this calls for a move away from 
systems of thought, or representational systems, towards a serial 
composition of thought based on difference in itself, or rather, 
the 'singularities of life'. In this you can see the non- 
representational mode of theory having particular application. 
5.5.1 Singularity and individuality 
The singularities or events constitutive of a tife coexist with the 
accidents of the corresponding life. Peleuze, 1997: 5) 
Let us return to the example of the treegreens. The attribute of the tree, 'to green', is a 
cc c singularity- event' that subsists in the vicinity of which the tree is constituted. 
Individuals,, therefore, are constituted within the vicinity of singularities that they 
envelop" (Ansell-Pearson, 1999: 132). Therefore I want to argue that encountering 
the event seriously directs research towards an experimentation that attempts to 
render visible the singularities that inhere alongside the corresponding life of the 
individual person. The experimentation occurs because it is no longer a question of 
interviewing the individual as knowing subject, as that "perfect' witness capable of 
giving testimony to some part of life's events, but of becoming a better witness to 
the event itself The researcher needs to experiment With ways to enhance, both 
conceptually and methodologically, their skills of description so as to become more 
capable of giving consideration to what is neither individual nor personal, but are 
the emissions of the singularities of events 
14 
. To see how this might work, let me 
14 For reference: "What is neither individual nor personal are, on the contrary, emissions of singulanties insofar 
as they occur on an unconscious surface and possess a mobile, immanent principle of auto-unIfication through 
a nomadic distribution, radically 
distinct from fixed and sedentary distributions as conditions of the syntheses of 
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recount an example of that suspended second existence of the 'general line' that 
regards the space of a 'pure event': 
She passed the lifeguard, and after she had gone some three or 
four steps beyond him she turned her head, smiled, and waved to 
him. At that instant I felt a pang in my heart! That smile and 
gesture belonged to a twenty-year-old girl! Her arm rose with 
bewitching ease ... It was the charm of a gesture drowning in the 
charm-lessness of the body ... There is a certain part of all of us 
that lives outside time. (Kundera, 1991: 3-4)15 
It may seem disingenuous to parade evidence from the art of the novel when my 
aim is to demonstrate the worth of researching the empty space of performance art 
but there is a crucial affiliation, namely that of force or that of (the force oý 
expression. Expression can occur anywhere: "what is expressed has no existence 
outside of its expressions; each expression is, as it were, the existence of what is 
expressed" Peleuze, 1990b: 42). So encountering an expression, in this Spinozian 
way, can be an encounter with all art forms for they all speak of the univocity of 
being. As Deleuze and Guattari put it: 
There is a specific way in which the novella treats a universal 
matter. For we are all made of lines. We are not referring to lines 
of Writing. Lines of writing conjugate with other lines, life lines, 
lines of luck or misfortune, lines productive of the variation of 
the line of Writing itself, lines that are between the lines of Writing. 
Peleuze and Guattari, 1988: 194) 
The key here is to realize and accept that our accounts 16 of the event should not 
be dependent upon, or even interdependent with, a principle of identity; rather 
there should be attempts to traverse the "empty significance of mobilities, 
consciousness. Singularities are the true transcendental events, and 
Ferlinghetti calls them 'the fourth person 
singular"' Peleuze, 1990a: 
17). 
15 See also Virginia Woolf's 
Jacob's Room "Thus if you talk of a beautiful women you mean only something 
flying fast which for a second uses the eyes, 
lips or cheeks of Fanny Elmer, for example, to glow through" 
(quoted in Gibson, 1996: 204). 
16 "T'hey leventsl take place only within certain 
determinate boundaries. They are not discursive. They are 
represented or recounted. 
They are thinkable only as having occurred" (Gibson, 1996: 181). 
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conjunctions of forces, confusions between entities, events as encounters" (Gibson, 
1996: 199). Thinking in terms of the event sees the life of the individual cede to the 
life of impersonal singularities. Or, rather individuality is an operation of 
individuating processes that comprise the chance amalgamation of forces and 
things, and is not therefore a function of the unity of an 'F, a Subject. Thus 
descriptions are put into practice to capture the insistence of the smile or gesture 
that traverses the body; they are not used as a description of the individual itself. 
Wednesday 2dhOctober. - two days before the premiere of 
Guest House 
The performers are back on the Arnoýini stqTe. So, In the viciniýy of the art work, we 
suddenly somewhere else than we usto 
slipping in with anotherperipective we start aTain: So, can tend to be. " (Benjamin, 1992) 
you describe a room for me please? Wl'hat are thy 
being asked to describe? This is a repetition of xhat I'm seen before: Wle have, after all, no means of 
verijiq whether these places ever existed 'When we evoke ýpace, we must immediately indicate 
what oawpies that space and how it does so: the depIgment of energv in relation to ýoints' and 
within a timeframe. " 4-efebmr, 1991: 12). In this repect Guest House reverts this evocation 
and show space ztseýf as it, ýves room for certain ocVations to take place. The soies of actions 
that comprise the performance in this scene have been loosely scripted, iniprovi, -ed, rehearsed a 
, gueýy remembered. 
The scene is a fiviq room. The white slats couple of times and are now va 
:, g s have been rearraqed. The #Thtiq is briTht. There is a clariýy in the white h ht that eems to 
y ý, hfing contains a spectral blue ,g must remain 
hidden, and et the h be telling us that nothin 
chiamscuro - an ether, agap, a phantasmaToria, a placefor 
idle talk. The tone of the dialque is 
emotionless. The sole thg are aiming at is akin tojorensic description. Thg are notperforming a 








A CTRE SS: Tbis is a sitfiq room in a s, -vall house. 
Not/ ,g wl, g reaýly mahl)es. Evegtlji, ýý-g i's done out in a reg 
seventies s_41e. (Glances left). The walo(ýPer iffiull qf 
pul, tle hiat4gles. (Looks dwwn) and the carpet ... (-, valks 
across the stage) there i's ajelloiv, sivirýypafierned carpet. 
(Turns right). Their ir a seventies TT- fet and an old 
worn, bedsellee with broken ptin fi var. f oj'k-id. f ýýgj 
_ 
rom-) 
trampoliniq,, on it. There is also an armchair, more 
conýýdable than /b e bedsettee (turns around and looks 
dov, n) and a cq&e table imith bils qf unýinished " jigsanýf- on 
I. t. (Looks up), Thereiý a bqy aindow which looks onto the 
street. And there is a white glass shelviiig unif n4th a Seisfire 
I. nside qf it. On either side there are twpboards containiii bits ,g 
oj'kmitliq and bils ofu, ýIinishedjýTsaw and aboie the gas 
fire are shelves upon which there is a Geman musical bov 
m4th a bear on it ... and next to that is a 
blueglassjar. On 
the wall is a photýgraph of the entii-e_lýmily wbo live in this 
house, two adults and nine children 
"A N '\7ERý7EVVITH ,, T THIS POI. 7 THE IL 
ME PERSOINT WT[OSE ROOM THIS WIAS 
STARTS TO CUTINAND 01/EKLAP/7 
COLIN. there is also ... the room was ufed ... the 
photograph was taken by the neigbbour and er 
..., for afamiylphotqraph taken 
by the next door neighbour 
... be came to take a 
big photograph of the 
entire family and that was taken in that room, 
so I can remember the room as well... again it 
had eh this wallpaper very seventies triangles 
I think purple or something I mean it was ... 
pretty awful but um (Laughs) ... um... . And I 
think that picture where it was taken was put 
on the same wall where it was taken so it was a 
very arty... urn... So is there one thing that 
sticks out... in the roomlin the room ... um apart 
from the bits offurniture I mean there were 
certain objects in the room, I mean one was a 
picture on the wall, which was quite grim 
actually... it was a picture by Millet which was 
a picture of these... I can't remember what it 
was called, but it is two people in a (beat) 
ploughed field and I think they're standing over 
a grave, the grave of their dead son or 
something; so I remember that picture on the 
wall 
, gbt 
it? Dojou know who brou 
Oh it wasn't a, it-s, it was 
just a kind of a print 
, No, but doyou know vbo, xho, who, wbosepicture 
it was, 
or 1'S it... 
I think it ... well 
I don't know whether it was 
my mum's or my dad's ... 1,1 
I don't know whether they were given it, or ... 
err... 
3. Flows, sequences, chains, series, 
processes, connections, and 
distributions: the continual vectors 
of singularities. The dialoTue is cut and 
ipliced - stretched and reduced to frqTments, 
some ftqTments stutter repetifivejl. Thi's kind 
q1 I sound editiq bears witness to the sheer 
volume oj'iýlbrmafion contained in a given 
moment. The dialope i's thus presented as 
I. ntqýrence. This is ý#ýctive nowhere more so 
than when it if used as an immediate 
I. nteracti . on with the actors. - here, actor, 
recorded interview (in/brmation) and sound 
show the slippeg task oj- getting even a 
tentative, graip on thiqs. 
DIRECTOR: Maybe he's lost it ... 
looking for it. I don't know ... there 
is something ambiguous about you 
not wanting to retell it 
ACTOR: Therefore I pretend I'm 
looking for it. 
DIRECTOR: You're trying to get 
to the point. 
ACTRESS: I did do a bit of that, but 
then I gave up on that - have to get 
my head around it ... exactly, it's 
like 
I'm working it out. 
DIRECTOR: Your eye shifts from 
object to object as you try and 
place them. You are engrossed - it 
gives you a reason for you to 
become with the questioning. 
ACTRESS: Thus at times it could be 
fictionalized by me ... I 
don't know 
what is coming next ... and yet at the 
same time I do, it's Just that I'm taking 
my time, pausing [bj the obje6, ts that are in 
the room]. 
DIRECTOR: 'Over here 
something happened. 
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Therefore we have the singularity of the event on show: the day the neighbour 
came to take a photograph of the entire family. A singularity is not an event of 
individuality - an "empirically actual is not a bare particular, a 'this' like any other 
'this"' - in that it has a "determinate content in virtue of its actual genesis" (Baugh, 
1993: 24). Here the history of these singularities coming into being comes from the 
life of that particular family, the room of the family household, the build-up of 
friendship with the neighbour, the development of photographic technology, the 
creation of the tradition of photographic portraits etc. All are virtual forces that 
come to be actualized in this event and all are founded in the empirical world. The 
individuality emerges through the interviewee's perspective on this event; it is a 
function of the actualization process such that the process of individuation occurs 
in the encounter of the event - "something happens before he construes it as 
happening to him" (Gibson, 1996: 20 1)17. Thus, we find in conclusion that to be 
witness to the event is to be individuated by it. This is to realize that "there is a 
mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or 
substance" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 261). To achieve tl-iis realization is to grasp 
the sense of the event, to extract sense itself where "sense is that which is 
expressed" (Deleuze, 1990a: 20). In this way sense does not exist outside of its 
expression and is therefore absolutely empirical and not metaphysical; they inhere 
rather than exist as such. Consequently: 
How could we not feel that our freedom and strength reside, 
not in the divine universal nor in the human personality, but in 
these singularities which are more us than we ourselves are, 
more divine than the gods, as they animate concretely poem and 
aphorism, permanent revolution and partial action? ... 
Today's 
task is to make ... pre-individual and nonpersonal singularities 
speak - in short, to produce sense. (Deleuze, 1990a: 
72-73) 
17 See also: -It would be a gross mistake to assume that 
because Lyotard is engaged in questioning unities and 
totalities, he is necessarily promoting some 
form of Individualism. If it is true that totality is a negatively marked 
term in his thought, the corresponding positive 
term is, rather, sj'nTulariýy. A singularity is not so much an 
individual as an evenf' (Bennington, 
1988: 9). 
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Translating this into performance research means that we must accept that a 
performance is never an interpretation of neither a text nor something that can be 
sufficiently interpreted. It means that when making of empirical data an extraction 
of sense rather than a representational discovery of knowledge we look at the pre- 
individual, incorporeal and immanent spacing between things in an indifference to the 
individuals that actualize it. This is not a brute atomism, incompossible 
individualism, that adds up to nothing because "a singularity is not so much an 
individual as an evenf' (Bennington, 1988: 9). Singulanties inhere and take place 
immanent to an event, so in seeking to find a way of presenting this type of 
observation as an adequate social science, we need to turn now to that second route 
through this problematic of adding up and making transposable in some way 
(practically or conceptually) these particular extractions of sense. Thus we look to 
the Leibnizian folding of the world into a space where a unity of communication 
becomes possible. 
Problem 9: Univocity part two 
What constitutes the unity of a work? What makes us 
'communicate `%vith a work? What constitutes the unity of a 
work of art, if there is such a thingý We have given up seeking a 
unity which would unify the parts, a whole which would totalise 
the fragments. For it is the character and nature of the parts or 
fragments to exclude the Logos both as logical unity and as 
organic totality. But there is, there must be a unity which is the 
unity of tl-ýs very multiplicity, a whole which is the unity of just 
these fragments: a One and Whole which would not be the 
principle but, on the contrary, 'the effect' of the multiplicity and 
of its disconnected parts ... A communication which would not 
be posited in principle, but which would result from the 
operation of the machines and their detached parts, their 
noncommunicating fragments. Peleuze, 1972: 144-145) 
What we have here is an expression of life in terms of an 
immanence of multiplicity which is taken from Leibniz's notion 
of monads - individual perspectives on the same world that are 
also perspectives which, in large part, do not communicate 
(hence the term monad as the singular unity of the individual). 
Whilst individual they are however immanent to one another 
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because it is the same world on which they all have a 
perspective. In other words, among their solitudes there is "a 
spontaneous 'correspondence"'; they "aU possess the same 
stock, enveloping and expressing the same world in the infinite 
series of their predicates" (ibid: 145). Therefore, in witnessing 
the space in-between things, the spacings that make up the 
intensities and movement of bodies, objects and situations as 
the events of performance art, as the event on show courtesy of 
performance, we witness the univocal dynamics which give 
experience (of this world) its unique unity: laughing with 
laughter itself, fafling in love with love itself; crying with crying 
itself, etc. This is what makes us 'communicate' With a work. 
This is what makes as grasp that 'ungraspable real', the virtual 
but not actual world in-imanent to us because we are of a life ... 
5.5.2 The pure event and art of counter-actualization 
I would like the happening to be arranged in such a way that I 
could at least see through the happening to something that 
wasn't it. (Cage, 1980: 55; quoted in Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 
371) 
The Stoic's attitude 18 towards events persists throughout Deleuze's work, because, 
as he put it, the event was "a philosopl-iical concept, the only one capable of 
ousting the verb 'to be"' (1995: 141). This capacity to move thought beyond the 
question of Being also enables Deleuze to sidestep (irritably') the critique that 
consideration of events can only be an anecdotal contribution to philosophy in that 
it offers nothing concrete in the way of a logical exposition on life - eg the event is 
not something substantive. Where there should be concrete, tangible objects the 
event is an ephemeral mist. Like Deleuze, I want to argue that this intangible, 
immanent, virtual and impersonal air of the event is too sign'ficant to ignore just 
18 The Stoic attitude, to put it briefly, is the nature of a new distinction that contrasts "the 'thickness of bodies' 
with the incorporeal events which operate on the surface of 
bodies like 'a mist over the prairie"' (Marks, 1998: 39; 
quoting Deleuze 1990a: 
5). 
19 "We are sometimes hesitant to call 
Stoic a concrete or poetic way of life, as if the name of a doctrine were 
too bookish or abstract to 
designate the most personal relation with a wound" (Deleuze, 1990a: 148). 
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for the name of rationality2o. It is for this reason that Deleuze is at pains to show 
how the personal and felt, and hence the substantive, is deeply implicated in a 
philosophy based on discovering the nature of events. So let me demonstrate this 
philosophy further through one of the most instructive examples Deleuze uses, that 
of the wound itself- 
A wound incamates or actualizes itself in a state of things and in 
a lived state; but it is itself a pure virtual on the plane of 
immanence which draws us into a life. 'My wound existed 
before me Not a transcendence of the wound as a superior 
actuality, but its immanence as a virtuality always at the heart of 
a milieu (field or plane). (Deleuze, 1997: 6) 
Deleuze frequently referred to this example of the wound taking it from Joe 
Bousquet's novel Les Capitaler "My wound existed before me, I was born to 
embody it" (1955: 103). The point he makes here is crucial to an understanding of 
the logic of the event to which he subscribes. The protagonist - the subject or the 
T of representational signification, and therefore, for Deleuze, by implication 
maybe you or I- recognizes the value of the wound as a condition of life separate 
from themselves; the protagonist thereby accepts their part in becon-Uing the quasi- 
cause of what unfolds, of what is actualized: i. e. the encounter of forces that 
becomes you and the wound. Deleuze portrays this acceptance as the question of 
attaining the will that the event creates in us; that there is an exchange (that plays 
out as a mutual oscillation) of the organic will of our life force for a spiritual will, 
where the spiritual is that which wills "not exactly what occurs, but something in 
that which occurs,, something yet to come which would be consistent With what 
occurs, in accordance with the laws of an obscure, humorous conformity: the 
Event" (Deleuze, 1990a: 149)21. -, his is about consistency, and in this it is about 
ethics. Counter-actualization is the creation of concepts - here the creation of the 
concept of the event - which comes to function as an expression of the unity of 
the singularities that inhere in the particular folds of 
life. 
20 "1 have, i ri -ýs notion of the event: you see, 
I don't believe in things" its true, spent a lot of time w 
iting about tl 
peleuze, 199-5: 160). 
21 This facet is founded on Deleuze's reading of 
Nietzsche's notion of Eternal Return (Deleuze, 1983). 
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To become worthy of what happens to us, and thus to will and 
release the event, to become the offspring of one's own events, 
and thereby to be reborn, to have one more birth, and to break 
with one's carnal birth - to become the offspring of one's 
events and not of one's actions, for the action is itself produced 
by the offspring of the event. (Deleuze, 1990a: 149-150) 
It is never a matter of regretting how things have turned out, but always of 
finding out how to embrace the past such that it can be said to have conditioned 
the present in the most positive sense (Buchanan, 2000: 25). This reflects Bergson's 
method of intwtion: that knowledge consists in finding and positing problems, the 
invention of new points of departure from that which already exists, and the 
freedom and courage to move away from ready-made solutions. As Hayden puts it: 
"What is at issue is the recognition that humanity makes its own history and that 
our freedom is only as great as the problems we set for ourselves" (1998: 39). So in 
relation to all events, be they Auschwitz, that dazed field, or the remembrance of 
your own particular room: 
The eternal truth of the event is grasped only if the event is also 
inscribed in the flesh. But each time we must double this painful 
actualization by a coun ter- actualiz ation which tin-nts, moves, and 
transfigures it. We must accompany ourselves - first, in order to 
survive, but then even when we die. Counter-actualization is 
nothing, it belongs to a buffoon when it operates alone and 
pretends to have the value of what could bave bappened. But, to be 
the mime of what effectively occurs, to double the actualization with 
a counter-actualization, the identification with a distance, like 
the true actor and dancer, is to give to the truth of the event the 
only chance of not being confused with its inevitable 
actualization ... It is, 
finally, to give us the chance to go farther 
than we would have believed possible. To the extent that the 
pure event is each time imprisoned forever in its actualization, 
counter-actualization liberates it, always for other times 
(Deleuze, 1990a: 161). 
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In other words, we can create clinical understandings by giving space to the 
event itself, by clearing room for its observation in both a practical (actualization) 
and a conceptual (counter- actualization) sense. 
IV Two days later: the premiere of 'Guest House' ., a work in progress 
I am sitfiq in the Arnoýini auditonum; there are morepeople on this side, the audience's side, than 
before - pbotqTrapbers, Arnoýfini staff, an amateurfilmmaker, fliends ... I am bere as uinea pig g 
and bere to offer commentag on the way the performance bas 6-banTed and on the performance as a 
wbole now that I am about to see it unfold more or less uninter77ipted However, in what bappens 
ne-%-t this doesn't bappen. There are numerous stoppaTes, mecbanicalfaults, retakes, performance 
notes, and last minute iVrovements - no, that last bit is wrvlýý beffer to see them as up-to-tbe- 
MI . nute chanTes. The tbiq is the performance is a work in progress, and in my opinion works best 
I. n itsguise as a rehearsal on show. Or rather, that i's the spirit Mith which the audience of the 
performance of Guest House should let themselves be seduced Guest House is aperformance of 
the atteVt to pull together material, to join the forces of situations and make these frqTments 
conspire towards somethinT thformative, instruttive and entertaininT, I am hooked, I am hooked on 
the narrative of the performers tryiqg to make a narrative, tývznT to make sense where ostensibl y 
there is none., just bits of interziews about disparate rooms, objects, events and lives. My attention is 
the energ the performance asks of me, the energv required to fill in thegaps, to find room for these 
things, to attempt to keep hold of this room, of these rooms, of these itvossible rooms. Audience and 
performer accompany each other 
ýy gs that are obtious# there? Do we see our own rooms, W1h do we seem so interested in thin 
pen ? Asapectalorto our own events and lives there, there in the objects, the desýýpfions, the va ess 
, gsjor, 
the uqraspable real' that is the virtual , gs of, or clearin 
Guest House we witness the sifin 
realm of the event i/seff. There is no narrative tojollow, notbin? to salve ourgrowiýT uncertainty: the g 
event is iVersonal, and inhuman. De CerYeau has put the plate of this performance on the map 
where be resees that 'Vories aboutplaces are makeshift tbings ... composed with the worldý fo 
debris " that there is a place where Nin extra and other (details and excesses comiq from 51 TS 
elsewhere) insert themselves in the acceptedframework " (1984: 107). Representiq what appears on 
'presentation 
of the hnes of the inlem`ewee's te, %t, does notgive a worthy the surface, a direct re 
testimony to the event In coVosing a show of spaces 'ýPegwherepunCbed and torn open by elloses, 
d,, fs, and leaks of meaning" (ibid) the Uninvited Guests bear witness instead to the conditions 
,, g g those details that comefmm elsewhere. In b, s that make an eventpossible 
by e%posiý and creafin is 
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last abstraction on the event DeleuýZe proposes a lead to heo us capture the event. 'Events are 
produced in a chaos ... but only under the conditions that a sort of screen intervenes. " (Deleu-Ze, 
/ 993: 76). Gue stH ou s e, as a performance piece, IS made out of such interventions, and, as such, 
thepeýbrmance is a work in prýgrrss, it is always interveniq. 
5.5 Conclusions: Ungraspable reality 
Performance art succeeds when it grabs our attention through the intensity 
produced in the way it is worked out of the tension of the present tense. The art of 
performance comes from the way it is built out of the present moment and the 
ambivalences that this contains. In the empty space and in the practice of 
witnessing a performance a moment of apprehension is a reach towards that which 
cannot be said. Words fail to capture the feeling. One of the reasons for this comes 
from the sense that after the encounter, the moment of apprehension, the 
ambivalence of all the other things that could have been going on sets in; the 
feeling that in making sense you have exercised a certain blindness to the full power 
of the event itself The representational system fails the witness and there is no easy 
communication of the apprehension that is now fast disappearing from view. T'he 
point is that ... the thing seen' exceeds the understanding of its witness and 
consequently returns to haunt her" (Heathfield, 2000: 21). 
In weaving together the space of thought and the space of empirical encounter, 
I hope to have mtimated the fact that in the face of a performance it is possible to 
site/sight the ambivalence of the event itself, and the fact that it can't be proven, in 
such a way that delivers us to a new experience of the world, an unthought thought 
and into a realm beyond the present limits of representation. The 
folds of 
Deleuze's work have produced three lines of flight out of this encounter. First, in 
the encounter with experience as a witness who cannot fully testify, there is a 
relation between the question and the answer, the demand upon and the response 
through representation, which cuts across the science of verifying testimony. 
This 
relation, achieved in the face of witnessing an event akin to that of 
being wronged, 
is the logic of sense: an incorporeal plane upon which to register a way of 
knowing 
through a sense of the event itself We need to work on the plane of this other 
perspective to things and 
look beyond the particular account of the individual and 
the human, towards a possible account of the unsaid, the mhuman; towards 
the 
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expressed and not the proposed. Second, we need to work the distinction of these 
two perspectives into our accounts. One way proposed for this is through the space 
of virtuality alongside that of actuality. This is about thinking two planes of thought 
at once, where the virtual plane delivers us to new possibilities of experience and 
expression for the project of expanding the ways in which can communicate modes 
of making sense of things. In this light, my own account of Guest House operated 
through the folds of theory -a virtual register through the creation of concepts that 
capture one particular perspective of the same event (the virtual here being that 
there is potential for other accounts) as an attempt to show how such a dual 
assemblage of the virtual and actual Might work. Finally, the fact that the virtual 
moves our thought towards the notion of univocity, a realm of 'spontaneous 
correspondence': that something makes sense not through an individual's particular 
intent and agency, but through the space of the event itself It is here that the 
potential of Witnessing the inhuman nature of the event presents a potential style of 
understanding, one that counter-actualizes that which actually happens by looking 
at the non-organic line of something that occurred in the happening: an alternative, 
but equally valid, way of making sense; and one that I believe is ever present in the 
appreciations we make of our encounters With performance. 
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There would have been a time for such a word' - 
To-morrow,, and to-morrow, and to-morrow, 
Creeps in this pretty face from day to day, 
To the last syllable of recorded time; 
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools 
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle! 
Life's but a walking shadow; a poor player, 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage, 
And then is heard no more: it is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
Signifying nothing. 
(Wilham Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V, Scene V, 18-28) 
I The hopeless word of 'never to return'. 
Timiql or an encounler with time 
6.1 Introduction: the quick and the dead 
Our knowledge of the material world is based on concepts 
defined in terms of the broadest generality and the greatest 
scientific (le having a content) abstraction ... energy, space, 
time .... When we evoke 'space', we must immediately indicate 
what occupies that space and how it does so: the deployment 
of energy in relation to 'points' and within a time frame ... 
Space considered in isolation is an empty abstraction. 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 12) 
In developing our knowledge of social practice we are investigating the taking place 
of the world. In aiming at the thought-performance of an 'empty space', this thesis 
is an attempt to shed light on the syntactical relations operating at the heart of this 
'taking-place' achievement. Part of this task is to construct concepts that make us 
capable of extracting sense at the point of these relations; as outlined earlier, this is 
the work of the performative understood as the frontier teetering on the edge of 
whatever next. Taking stock of what has been achieved so far, both in the 
theoretical 'empty space' and the concrete empty space of performance art, we 
have looked at the energy of affect in the corporeal realm and to the virtual realm 
of events. We have intimated that this affect spaces out the encounters that people 
this world. The force of the event itself gives room for things (material and 
immaterial) to occur - an occurrence of things (objects) that likewise complicate 
and fold the channelling of such forces (energy). Therefore, in the argument that 
Lefebvre uses above, one frequently referred to within the practice of human 
geography (see Gregory, 1994), we have finally to consider the conceptual realm of 
time: the tension of the present tense unfolding in the timing of performance itself 
as the man walks across the empty space. 
What is time? Time is foremost an abstract relation and an exceptionally 
is equally exceptional the way modifies an of our complicated concept that 
endeavours be they scientific, artistic, political or philosophical. Time, conceptually, 
operates both in absolute terms - as a period, an epoch, as an enduring, as Alon, 
etc - and in reference to succession - the past, the present and the 
future, as a now 
or never, a Chronos. The conceptual justification of the importance of time given 
by Lefebvre in the quote above is a partial one. It is partial because it only operates 
for time conceived in terms of Chronos) as that which 'frames' energy. Whereas 
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spaces and times "are generated by the movements of mobiles, they do not frame 
these movements" (Latour, 1988: 25) - the recent theoretical intervention of Actor- 
Network Theory exemplifies the importance of tl-iis partiality. Such an argument 
begins to move us away from Lefebvre's Chronos: thus on the one hand, the time 
of Chronos is a container that offers a uniform measure for the taking place of 
things, and on the other hand, the time of Alon emerges only in the performance, it 
is constitutive of the performative because it is constituted in the performative. In 
other words, the virtual time of time itself (Alon) is tangible only in its moment of 
actualization because it is the driving force of that actualization. Part of the purpose 
of tl-iis chapter is to show that to understand performance we need to address this 
notion of virtual as well as actual time, an appreciation illustrated in Elizabeth 
Grosz's recent work (2000a; 2000b): 
As a whole, time is braided, intertwined, a unity of strands 
layered over each other; unique, singular, and individual, it 
nevertheless partakes of a more generic and overarching time, 
which makes possible relations of earlier and later, and relations 
locating times and durations relative to each other. Such a 
durational - that is to say, wholistic and fragmentary - concept 
defies any simple linear model of the arrow of time, in which 
the time of beings, and processes is elided in favor of a 
measured movement whose uniform, regular beat generates an 
objective, measurable, clock time. (2000a: 17-18) 
Introducing the concept of duration unites both of these conceptual takes on 
time, bringing together time as it frames our understandings and as it offers up the 
singular and the unique in its guise as an incessant force bringing about change. 
This echoes the link to that "explosive internal force that life carries within 
itself' 
(Deleuze, 2000: 51) running throughout the thesis. This link brings to the fore a 
new take on an old problem: that through this "positive, internal movement, 
being 
must become qualified and concrete in its singularity and specificity" 
(Hardt, 1993: 
14). 1 want to suggest that by utilising Deleuze's conceptualizations of time 
by 
juxtaposing the Stoic configurations of 
Aion and Chronos, it is possible to think of 
the same and the different, the concrete singular and the ongoing continua, 
together. The actuality of Chronos acts as a 
leverage for apprehending the qualified, 
necessary and 
determinate sense of our being, whilst Aion provides a sense of the 
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vital openness and indetern-unacy of experience as it happens. All of which etches 
out the excess primacy of the "heterogeneous time of difference over the 
spatialized time of metrication with its quantitative segments and instants" 
(Boundas, 1996: 92). In this chapter on time, this conceptual contest between 
Chronos and Alon plays out a problem that reflects the larger argument running 
through the thesis that rather than impose from a transcendental plane a unity and 
completeness through homogenization and reduction we extract notions of unity - 
the univocal, the pure event, the one substance, the virtual - from the actual (the 
empirical). In particular here I want to uncover two interrelated theoretical and 
empirical applications that are both attuned to the making sense of these issues of 
time and their role in the constitution of the social. 
The chapter is divided into three sections, which will draw out some of the ways 
in which the theorizing of time, operates as a further way of looking at and hence 
interfering With, the grounds upon which we come to understand the social. In the 
first section I x-, A place the role of time in the context of the discussions held in the 
previous chapters. I will do this in two ways. First, through the contrast between 
the notion of a direct and indirect image of time I will show how particular 
considerations of time relate specifically to the experiential ways in which we 
encounter time, both actualjl through our corporeality and the plane of affect, and 
tirtually, through a sense of immateriality and 'eventhood'. Secondly, an outline of 
the different characteristics of Ch-ronos and Alon will exami'ne the way we 
theoretically, and therefore to a certain extent referentially2, engage with time. This 
will enable me to show how these two Stoic concepts, when played alongside one 
another, suggest a possible way of theorizing the general and the particular. This 
will lead into the second section, because in the relationship between Ch-ronos and 
Aion a gap of excess opens up producing a realm of indiscernibility. In this section 
I will make an account of the final piece of research carried out for this thesis, that 
of the study of rehearsals for a professional theatre production. I will conclude this 
section by analysing how the rehearsal process itself, as Witnessed, plays upon what 
is now a burgeoning interest interfacing the social sciences with other disciplines, 
2 Please note that whilst this distinction between the experiential and the referential might suggest a divide, 
respectively related, between theory and practice, that 
is not my intention nor is it my belief (see Chapter One). 
Rather it is a necessarýý simplification to enable me to distil a sense of how conceptuafisations of time come to 
play an important role in 
both the practice of and the understanding of our cveryday lives. 
171 
Timing, or an encounter witb time 
that of Benjan-un Libet's neuro-scientific discovery of the 'half-second delay'. In 
particular I argue that this empirical encounter in the process of rehearsals offers 
-social science a way of conceiving an explicitly performative sense of subjectivity. 
This reveals a potential research strategy held within the space of performance art, 
showing how non-representational theory can be put to use in the making of 
alternative ways of understanding. In the third, and final section, I Will illustrate 
how this gap of indiscernibility heralds another conceptual space involving time: 
that of memory or the 'pure past'. If the 'half-second delay' offers a relatively weak 
and ephemeral subjectivity, may be it is through memory that we can conceive of a 
firmer ground; for, even when starting at degree-zero in 'empty space' and with an 
anti-subject orientated stance, the idea of subjectivity is very difficult to ignore. A 
final introductory point: the concepts used here to work through the notion of time 
don't work to show us what time is; rather they are normative in relating 
understanding of the temporal towards certain uses (see May, 1996), and are 
therefore potentially useful for transposition elsewhere. This is not about having a 
better understanding of the world; rather it works to encourage better ways of 
living in a world conceived in the 'tactical resourcefulness' (Conley, 1993) by which 
we make aspects of life apparent. 
SECTION ONE 
6.2 Movement and force: time irretrievable and indeterminate 
Think back to the objects presented in the performance of Guest House in the 
previous chapter; think back to the material presence of the ob)ect in Chapter Four 
and the material affect of the body in Chapter Three. Place these thoughts in the 
cempty space' and imagine the encounter of two organic bodies and the ever- 
changing dimensionality that propels encounter after encounter as the scene 
unfolds and as the two bodies co-exist within the same performative field. A simple 
act) for example the movement of footstep after footstep, carries the situation forth 
into the next moment. It is clear, even in this pared-down example, that imbued 
within any apprehension of the actions that make up our 
lives there is a sense of 
time: there is movement, change and difference at work. On the one hand we can 
relate this to perception, to the fact that we are the 
body and that the body is the 
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subject of perception (see Merleau-Ponty, 1962)3. (It is important to note that this 
is a movement back from the impersonal forces illustrated in the previous two 
chapters, and that that this reiterates that we can have many perspectives on the 
world with neither one being superior to the other - the point is to always ask what 
any one perspective facilitates. ) In short, sense of the world is made through the 
sensory-motor perception of the other body and of this encounter. So, if this were 
an abstraction of the everyday life of two people in the social world such a 
perception would be a recognition that this other body is, for example, Francesca, 
your friend. On the other hand, moving towards the sense of the immaterial again, 
we abandon the notion of developing our understanding through this material 
perception alone, and encounter the other body (which could equally be an object 
or the force of a wind or the architecture of [the] space itselo through a pure image 
- the pure sight, sound, or force, etc. that it brings to bear. In this case it is that 
particular body that we encounter, not the additions that over time produce the 
notion of a general body and thus a capacity for recognition. This is an image that 
is anterior to signification, it is a 'pure' image achieved through any one, or 
combination, of our senses, be it a "pure optical" or a "pure sotUC114 image etc. The 
distinction between these two perspectives is portrayed as follows by Deleuze: 
It would seem first of all that the sensory-motor image is richer, 
because it is the thing itself, at least the thing as it extends into 
the movement by which we make use of it. %X/hflst the pure 
optical image seems necessarily poorer and more rarefied: as 
Robbe-Grillet says, it is not the thing, but a 'description' which 
tends to replace the thing, which 'erases' the concrete object, 
which selects only certain features of it, even if this means 
making way for different descriptions which will pick out 
different fines or features, which are always provisional, always 
in question, displaced or replaced. (1989: 44-45) 
31 refer to the definition of perception 
held by the earlier and influential work of Merleau-Ponty where a theory 
of the body is already a theory of perception: 
"The thing and the world, are given to me along w1th the parts of 
my body, not by any 
'natural geometry', but in a living connection comparable, or rather identical, with that 
existing between the parts of my 
body" (1962: 205). 
4 These are the names Deleuze gives to such 
'pure forces' as they are translated in philosophical and concrete 
terms by the technology of the cinema 
(see Dclcuze, 1986 & 1989). 
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Needless to say we experience both these perspectives at the same time: the one 
organic - in other words, the actual body you touch; the other inorganic - it is the 
sense you make of the encounter, the 'description' you give of it, it is the 
encounter's virtual register. The former perspective is that of the movement-image 
(see Deleuze, 1986) and the latter that of the time-image (see Deleuze, 1989). And 
both perspectives use and take time to happen. In this regard both offer an image 
of time: the movement-image is an indirect representation of time, whilst the time- 
image is a direct image of time. In working with the pure optical imagel or the direct 
image of time, we make pure descriptions that are undone at the same time as they 
are produced. If we use perception or phenomenology alone and work with the 
movement-image we effectively retain from the thing, or the other body, only what 
interests us, or what extends into the reaction of 'us' as the character, the subject, 
only the perspective of our sensing of what happens in the moment. Conversely: 
The pure optical image may only be a description, and concern a 
character who no longer knows how or is no longer able to 
react to the situation; the restraint of this image, the thinness of 
what it retains, line or simple point, 'slight fragment' Without 
importance', bring the thing each time to an essential singularity, 
and describe the inexhaustible, endlessly referring to other 
descriptions. It is, then, the optical image which is really rich, or 
'typical'. (Deleuze, 1989: 45) 
The indirect image of time is 'typical' in that it speaks of that which affects us all 
and is not a description of something particular to us. This quality of opening up a 
description of the world separate from our individual perspective enriches the time- 
image because it is not, unlike the movement-image, dependent on the 
"movements it is able to follow or make, but by the mental connections it is able to 
enter into. And it becomes questioning, responding, objecting, provoking, 
theorematizing, hypothesizing, experimenting, in accordance with the open list of 
logical conjunctions ('or', 'therefore', 'if, 'because% 'actually', 'although ... 1)" 
(Deleuze, 1989: 23). The time-image thus cuts across the universal register of time 
- T1, T2, 
T35 ... etc. 
(see Figure 1) - and organizes alternative "cartographies of 
thought, mappings or visualizations of the movements of thought in and as time" 
(Rodowick, 1997: 84). It is right here in the alternative cartography of the time- 
i_ri 1 image that this chapter sets out to offer the empi cism of rehearsals as a potential 
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place for exploring the associative glue of these logical conjunctions ('or', 
'therefore', 'If, 'because', 'actually', 'although... '). In doing so, the chapter will 
follow the theoretical diagram of the time-image and its affiliation with the Stoic 
configurations of Ch-ronos and Alon by weaving individual moments of theory into 
the actual space of performative happening as explored and utilized in the 
processes that make up rehearsals. Before picking up the first thread of the 
theoretical diagram I begin with a fold that looks into and introduces the 
foundation for my research into the rehearsal process. 
Rehearsals 
The rehearsal process examines the immanence of the virtual through practice, or 
rather the theatre of intimate, personal, and 'momentarily relational encounters' 
(Shotter, 1995), by bringing to the fore the web of 
associations that come together to form a particular 
encounter. Naturally, these seemingly ephemeral 
conjunctions are concretized, stratified, and through time 
construct the social arenas in which we play. We don't, 
however, always have recourse to an already agreed 
justification for action in the spontaneous and novel 
circumstances through which our lives cross. Unlike final 
theatrical performances (the base assumption shaping the 
use of dramaturgical metaphor within social science) life 
The human achievement - shared by a few 
primates and aquatic mammals but not 
elaborated by them - is the ability to make 
decisions based on the virtual as well as actual 
alternatives. These virtual alternatives take on a 
life of their own. Theatre is the art of 
actualising them and rehearsal is the means of 
developing their individual shapes and rhythms. 
By turning possibilities into action, into 
performances, whole worlds otherwise not 
lived arc born ... Rehearsals and recollections 
- preplay and afterplay - converge in the 
theatrical event (Schechner, 1994: 184). 
may be seen to be more akin to the rehearsal room where the aim is to feel a way 
onwards, in a practical sense, whereby one is attempting to 
be attuned to the immediate 
environment of the situation. 
Research held within the sphere of the rehearsal process 
is therefore an exploration 
into "the co-op erative-experien tial path to theatre processes 
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eVoking 'felt-meanings' and knowledges, through the contextualized work by groups of 
singular social subjects" (Melrose, 1993: 201). 
The research that I offer here comes from entering as an observer into the five- 
Nveek rehearsal process (from the 6/1/98 to the opening night of the 5/2/98) leading 
up to the Bristol Old Vic's production of Arthur Miller's second play A11Mg Sons 
(197 1)'. The account made of this research was carried out through the use of extensive 
note taking and annotation of the actors' movements as they played through the text 
and blocked the action for the production. In particular, emphasis was made of the 
gestures and intensity improvized as the individual scenes were played out, and of the 
decisions made and 'justifications given, by the director and the actors, as they 
negotiated through performances the dramatic text. The main part of this research is 
achieved through the intense immersion into the rehearsal process comprising, in this 
case, nearly the entire run of the four-week rehearsal period (see Appendix 1). It has not 
been my intention to show the extent of the notes made in this time. Rather, in the 
research extracts set out in this chapter, my purpose is to show how within the research 
process itself in particular, and in the process of rehearsal in general, a space is created 
in which another sighting of 'how things go on' can be achieved. I have then used 
distilled extractions of my notes to exemplify one method through which we can make 
this particular space of apprehension both meaningful (theoretically) and practical (in 
terms of setting out how these apprehensions become apparent in the space between 
the written dramatic text and the tentative live performance in rehearsal). Other 
methods are clearly available in this space, not least one which follows the intentions of 
Laban in annotating a new vocabulary for scripting the seemingly unrepresentable - 
whilst this potential is latent Within the notes I made it is not the intention of this thesis 
to pursue them. 
5 Synopsis of Arthur Mfller's All My Sons (first performed in 1947): The play deals with the divorce between 
action and responsibility: that reveals a drama that "by its very movement - by its creation, suspension, and 
resolution of tension; its inexorable rush towards tragic confrontation - proves that the past is always present 
and cannot be ignored, forgotten or denied" (Centola, 1997: 50). The dramatic action is centred on Joe Keller, a 
thriving businessperson, who shifts the blame for producing cracked acroplane cylinder heads in wartime on to 
his partner, Steve Deever, and sends 21 pilots to their deaths. Joe's ultimate defence is that he did everything for 
his farnfly. But when one son, Chris, invites his dead brother Larry's ex-grlfriend Ann (Steve Deevcr's 
daughter), to the Keller household with the intention of proposing to her (despite being blocked by his 
obdurate mother and tainted 
by familial guilt), the truth of how Larry went missing in action during the war 
forces Joe Keller's past into the open. 
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6.2.1 The play between Chronos and Aion: the gap within which 
rehearsals take place 
What we have here is a unity in which its phrases and aspects 
are related to each other not as separable, existentially identifiable 
component parts, but only as sensi*bjl distinct and distinguishable 
aspects of the same flowing totality. Each locus is a region of 
structurizing activity (an agency? ), Within which a diffuse, 
dynamic unity is continually, creatively sustained by the 
(disorderly) exchanges at its boundaries, exchanges between it 
and the other activities surrounding it ... which depend in their 
turn upon dynamic exchanges at greater and lesser levels, and so 
on. (Shotter, 1993: 67) 
Here Shotter is referring to time as it is figured in complexity theory within the 
natural sciences (specifically in relation to the work by Prigorine and Stengers, 
[1984]). What I want to show by this reference is the way in which our conceptions 
of time, to whatever degree of intricacy, operate in a very similar way whether they 
are applied in the sciences or the humanities. The loci here are Eke many 
encounters, both an order out of chaos and an account of a dynamic stability 
occurring in the processes of flow. But how do we apprehend and get a sense of 
these loci and their place in the unravelling of the (social) world? And more 
pressingly how do we theorise their occurrence and hence make possible their 
captureP An answer is made to both these questions through Juxtaposing the Stoic 
notions of Chronos and Aion, which enable a theoretical take on both the same 
and the different, the singular and the ongoing, together. So in the remaining part 
of this section I want to show how Chronos and Aion, separately and in mutual 
relation, can be seen to work in a syntactical way within the general practice of 
everyday fife'. I will then take what is brought forth in this examination and place it 
6 As I have already suggested, performance is an art that speaks explicitly of the tension of the present tense. I 
want to set out here how a notion of immediacy 
is almost always mediated and simplified by a reduction that 
expresses it as nothing more than the succession of 
instants. In this section I want to lead towards an argument 
for another potential research strategy within the performing arts: that the process of rehearsals was an 
enormously rich site 
for experimentation not only for the purpose of acting but for research too. Thus the 
spacing achieved to the metrication of 
Chronos turns attention to the first of the two methodological issues 
under examination 
in this chapter. 
177 
Timiý or an encounter with time 
in context within the process of rehearsals as a way of understanding what is put on 
show there. 
6.2.2 Chronos: corporeal and actual 
There is a sense that we do not experience the present as something wholly unique 
-a fact exposed with mechanistic clarity if you consider the task of the actor when 
performing a text learned by heart. In everyday terms such clarity is greatly put out 
of joint. However, we still schedule our lives, making of them representations, 
measuring our encounters temporally with n-unute exactitude, becoming impatient 
with the present "whose duration restricts our access to a future event that we 
desperately need to make real" (Crocker, 1998: 486). We wish to eliminate time's 
interval whilst living so religiously by it. This can be aptly phrased as proleptic living; 
living as if a future event was accomplished already. Irretrievable lives. It happens. 
Tick-tock. This is the time of Chronos. Three aspects of this conception of time 
make it possible to conceive a theoretical fine capable of linking our habitual 
communication of time to a sense of a performative unfolding in time itself. Such a 
line works to break open that space between the actions unravelling in an 
encounter; it gives pause to thought in a way not noticeable in the way our lives 
unfold in the everyday but perhaps closely intimated in the process of rehearsals. 
The first of these: this happened - 'she raised her hand', tick - then - 'he drew 
back', tock. What is being done and what then has been done is understood and 
categorized via discrete manifolds. This is a turn-taking that is discontinuous and 
actual, encasing us in a series of successive, relative presents and providing us 
with the building blocks for the civilization of time, "an organization that 
humanises time by giving it form" (Kermode, 1966: 45). Thus think of the clock's 
tick-tock as two discrete manifolds, where "tick is a humble genesis, tock a feeble 
apocalypse" (ibid). In acting parlance such manifolds are akin to Stanislavski's 
units of action. Chronos thus incorporates; it measures "out the action of bodies 
and causes" (Deleuze, 1990a: 162) seeing difference as only that which exists 
between self-identical entities and which consequently only speaks of difference 
in degree (Deleuze, 1988c). In this case the action, the character's intent 
(dramatic texts are obviously scripted, very representational and subject- 
orientated) and that which it 
is the actor's task to display, is played through the 
subject - the action is not going to change the qualities of the subject enacting 
it. 
In other words, we want to see what 
Hamlet, or Lear, will do when 'what 
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happens next' happens. The great actors work to put life into the happening and 
not into the precise performative description of the character the audience 
expects of them. In this way, difference in kind comes about when the action 
enacts the subject. For example, Jonathan Miller describes how a subject is played 
through an action in the way he directs his actors for La Bobeme: 
Where Rudolfo is making his first tentative flirtation with Mimi 
I deal with the microscopic details of embarrassment and 
shyness. Instead of having some great theory about love ... I 
told my Rudolfo not to look at Minil, but instead to study his 
feet, and in that moment they discovered how to play the whole 
scene. (1997) 
Second, there is the notion of a vaster present which places these discrete 
manifolds into a general conception of time: for example from the moment of her 
rising hand, extending through to the withdrawal of his face only the present exists 
so that the future and the past are branded relative modalities of the one present (see 
Deleuze, 1990a: 1622; and 1988c: 74). (1 will deal With this in much more detail 
shortly (see 6.4.2); suffice to say that for now it sets up a significant contrast With 
the way in which Aion operates a conception of time in terms of the past and the 
future). Thirdly, the movement represented by Chronos delineates time as the shift 
from the possible to the real, and thus involves loss - an irretrievability rendered 
because other possibilities are now impossible; their time is gone. For example: It 
happens, it has to happen, time passes and in practice you are Judged by what you 
do. Meanwhile possible futures are being shut down whilst equally new possibilities 
open up. This is illustrated in the smallest details - consider for example, the main 
incident haunting Arthur Miller's play All My Sons: 
KELLER: Every half-hour the Major callin' for cylinder heads, 
they were whippin' us with the telephone. The trucks were 
hauling them away hot, damn near. I mean just try to see it 
human, see it human. All of sudden a batch comes out With a 
crack. That happens, that's business ... 
All right, so - so he's a 
little man, your father, always scared of loud voices. What'll the 
Major say? - Half a day's production shot ... So he takes out 
his 
tools and he - covers over the cracks. (Act One, page 30) 
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Every rninutia of action clearly holds an unbearable weight of responsibility 
actualising what is, up until that moment, seemingly virtual. In the split moment, or 
the performative rupture, of the decision to cover up the cracks hes the 
commutation between virtuality and actualization. The clarity of the action of 
setting about repairing the cylinders for shipment signifies the complete change of 
the situation as it opens up an alternative future to what had gone before - 21 
airman are now going to die because of these cracked cylinder heads. Through this 
Steve Deever, the "tittle man", is incorporated into the material reality and the 
specific netting of signification via a moment of embodied connectivity that is the 
action of repairing. Putting aside for the moment the fact that there are multiple 
nettings of signification adequate for the communication of this moment, the 
movement that potentially makes such an action is hidden behind the 
representation of time as a succession of instants. This is the paradox of Zeno's 
arrow: 4(movement cannot be reconstituted on the basis of instants any more than 
being can be constituted on the basis of presents" (Boundas, 1996: 83). Rather than 
is an atornistic conception of experience - an empty linear sequence of nows - time i 
actually created in experience by the way in which moments are associated 
(Goodchild, 1996: 17). This virtuality is apprehended in the time of Aion, so, like 
paradigms but simultaneously, we shift plane and realize that it is happening 
whatever ---- 
6.2.3 Aion: incorpOreal and virtual 
"There is only one time (monism), although there Is an infmity of 
actual fluxes that necessarily participate in the same virtual 
whole. " (Deleuze, 1988c: 82) 
It's happening: this is difference as the movement of a virtuality that is actualising 
itself (Deleuze, 1988c: 93-97). This is the time of Aion- Contrasting Chronos by not 
judging time purely in relation to the death of its contents as corporeal and actual, 
in terms of "'the explosive internal force that life carries Aion conceives time purely i 
within itself" (Deleuze, 2000: 
51). In other words it is that which delivers us to the 
instant in "an internal multiplicity of succession ... virtual and confinuou? 
' (Deleuze, 
1988c: 38). Relative to Chronos, instead of speaking of the one present 
Aion 
conceives -a 
future and past [that] divide the present at every instant and subdivide 
it ad infiniturn 
into past and future, in both directions at once" (Deleuze, 1990a: 
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164). In other words, Aion is conceived of this as monistic, virtual time, whereas 
the actual fluxes are made apparent through the more precise narrative contouring 
of Chronos. So, one's implied territory expected in the time of Chronos is 
disrupted by this continuous flow of Alon. This in part reflects the need for the 
actor to exhibit spontaneity despite knowing the course of action unfolding. 
Theoretically, the point is that we cannot be fixed points in the world for we 
become with the world (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 169). Thus, this interplay, 
between Aion and Chronos, allows a communication of a minimal subjectivity 
whilst never denying the fact that any subjectivity cannot be anything other than a 
process of becoming (see Smith, 1998: xxxvi). It is not identity that is rejected; 
rather there is a rejection of identity being subsumed under a transcendental 
principle (see May, 1994: 46) - actors are always more than the character on the 
page because they unfold meaning through the performance as it happens in 'real', 
Aion time. It is in showing this that the significance of performativity as the 
frontier teetering in between the necessary and the unexpected comes to the fore. 
Finally then, and of most significance here, we acknowledge that Aion is virtual 
in that it cannot be grasped; it is indeterminate in existing as the pure empoform of 
time that traces the frontier between things (Deleuze, 1990a). Something does not 
exist without the future mode and a past genesis, but these dimensions don't exist 
with it, they are virtual. So, thinking in terms of Aion is to think time itself, to think 
of the immanence of another world of incorporeal, or surface (non-individual), 
effects that are about 'pure operation' not incorporation (Deleuze, 1990a). 
Immanence to the virtual presents the next happening as that which is in liaison 
with all that has ever been, whilst equally presenting the fact that the virtual whole 
changes as it endures such that novelty ariseS7. Without the force of the future 
upon the present, action is unimaginable. Yet, despite expectations of what is to 
come this sense of future is likewise unforeseeable. In summary: Aion gives 
credence to a non-representational way of sensing the world, apprehending in the 
spacing between two enactments, a virtuality of forking time and of infinitely 
,g 
Paths, 1964). And it is this gap that saturated space (Borges, The Garden of Forkz'n 
allows us finally to intimate a virtual space, a space of indiscernibility, that hovers 
7 Again this lays further foundations for the problematic of theorizing a notion of the pure past that I bring 
together in making one of the 
key theoretical points of this chapter, that of the role of memory and its relation 
to subjectivity (see 
6.4.2). 
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immanently around all that is done, shadowing everything realized with what might 
have been (see Deleuze, 1990a: 100). It Is not that we should ever fully know these 
things; rather the point is that firstly it happens before we represent the event via 
the question of 'wbat happened? ' In this respect, part of the power of the rehearsal 
space, in terms of research, is in the fact that this equation is reversed. Knowing 
what is to happen, and playing to that outcome with conviction, is to be open to 
the numerous ways in which you can account for the particular act you know, as an 
actor, you are going to perform. In short, the actor's art in rehearsal is being skilled 
in an appreciation of the virtual; the actor's art in performance is being skilled in an 
appreciation of the potential for alternative means of going on with the scene by 
way of a sense of indiscernibility - in other words, improvization. In both cases, 
performance is intimate with virtuality. 
6.2.4 The indiscernibility of time: virtuality 
Taking my cue once again from Deleuze, unlike possibility, the virtual is always 
real; being inaccessible but necessary, not proceeding but contemporaneous to the 
present (see MassurrU, 1992: 167-170; also Deleuze, 1988c: 96). This is Virtuality as 
ccreal potential that is imperceptible in itself' (Goodchild, 1996: 4)8. The unity of a 
moment of actualization - that minimal subjectivity in a doing - is in fact "a 
contingent operation holding together a potential divergence" such that the virtual 
opens up uncharted directions (Rajchman, 1997: 18). The performative frontier in 
rehearsals, the moment-by-moment enactment of the text, proceeds not by 
elimination (possibilities not realized), nor by limitation (thwarted possibilities) but 
only by creation (the actualization of potential) (see Deleuze, 1988c: 96). Every 
move the actor makes, and every move we make in general, is an untimely moment 
redistributing what has gone before wl-ifle opening up what may yet come (Deleuze, 
1988c: 96; see Hayden, 1995: 295-296). 
I want to now fold this theory into the empirical space of the rehearsal process. 
In this first extract, in the space between the textual scene from All My Sons (in the 
8A classic example of this imperceptibility: "Take a lump of sugar: it has a spatial configuration. But if we 
approach it from an angle, all we will ever grasp are 
differences in degree between that sugar and any other 
thing. But it also has a duration, a rhythm of 
duration, a way of being in time that is at least partially revealed in 
the process of its dissolving, and that shows 
how this sugar differs in kind not only from other things, but first 
and foremost from 
itself" (Deleuze, 1988c, page 31-32). 
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right-hand column) and the research notes of the rehearsal performance, I want to 
pin the points above through the eventhood of Frank's appearance. The discrete 
manifold of incorporation (Chronos) is manifes t in the action concerning the 
ladder, in particular the actor's concern over the timing of the precise action of 
putting it down. Theatrically, the ladder's presence, as justified by the actor, is 
symptomatic of the fact that Frank has been driven (Aion) into the encounter 
without time to pause and hence put the ladder down. The proliferation of 
questions asked in rehearsal of this seemingly simple act of Frank's arrival, and the 
need to ask more questions as the scene unfolds, shows how several meanings are 
viable. This space further illustrates that the moment-by-moment decisions based 
on these different meanings unravel yet further possibilities above and beyond the 
fact that at any moment some other factor/ force/ person might enter the equation. 
All Mv Sons 
Act One page 26-27 
Mother: (Goiq to ber) Because certain things have to 
be, and certain things can never be. Like the sun has 
to rise, it has to be. That's why there's God 
Otherwise anything could happen. But there's God, 
so certain things can never happen. I would know, 
Annie - just like I knew the day he (in&cates Chris) - 
went into that terrible battle. Did he write me? Was it 
in the papers? No, but that morning I couldn't raise 
my head off the pillow. Ask Joe. Suddenly, I knew. I 
knew! And he was nearly killed that day. Ann, you 
know I'm right. 
ýgoln ,g ge) (Ann jiýinds tbm in mlena, then turm trrmbluýý 
' tostao, 
Ann: No, Kate 
Mother: I have to have some tea. 
(Frank appears car7yiq a ladder) 
Frank- Annie (CominT down) How are you, gee whiz! 
,g 
his Ann: (takin * hana) Why, Frank, you're losing your 
hair. 
Keller: He's got responsibility. 
Frank: Gee whiz! 
61hrehearsal 12/1/98: 10am-lpm 
SESSION 3 (see appendix 1) 
Director: (to Frank) Is he 
borrowing the ladder or 
providing it? 
Frank: I'm handyman, so I'm 
just pottering around working 
on my house, and I've heard 
voices so I've come from the 
garage at the front of the 
house, it's my ladder. 
D: Yes. (Turns to Annie) He 
fancies Annie - she's the 
girl he could never have - 
she's the intellectual one. 
Ann: And the signs of ageing, 
losing his hair put him in his 
place again. 
D: (To everyone) What does 
Frank bring to the scene? 
Chris: The outside curiosity of 
183 
Timilýý or an encouwer lime 
Keller: W'ithout Frank the stars wouldn't know when Steve, the situation - 
to come out. D: (To Chris) After he has 
Frank: (laugohs; to Ann): You look more womanly. gone, what's your task? 
You've matured. You - Chris: Smooth over things. 
Keller: T ake it easy Frank, you're a married man. D: Is it more? Clearly from 
Ann: (as My lauTb) You still haberdashering? his letters, their mums are 
Frank: \X, hv not? Nlaybe I too can get to be II mentioned, does he 
president. How's your brother? Got his degree, I mention the neighbours? [ie 
hear. No he never has] Therefore, 
Ann: Oh, George has his own office now! try and play it down - what 
Frank: Don't say! (Funereaýly) And your dad? Is he -? has been said about it. Both 
Ann: (Abnýpfyl) Fine. I'll be in to see Lydia. [Chris and Mother] have a 
Frank: (sympathefica4ly) How about it, does Dad talent for ignoring things - 
expect a parole soon? they lie when Ann says 
Ann: (witbgrowing ill-ease) I really don't know, I- exactly what they don't want 
Frank: (Staumbly defen&n 
,g 
berfiaber. /or ber sake) I mean to hear when Frank leaves. 
because I feel, Y'know, that if an intelligent man like Ok lets play it through 
your father is put in prison, there ought to be a law again. 
that says either you execute him, or let him go after a 
year. Frank: --k question about the 
, g) 
Want a hand with that ladder, Frank? Chris: (interruptin position of the ladder - Do I 
Frank: (takinS cue) That's all right, I'll - (Picks up put it down, or do I hold onto 
ladder). I'll finish the horoscope tonight, Kate. it, le I'm here for a chat, half 
(Embarrassea). See you later, Ann, you look an hour!! 
wonderful. (He exits. Thg look atAnn). D: Yes, look like you 
Ann: (to Chn's, as she sits down on the stooý Haven't they preparing to stay! ... it was 
stopped talking about Dad? fine the way you did it then 
[putting the ladder on 
speaking'Why not? Maybe I 
too ... 1 
is to grasp its field of The crucial point here is that to understand any moment i 
latent potential such that whatever significance is given to an event it is dependent 
both on what could have happened and the fact that events take place t'n time. That 
is to say that it is often a 
delusive practice trying to predetem-Une events in advance 
of their occurrence; after all there Is always a surplus constituting 
'the choice' that 
makes those mornent-by-moment 
decisions real. The sheer noise of debate in 
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rehearsal surrounding the potential ways of acting out even the most ordinary 
looking tine of text is symptomatic of this. 
To conclude and sum up the thread of this first section, take the following event 
(mentioned above -'she raised her hand, 'he drew back'): 
I fancied they both stood still for an instant, and looked, as it 
were, strangely at one another, but I may not have seen ii bt/ ' the ,gy in 
crowd. It is asserted, on the contrag, ... that Liza, glancing at 
Nikolai Vsevolodovich, quickly raised her hand to the level of 
his face, and would certainly have struck him if he had not 
drawn back in time ... I must adn-ut I saw nothing myself, but 
all the others declared they had, thou rt , gh tbg ce ainyl could not all 
have seen it in such a crush (Dostoevsky, The Possessed, quoted in 
Morson, 1994: 122 - my emphasis). 
Morson makes clear that we are given here not one but many potential events, 
such that Dostoevsky's purpose is "to suggest that reality includes what might have 
happened" (1994: 123; see also Bernstein, 1994). It is not that there are several 
perspectives on the same world, rather that each viewpoint opens up another world 
that is at the same time 'of this world'. In rehearsal the actors might achieve any 
number of potential worlds but they Will all be of the text All My Sons. So, if what 
makes an action significant is that this happened rather than that, that there is a 
choice and a potential difference, did Nikolai move, or is Lisa someone who is 
ultimately unable to inflict such action? The event in itself speaks of all these 
worlds, of all these potential eventualities by being indifferent "to the individual 
and the collective ... because it is actualized in 
diverse manners at once, and 
because each participant may grasp it at a different level of actualization within its 
variable present" (Deleuze, 1990a: 100). Thus, the event in itself is neutral to its 
actualizations being "always yet to come and already passed" (ibid), being excessive 
in that it is in itself impenetrable. As noted in the last chapter the concept of 
IM 1 singularity comes to the fore in rendering the i personal and pre-individual 
transcendence of the event that does not correspond purely with the empirical 
actuality of individual people, perspectives or things. These slngularities exist as a 
'fourth person singular' distributing potential which admits "neither Self nor 1, but 
which produces them 
by actualising or realising itself' (Deleuze, 1990a: 103). 
Therefore it is not a question of the character of Frank or of the actor playing him, 
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but a question of the singularity that is in the text, that of Frank walking in carrying 
a ladder. In other words, people, perspectives or things only come about, become 
actual, through events, through being performed. They "are no longer imprisoned 
vithin the fixed individuality of the infinite Being, nor inside the sedentary 
boundaries of the finite subject" (Deleuze, 1990a: 107). Decisively, this can only be 
so if one understands the present moment as saturated with a virtual field of what 
n-ught happen next (the chance combination of a whole plethora of forces). The 
forces at play here, having no fixed points of reference, are now merely -related to 
other forces, such that singularities are not moments of synthesis, more 
mathematical points expressing the immediate convergence of several forces. Of 
course, amongst these forces there are predominant players that, due to their 
slowness of composition (materially one rrught think of architectural spaces), or due 
to their more stratified nature (discourses that are reiterated more than most due to 
the security that their abundant performance provides), seem to suggest fixity. The 
encounters that etch out our fives thus come out of convergences that are either 
connective (if ... then), conjunctive (and ... and), or disjunctive (either ... (or) ... 
(see Smith, 1998: xxvi-xxvii). Finally then we are working with a new image of time, 
that which Deleuze refers to as the crystalimage (1989), one that works to the beat 
of these connective possibilities: that time has to split as it sets itself out. In any 
moment part of the present is launched towards the future wl-lilst another part 
preserves all the past. The rehearsal process is about working at the juncture of this 
split in the indiscernible gap where something has to happen because it is 
happening whatever. As Bergson himself put it: 
Every moment of our life presents the two aspects, it is actual 
and virtual, perception on the one side and recollection on the 
other ... Whoever becomes conscious of the continual 
duplicating of his present into perception and recollection ... 
will compare himself to an actor playing his part automatically, 
listening to himself and beholding himself playing (1920: 135-8). 
Taking this crystal-image (see Deleuze, 1989: 68-97) of time, that of time 
splitting, I move into the next section to suggest that we can use this fundamental 
operation of time to instance an understanding of the process of subjectivity. 
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SECTION TWO 
6.3 An instance of subjectivity 
In an encounter with another body you can argue that subjectivity arises in the very 
instance of the perception of this other body - their appearance, smell, gait, voice, 
surface - in an act of reconnaissance (as in the French fiit de reconnaitre, to be 
understood by way of recognition). For example, the subjectivity of Frank in the 
extract above as he meets Annie for the first time in several years: "You look more 
womanly". In other words, raw "percepfion searches out memory as a mirror image 
that gives it identity and renders it meaningful" Jýodowick, 1997: 92). In the very 
act of the encounter there is a fold of space and time (a space-time being a folding): 
C'where perception occurs in space, memory occurs in time" (ibid). Using a diagram 
of Bergson's from Matter & Memog (figure 2), let me present this folding in direct 
relation to the comments made at the end of the last section. 
In the empirical 'real' of the time of an actual moment as it happens 
(represented by the zone OA), for example the moment skin touches skin in a kiss, 
time itself splits simultaneously constituting "the layers of one and the same 
physical reality [B', C', D'], and the levels of the same mental reality, memory or 
spirit [B, C, D]" (Deleuze, 1989: 46). The smallest circuit is OA, and not AW, 
because it refers only to the object that initiates the force that brings about the 
moment of this encounter. Memory then comes immediately consecutive to this 
perception as the zone of indiscerrubility clears (the shaded circle) and the 
"The progress of 
FIGURE 2D attention results in creating 
anew not only the object 
C pcrceivcd, but also the ever 
widening systems with B 
which it may be bound up; 
so that in the measure in 
which the circles B, C, D 
represent a higher 
......... ...... ................................................. explanation of memory, their reflection attains in B', 
........ i .................................................. C', D' deeper strata of 
" reality" 
(Bergson, Matter C'7- 
............................................................. an encounter 
D Memog, 1990: 105). 
9 'I'hink hcrc of the pcrccption of an objcct and the 
first mcmorý, associatcd with it (if any, as it might bc a 
degrce 7cro cncountcr, and this too will 
bc of dcgrcc - c. g. think of a ncw born baby and its first touch whcrc 
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encounter passes through the force of Aion such that 'before ýýou know it' you 
have become active in ordering the potential avenues opening up around this 
encounter. This is the movement from experientiality to referentiality, from sensing 
to making sense. You have achieved, or endured, a way of going on with the ever- 
changing, potentially chaotic, flow; and all parties to the encounter achieve a sense 
of dynamic stability. It is helpful to think of these stabilities as durations, and to 
expand this appreciation by thinking of durations as anything from the evolution of 
the human being or the development of a mountain range, to the duration of a day, 
a play, an hour, or the time it took Mr Palomar to walk his walk across the beach 
(see Chapter Two). The object of the encounter is thus taken in through the 
immediate description of the pure optical or sonic image that it gives off, and then 
through the way it links to the higher expanse of memory through previous 
experience - be that experience which has just been achieved a few seconds earlier. 
Thus a deeper reality is formed in time and through duration "where there are no 
longer sensory-motor images With their extensions, but much more complex 
circular links between pure optical and sonic images on the one hand [B, C, D], 
and on the other hand images from time and thought, on planes which coexist by 
right, constituting the soul and body" of that particular encounter [B', C', D'], be 
that a person, a place, a book, or a song etc. (Deleuze, 1989: 47). The crucial point 
is to appreciate the importance of the phrase 'ot)er time' and the way that these 
conceptions of time legitimate a theoretical space, that deeper reality, for the 
location of those immaterial elements illustrated in the last two chapters whilst 
never suggesting that tl-ds is anything other than grounded in the actuality of 
empiricism. In another extract from the research into the rehearsal processes, 
chronologically moving on from where we left the drama of the play itself, let me 
site a space for observing the development of this deeper reality in action. In what 
follows one can see how the syntactical moment of the action of a kiss instances 
both a history of time leading up to the point of action (the kiss) and an intensity 
peak in the present (OA as the kiss itselo that opens up the future to alternative 
circuits of connection (conjunctive or otherwise) that over time 
develop the 
immaterial "soul and body" of that encounter and that person. In addition, all of 
this only makes sense because it is put into relief by that "explosive internal 
force 
there is a 'habitual recollection' derived from genetic evolution; there are already circuits to link this encounter 
to) - 
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that life carries within itself', time itself, forcing the action and the characters to 
keep moving on. 
Ty Sons 
Act One page 31-33 
Chris: Isn't he a great guy? 
Ann: You know? It's lovely here. T he air is 
sweet 
Chris: (HqpýlýýIy): You're not sorry you 
cameý 
Ann: Not sorry, no. But I'm not going to 
stay 
Chris: Why? 
Ann: In the first place, your mother as 
much as told me to go. 
Chris: WeR - 
Ann: You saw that - and then you - 
you've been kind of - 
Chris: What? 
Ann: \VeU ... kind of embarrassed ever 
since I got here 
Chris: The trouble is I planned on kind of 
sneaking up on you over a period of a 
week or so. But they take it for granted 
that we're all set 
Ann: I knew they would. Your mother 
anyway 
Chris: How did you know? 
Ann: From her point of view, why else 
would I come? 
Chris: Well ... would you want to? 
(Ann 
still Sludies bim. ) I guess you 
know this is 
why I asked you to come. 
Ann: I guess this is why I came. 
61h rehearsal 12/1/98: 2pm-6pm 
SESSION 3 
D: What does she want with Chris? 
Ann: A companion, someone there, reliable, 
solid. 
D: And she's not met that? 
Ann: She's got close ... [but here] she gets 
that and more, she gets all the good things 
I've [, Nctress referring to herself as the 
character] cut off these years. 
D: She says 'After all these years' - Do 
you think her love for him, I mean he's 
the older brother, possibly more like Joe, 
her instinct is right - she's got no solid 
base in her life [Ann's mother is unwell 
and her father, Steve Deever, is in prison 
for the crime Joe, Chris's father, 
instigated], it's not an age that supports 
women until they got married. It hasn't 
worked out in New York; she's 
hankering back. Later on she says ... 
. ýnn: ... 'I'm not going to 
leave here alone' 
D: (Turning to Chris) What is it about 
Annie? 
Chris: He does know her best, he's not fast 
with women, shyness - it is getting to an age 
when I should be thinking of my age - 
thinking about a fanuly. Larry was the fun 
one; Chris has his books, serious like. 
D: He hasn't had the time to find 
anyone! Not sure there is a sexual 
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attraction, hence that moment is tender, 
deal. (Finally) I love you. (Pause. Sbe waits. ) I 
have no InIagination ... that's all I know to 
tell you. (Ann is jvailiiýý reaý),. ) I'm 
embatTassing you. I didn't want to tell it to 
you here. I wanted some place we'd never 
been; a place where we'd be brand new to 
it can be. 
Chris: By getting all that stuff out, he can be 
free to think about her; yet still feels held 
back - there's only momentary relief. 
D: She has to let him make the moves. 
Ann: I can do so much 
each other ... You feel it's wrong here, 
don't you? This yard, this chair? I want you 
to be ready for me. I don't want to win you 
away from anything. 
Ann: (puttiq her arms around bim. ) 0 h, 
Cluis, I've been ready a long, long time! 
Chris: Then he's gone forever. You're 
sure 
Ann: I almost got married two years ago 
Chris: Why didn't you? 
Ann: You started to write to me - jlýgbt 
pause. ) 
Chris: You felt something that far back? 
Ann: Every day since! 
Chris: Ann, why didn't you let me know? 
Ann: I was waiting for you, Chns. TIH then 
you never wrote, and when you did, what 
did you sayý You sure can be ambiguous, 
D: Why does he say that line 'He's a 
great guy isn't he"? 
Chris: He's thinking The past, I saw, is a formality, 
about marriage, 
merely a dimmer present, for 
everything we are is at every 
about Annie having moment alive in us. How fantastic 
a play would be that did not still 
any doubts the M-Ind's simultaneity, did not 
D: Therefore test allow a man to 
'forgct', and turned 
him to see present through past 
the water - does and past through present, a form 
that in itself, quite apart from its 
Annie resent him content and meaning, would be 
Uoe, his father]? inescapable as a psycholo ical 1 91 
process and as a collecting point 
(Pause) Also, for all that his life in society had 
poured into him. (This little man 
allow yourself to walking in the street had all my 
take more time youth inside 
him, it seemed) 
(Miller, Timebends, 1987: 131), 
with the first I 
interchange, some huge lines there. 
Ann: T his is the first time with been alone, its 
oh fuck, this is the moment, ease slips out the 
window. 
you know. 
Chris: (looks towards the bouse, then at ber, [The actors nin thrwýýgh the scene qTain] 
: Give me a kiss, Ann. Give me a- 
(Tbg kiss) God, I kissed you, Annie, I 
kissed Annie. How long, how long I've 
been waiting to kiss you! 
Ann: I'll never forgive you. Why did you 
wait all these years? All I've 
done is sit and 
wonder if I was crazy 
for thinking of you. 
Chris: Annie, we're going to five now! I'm 
going to make you so happy. 
(fle kifses ber, but u4tbout tbeir bodies towbing. ) 
D: (speaking to Cbris) 'I'm 
embarrassing you' -you're going to say 
no [Ann is going say no to Chris]. 
You've got to go down the road to 'oh, 
I've bollocks it'. You need to be sure - 
It's like Dad [whether or not he was 
guilty], you need tangible, formal proof. 
Ann: I find putting my arms around him as 
if I am jumping the gun. 
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Ann: (a little embaffasseeý: Not hke that 
you're not. 
Chris: I kissed you 
Ann: Like Larry's brother, Do it hke you, 
Chris. (He breaks away from her abruptly. ) 
What is it, Chris? 
Chris: Let's drive ,, -ome place ... I want to 
be alone with you. 
D: You've got to help him! 
Chris: That proximity [that they )ust had 
when acting this scene out, probably due to 
the director's note to be more tender] would 
make me more nervous. That would be 
great. 
D: A lot of guys wouldn't give anything 
unless they can be sure. 
Ann: 'I'm waiting for ýIou'!! She still is! 
Ann: No ... what is it Chris, your mother? 
Chris: No - nothing fike that [ ... I It's A 
12th rehearsal 20/1/98: 2pm-6p 
niiýxed up , -, -lth so manV other things SESSION 9 
You remember, overseas, I was in 
command of a company? D: There's one thing in there between 
Ann: Yeah, sure. 
Chris: Well, I lost them. [ ... ] They didn't 
die; they killed themsehes for each other. I 
mean that exactly; a little more selfish and 
they'd'Ve been here today [ ... ] 
And then I 
came home and itwas incredible. I- there 
was no meaning in it here; the whole thing 
to them was a kind of a- bus accident. I 
went to work *with Dad, and that rat-race 
again. I felt - what you said - ashamed 
somehow. Because nobody was changed at 
all. It seemed to make suckers out of a lot 
of guys. I felt wrong to be alive, to open 
the bank-book, to drive the new car, to see 
the new refrigerator. I mean you can take 
those things out of a war, but when you 
drive that car you've got to know that it 
came out of the love a man can have for a 
man, youýve got to be a little better because 
of that. Otherwise what you have is really 
loot, and there's blood on it. And I didn't 
want to take any of it. And I guess that 
included you. 
I the first and second kiss. The first is 
genuine, it's something you've wanted 
for some time, and then there is 
something in between. So it's the effect 
of the first, something to do with the 
I fact that you've got the reciprocated love 
back - so you see what I'm getting at ... 
is that something he's been conscious of 
- that loot thing? 
Chris: No ... I say, I guess that's something 
D: Yes, and it's in the way. The 
association kicks in between the hisses. 
Chris: But why would it happen now, when 
I say 'were going to live now'P 
Ann: But I felt it was me giving the kiss, and 
the second kiss, I'm waiting for him to give 
I the full 'passionorama'! 
D: I think that's it. 
Chris: And in tying it in with the story, 
that's what you want? 
D: To be honest I think you've done it 
better; you've got this moment before. 
Chris: Do I need to be tougher than before? 
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Chris: I want you now, Annie 
D: Deliver them less tentatively ... yes, 
let's try it. 
Ann: Because you mustn't feel that way 
any more. Because you have a right to 
whatever you have. Everything, Chris, 
understand that? To me, too ... [... ] 
Chris: Oh Annie, Anrue 
... I'm going to 
make a fortune for you! 
Keller: (q&qTe) Hello .-. Yes, sure 
[answenng a telephone call from Annie's 
brother George who has Just seen their dad 
in prison, and is now coming over because 
he is convinced that Keller is gaty. ] 
[TI)e adors nin throllý , gh 
the s6-ene qTain] 
D: I think that 'I'm going to make a 
fortune' ... I think that he can then give 
the real kiss - in this scene they are 
discarding the past, so that they can see 
that they are going to make a pure 
future together. 
Chris: Do you think that when they come 
together it's so believable ... if when I say J 
kissed Annie' 
... it leaves her a bit 
Ann: (Laughiq softly): kX, hat'll I do "With a 
fortune? 
Tbg kiss. Keller entenftom the bouse. 
embarrassed. 
D: Leave that one - it's a 'see thing' [ie 
trust the theatrical stagecraft] 
Ann: It felt nice, like come on I've got you 
now; this is the beginning of my future. 
Chris: It felt better down there [a reference to 
Mes ta 
, ge 
blockz*n 'n down centre stqTefront]. ,g meanz T 
What we have in evidence here, at the heart of the rehearsal process, are space- 
time foldings, proliferating instances of entering into relation with other things 
(physical entities inert or otherwise, emotional or otherwise, affecting or otherwise) 
that bring about connections woven out of the sense of time weaving in both its 
directions - preserving the past and contracting the future. This is to work a 
philosophy of becoming into our understandings "which does not tolerate the 
separation or the distinction of before, or after, or past or future. It pertains to the 
essence of becoming to move and pull in both directions at once" (Deleuze, 1990a: 
1). This brings us back to the crystal-IMage of time, that Image of time revealing the 
fundamental operation of time as it splits into two directions at once. In this fight 
the rehearsal process is about making visible "the ceaselessly fracturing or splitting 
of non-chronological time" (Rodowick, 1997: 92). Thus in the instance of each kiss 
there is a preservation of the past at the self-same moment that the kiss itself opens 
up and affects the 
future. Take the first kiss - "How long, how long I've been 
waiting" -a wait 
held within Chris because of the past where his brother Larry had 
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been Ann's previous boyfriend - "Then he's gone forever". Then the second kiss: 
whilst contracting the future - "we're going to live now! " - it still contains an 
affection for the past in that Ann detects the reticence of the past still latent in 
Chris's feelings - "I kissed you" "Like Larry's brother". And finally, the third kiss 
opens up to a more carefree future - "I'm going to make a fortune for you! " 
"What'll I do with a fortune! " 
T he essential point, in any event, is that the two related terms 
differ in nature, and yet 'run after each other', refer to each 
other, reflect each other, Without it being possible to say which 
is first, and tend ultimately to become confused by slipping into 
the same point of indiscernibility (Deleuze, 1989: 46). 
This point of indiscernibifity in which things happen is the place where an 
instance of subjectivity can be located. It is the "association that kicks in between 
the kisses"; it is the point of selection, and the point where a decision is made 
before you are aware of having made it. Whilst almost impossible to sight, except 
by intimation, this is the point of entering into relation of "the real and the 
imaginary, the physical and the mental, the objective and the subjective, description 
and narration, the actual and the zidual... " (Deleuze, 1989: 46). One can say that it is 
the full force of the present that in its passing on creates a trace of subjectivity in 
the requirement it makes of the way we handle its passing. We need to open up 
ways of apprehending this space of the present moment despite Zeno's paradox 
that keeps it forever from our grasp. Thus to conclude this section, and by way of 
leading into the next, I want to address the theory by which such apprehensions 
can come to make sense, and indeed justify the processes at work in the case of 
rehearsals used for research. 
Problem 10: The unravelling of subjectivity 
In Bergson's Matter and Memog Deleuze finds a 
conceptualization of subjectivity that cuts across the chaotic 
variability of our philosophical and scientific attempts to come 
to terms with this unfathomably complex notion of being a 
subject. What Bergson presents here are five aspects of 
subjectivity distilled in their most abstract sense in order that 
they n-ught, for the purposes of analysis and in a wide range of 
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scenarios, extract an appropriate understanding of the world. 
These aspects are need-subjectil4ty, brain-subjectitio, affection- 
subjeclh, ýty, recollection-subjeclitio, and contraction-subjectivio. 
Within duration (the continuity of things) there is a moment of 
selection based on a need that breaks the continuity and opens 
up an interest that lets the rest, that which remains outside this 
interest, pass by. In relation to this interest there is a moment of 
indetermination, a moment which equals that interval between 
received and executed movement (perception and action if you 
like). This plays upon the neuro-scientific notion that the brain 
(that the brain is made up of slowly emerging subconscious 
processes), by virtue of its network of nerves, divides up the 
excitation of infon-nation (perception) infinitely and incessantly, 
leaving several possible re-actions. Next, in terms of space and 
time and therefore immanent and imminently, there is the 
moment of affection: perception does not reflect possible action, 
nor does the brain bring about the interval without the 
assurance that certain organic parts are committed to "the 
immobility of a purely receptive role that surrenders them to 
pain" (Deleuze, 1988a: 53). This is not to say that we are 
completely passive, but we cannot help but be affected by the 
surrounding environment. The interval of these potential 
reactions, the indeterminacy of the moment, is filled by 
recollection, by memory, by habit, by experience. The moment is 
actualized. The moment is almost over, its final breath being 
one of contraction: the body being of the ongoing forces that 
converge in space, and through an instant in time, thus brings 
about a "contraction of the experienced excitations from which 
quality is born", the qualities that over time make you who you 
are (ibid). 
Within any moment, conceived in the manner of the abstract 
description given above, there is an oscillation between 
objectivity and subjectivity. Let me explain: the aspect of need 
hes in the realm of the objective in that it is a direct extraction 
from the world; Braz'n remains on this side offering openings 
from such objectivity, openings which may or may not remain 
entirely objective - hence this being the interval of 
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indeter 'nation; 
. 
#ý 1111 n-11 is A ction is the 'impurity' that disturbs thi 
notion of pure objectivity (see Deleuze, ibid), and from this 
point on we move into the realm of subjectivity as it occurs in 
recollection and contraction: only you could have occupied those 
space-tiMes, those experiences with their specific perspectives 
and needs, and only you endured those affections that now come to 
you like so many recollections contracted to this moment of 
existence, of you being you now. 
In relation to our common understanding of time and the role it 
plays in our assumptions of what memory is, one further 
question remains in the problem of unravelling subjectivity: 
'Where are these recollections or memories that fill the gap of 
indeterminacy located? ' It is commonly assumed that memories 
are somehow preserved in the location of the brain as if the 
brain were a store for such recollections that could be called 
upon at any time. Following Deleuze's Bergsonism, I want to 
move against this assumption. Firstly, if the brain is considered 
on the side of objectivity, as outlined above, then memories, 
which are essentially subjective in nature, cannot be located 
there. In short, I want us to see the brain as just another organ 
of the body that channels in purely operational terms, and hence 
objectively, the 'sensation-information' that comes from pure 
perception. The brain in itself does not hold any subjective 
currency. Secondly, the distinction that Bergson makes between 
matter and memory comes to the fore. The point that he makes, 
and that which Deleuze amphfies in creating several 
philosophical interfaces for this alternative way of thinking 
about time, memory and subjectivity"', is that there is a 
difference in kind between matter and memory that is paralleled 
respectively in the difference between the present and the past, 
and pure perception and pure recollection. Again I think this 
difference can be presented conceptually in terms of the 
empirically actual, and ontologically factual, folding of space and 
ge (1986), Cinema 2: The Time-Image (1989) all of which have 
, gsonism 
(1988c), Cinema 1: The Movement-Ima 10 Ber 
spawned ongoing philosophical 
invention (see for example DeleuýZe's Time-Macbine (Rodowick, 1997); The Brain is 
the Screen: DejeuZe and The Pbilosqpýy of 
Cinema (Flaxman, 2000); and indeed the performance art and documentary 
pieces of Goat Island 
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time -a folding that makes them simultaneously one and the 
same thing. Consider this: 
In the same way that we do not perceive things in ourselves, 
but at the place where the), are, we only grasp the past at the 
place where it is in itself, and not in ourselves, in our Present. 
(Deleuze, 1988c: 56) 
In relation to time the common perception of the past is that if 
it is something it is something that is no longer. In this sense 
"we have thus confused Being with being-present" (Deleuze, 
1988c: 55). In other words, Just because something is no longer 
actually happening, and is therefore no longer present before us 
in terms of time, doesn't mean that it doesn't inhere in the 
present that , ve are now 'in'. The past is in time just as the Eiffel 
Tower, for example, is in space - whilst neither is present 
before us they both have the power to affect us in the future (eg 
you do not doubt that the Eiffel Tower is still standing). 
SECTION THREE 
6.4 Memory: the 'pure' past 
The question now then is about how to obtain meaning from the immediacy of this 
physical point, the encounter, in such a way as to make it something more than a 
bare particular. Whilst it is clear that the driving force of time itself, Alon, delivers 
the world, the world is obviously not completely made anew in each moment. As I 
have intimated in the last section, our fives take place over time, and through this 
time a 'deeper reality' evolves that is particular to our experiences. In the final 
section then, alongside from the quick of each moment, I want to illustrate that 
equally there are qualities of recollection and contraction that play as important a 
part in constituting the social as this Heraclitian flow: there is a sense of duration 
and orientation through the recollection of the 'pure' past, the realm where 
memory is located. In the light of this rehearsals offer a space and a mode for 
apprehending in closer detail that which ultimately escapes view: the indiscernible, 
and the indiscernibility of, the present moment. Crucially, it only achieves this by 
working explicitly through the full range of our conceptualizations of what time is: 
time itself, the past, the present and the future. Rehearsals also reveal that it is in 
this indiscernible gap between the virtual and the actual, at the moment when the 
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virtua is actualized, when Chronos delineates the actual fluxes that necessarily 
participate in the virtual whole of Aion, that subjectivity is instanced. Furthermore, 
showing that it is only through an appreciation of time that subjectivity can come 
to make sense. Now moving the argument on into the next and final section of this 
chapter, at one level this play between the virtual and the actual works out of the 
understanding that the actual refers to the state of things as rendered spatially 
through perception whilst the virtual fractures this simplicity by introducing the 
multifaceted subjectivity sought out in time through memory. Thus, referring back 
to the circular ripples of figure 3, successive moments are preserving the past in the 
very instance that there is contraction of the future: 
How can we say that it is the same object which passes through 
different circuits, because each time description has obliterated 
the object, at the same time as the mental image has created a 
different one? Each circuit obliterates and creates an object. But 
it is precisely this 'double movement of creation and erasure' 
that successive planes and independent circuits, cancelling each 
other out, contradicting each other, joining up With each other, 
forking, will simultaneously constitute the layers of one and the 
same physical reality, and the levels of one and the same mental 
reality, memory or spirit". (Deleuze, 1989: 46) 
As I hope to show, this simultaneous other layer of reality is "definitely not 
produced in the head or in the mind, it is the objective characteristic of certain 
existing images which are by nature double" (Deleuze, 1989: 69). In pointing out 
that this layering of the virtual and the actual has nothing to do With the head 
Deleuze is pulling us away from thinking this relationship through the body, 
through a biological essentialism; and that it is not in the mind is to dispel recourse 
to an innate, transcendental (Kantian) faculty. Deleuze's aim here is to make 
thinking capable of working through this layering - and the potential 
indiscernibility brought about in-between the layers in the moment of actualization 
- not as something confusing, 
but as something that puts us into direct relation 
with In an echo 
back to Chapter Four, this indiscernibility 
c4gives us access to that Proustian dimension where people and things occupy a 
place in ti-me which is incommensurable with the one they 
have in space" (Deleuze, 
1989: 39). Back there I presented this in terms of immateriality - for example, the 
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condition of falling in love as something that, whilst personal and subjective, 
somehow speaks of a shared state of being - whereas this time I want to work out 
this sense of immateriality in terms of memory. Thus, in the final part of this 
chapter, I want to set out the theoretical problem of memory and the solution it 
delivers us to by bringing the threads together in the empirical space of the 
rehearsal process. 
6.4.1 Memory 
Problem 11: Bergson's notion of a 'pure' past 
One way of understanding the operation of memory, at least in 
consistency with what has gone before, is to turn once again to 
Bergson and pick up the previous strands and follow their 
development through towards the notion of the 'pure'past. 
Starting With the notion of the 'present moment' (point S in 
Figure 3) it should be immediately clear there needs to be a new 
FIGURE 3 
AB or A'B': a 
region of the past, 
or a sheet of the past. 
The Cone: the 
coeXistence of the 
past (virtuaý With 
the present (actuaý- 
S: the present moment, or a .................. I ............ ................. 
peak of the present, an act or a 
fold. 
We become conscious of an act 
suz genens by which we detach 
ourselves from the present in 
order to replace ourselves, first in 
the past in general, then in a 
certain region of the past ... But 
our recollections still remains 
virtual; we simply prepare 
ourselves to receive it by adopting 
the appropriate attitude. Little by 
little it comes into view like a 
condensing cloud; from the virtual 
state it passes into the actual. 
(Bergson, Time and Free Wlilý, 
quoted in Deleuze, 1988c: 56) 
present instantaneously following on the back of this 'present 
moment' in order for this present to pass and for the notion of 
a moment to make sense. This is one of the paradoxical 
difficulties of thinking time on the plane of Chronos because 
clearly "no present would ever pass were it not past 'at the same 
time' as it is present" (Deleuze, 1994: 81). Think again of Zeno's 
paradox, the nearer you attempt to delineate the exact moment 
of the present, the more it seemingly becomes capable of never 
being graspable. Three points or paradoxes ensue from this way 
of thinking. The first point: there is a contemporaneity of the past, 
in other words the past is contemporary with the present that it 
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was (diagrammatically, in figure 4, this is represented by the tip 
of the cone). Instantly this argument involves something more 
theoretically dynamic: that if the past is contemporaneous with 
the present that it was "then all the past coexists With the new 
present in relation to which it is now past" (ibid: 81-82). In this 
sense the past I*S. It is not something that once existed, that was 
but is no more, rather it is something that insists and is a 
consistent part of the present that is now. Thus, the second 
paradox: the coe. N: i'stence of the past With the present (the 
metaphor of the cone in Figure 4). And finally, if this 
coexistence is accepted then by implication you sanction the 
notion that in some way there is this past that pre-exists the 
present. The past thus "forms a pure, general, apn'On* element of 
all time" (ibid: 82). This is Bergson's notion of a 'pure'past 
which conserves itself in itself by being presupposed by the new 
present which thus comes forth only by contracting the 'pure' 
past of which it is 'now' already a part. In some way this 'pure' 
past is a virtual recording surface of all the durations that have 
ever existed. Each section, or sheet of the past, as presented in 
Figure 3 as AW or AB operate as more or less expanded or 
contracted levels of the totality of the past (see Deleuze, 1988c: 
59-60). In short you do not doubt that yesterday, or twelve years 
ago (as difference levels of contraction), the force of your body 
left a mark somewhere, With someone and was itself affected 
and marked by the passing of time, altered by an 'internal force' 
that carries life within itself Thus when speaking of duration it 
less a question of succession than of coexistence, of memory as 
virtual coexistence in the present. 
Taking this into the space of rehearsals, the dramatic tension and denouement 
of the play All My Sons emerges through the actor's ability to act the present in 
direct relation to the volume of the past. The actor, and in particular in the scene 
below Chris, has to achieve the next moment of the textual action through the very 
contours of the past that 
brings this situation to its specificity. For example, in the 
text from the rehearsals that follows there Is a gradual unravelling of the past that 
works to expand the awareness of a particular 
level of the past -a particular past 
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moment and its associations - in the repetitive questioning you did it? ' It is 
possible to see these associations develop like a spiral line working up the curved 
surface of the cone in Figure 3, just like when a memory gradually takes on more 
completeness as your encounter with such a memory is allowed to endure. 
I// Mj Sons 
Act Two - page 66-67 
Mother: Chris, I've nevcr sl'Ud no to 
you in my Efe, now I say no! 
Chris: You'll never let him go till I do it. 
Mother. I'll never let him go and you'll 
never Ict him go! 
Chris: I'N, -e let him go. I've let him go a 
long - 
Mother: (m4l/7 no lessforce, but fumiqfrom 
bim) Then let your father go. (Pause. 
Chris stands tran. ýixea) 
Keller: She's out of her mind 
Mother: Altogether! (To Chris, but noffadqo, 
tbem) Your brother's alive, darling, because 
if he's dead, your father killed him. Do you 
understand me now? As long as you h-ve, 
that boy is ahve. God does not let a son be 
kifled by his father. Now you see, don't 
you? Now you see. (B9, ondcontml, sbe bunies 
up and inlo The bouse) 
Keller: (Chris has not moved. He speaks 
, gýy, questionin 
ýy) She's out of I. nsinuatin ýg 
her mind 
Chris: (in a broken wbijpeý Then ... you 
did it? 
, ginn'T ofplea 
in bis Keller. (Wlitb the bý in 
voice): He never flew a P-40 - 
Chris: (slruck; deaýly) But the others. 
Keller: (injirtent#) She's out of her mind. 
(He takes a AP towards Cbris, pkadiývl ). 
Chris: (ujyieldi, ý, O Dad ... you 
did itý 
Keller: He never flew a P-40, what's the 
161h rehearsal. Monday 26/1/98: 2pm-6pm 
SESSION 12 
Director: (To Keller) It needs 
so much - all the cumulative 
things - the passion ... some 
of it has to be converted into 
anger ... something, a look 
or a stare, so that by the time 
you get to 'what could I do, 
you were a boy. - . 'something 
clicks - that it is too human - 
he is cornered by his own 
flesh, it is not father and son; 
\X'hcnc,,, cr the hand of the 
distant past emerges out of its 
grave, it is always somehow 
assured as well as amazing, and 
we tend to resist belief in it, for 
it seems rather magically to 
reveal some unreadable hidden 
order behind the amoral chaos 
of events as we rationally 
pcrcclVc them. But that 
emergence, or course, is the 
point of All My Sons - that 
there arc times when things do 
indeed cohere (Miller, 
Timebends, 1987: 135). 
he's [Keller] fighting for his life, .. - (To 
Chris) 
was there even, in the back of his mind, that he 
knew of the risk - it's then 'Tell me everything 
and I will be judge'. Sit on that thought but hold 
it back. I don't mean to say that it hasn't been 
indicated [before now in the moments in the play 
rather than in the actors performance] but it is at 
this point that it is realized. He is extraordinarily 
coherent in his anger. It is then when he says 
'What must I do? ' That is when it comes in on 
him. 
Chris: yeah, but that all comes from the stuff 
before, that all comes from that ... 
I know you say 
that he's F, ', 'eller] a con, but you get clear when you 
get like that [when you get pent up, angry in the 
moment] ... the rhythm Just goes ... 
D: Yeah its got rhythm - there is a lot of fury, 
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matter with you? passion, but he needs to be in control, that's 
Chris: (still askill-g, and sqyiiýo Then you where when he says 'what do I do' that is for 
did it. To the others. him [ie he's not asking Keller to tell him] and 
Both hold their wices down. it is because he doesn't know what to do with 
Keller: (afraid qf him, his deaýly 111sistence) it [what he now knows about his father] ... its %X"hat's the matter with you? What the 
an impotent hit on the back. OK also this hell is the matter %"th you? 
Chris: (quieýly, int-redikly) How could you 
control in pursuing his father for the truth 
do that? How? 
Chris: So what's the difference between that and 
Keller: %X"hat's the matter, \"th you? what 
I'm doing? 
Chris: Dad ... Dad, you killed twenty- 
D: This is man to man. 
one men! Chris: So, the realization is going on ... then I 
Keller: What, killed? confirm it ... and then I ask 
him to explain it ... and 
Chris: You killed them, you murdered them. then I see the type of man he is ... and that is very 
Keller: (as through throwinT his whole nature upsetting information but also you are seeing your 
befoir Otis) How could I kill anybodyý father for what he is ... and I put my ass on the 
line 
Chris: Dad! Dad! 
for George, Ann, ... everyone, and it is Keller (T? qv1g to huh &w) I didr* kill anybocV. 
overwhelming fury [because the foundation of Chris: Then explain it to me. \Vhat did 
putting everyone else first has been shattered so the 
you doý'Explain it to me or IT tear you 
to pieces! way 
he has lead his life believing in Dad etc has been 
Keller: (hortijied at his orervhelminTfun) destroyed] 
Don't, Chris, don't - D: What I'm seeing at the moment 
is not what 
Chris: I want to know what you did, you just described. 
now, what did you doý You had a Chris: Then what are you seeing? 
hundred and twenty cracked cylinder I D: What I see at the moment is gut-wrenching 
heads, now what did you doý disappointment with his father. 
Keller. If you're going to hang me then I- Chris: Absolutely 
Chris: I'm listening, God Almighty, I'm 
D: Yes, and you need to give that this is about listening! 
a man, you're judging him. If I was Keller I'd 
be thinking you can talk alright but thank fuck 
you are not hitting me, but I need to see him 
needing to listen to you ... What you are 
doing 
is not wrong ... 
Chris: Yeah, I Just trying to figure it out 
D: As well as the fury it is about seeing your 
father as a man, as just another man. 
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Additionally, the actual subjectivity and being of Keller is caught in the present 
by having been made in the past, by which I mean to suggest that his reality is 
consistently shaped, or haunted if you like, by the sheets of past (the regions AB or 
A'B') that are his particular previous experience. In the scene above, and indeed in 
the entire play, it is the sheet of past that is the moment when Keller a reed to ship 19 
out those cracked cylinder heads. Now this moment, say the sheet AB, coexists and 
potentially influences all that comes after it, (beneath it in terms of the conic 
diagram). Hence, this new encounter with his son Chris becomes, in its passing, a 
new sheet of the past. This new sheet exists closer to the apex of the cone because 
it is shaped by the coexistence of the past and in its contemporaneity has itself now 
become a part of the virtual whole of the 'pure' past potentially influencing the 
future. In other words, you cannot erase what happens, even the most banal or 
n-unute action. Thus in each of his responses, Kel-ler is recollecting the past and 
shaping the contraction of the future (the latter achieved in the way that Chris 
demands to be told). 
6.5 Conclusions 
Starting from the recognition that "it is we who are internal to time, not the other 
way around" (Deleuze, 1989: 82) this chapter has been about bringing to the 
surface some of the dynan-Lic ways in which time itself operationalizes the unfolding 
creation of the world. This statement is hardly startling, but as I hope to have 
shown it holds several complex and compelling implications. To draw these 
elements together I frame the implications presented in the chapter as three lines, 
all of which stitch together the possibly of an alternative temporal topography for 
future research. The first of these traces out the full force of the sense of time as 
time itself - that Aionic drive delivering us to each moment. In the rehearsal 
process the actors are able to script their performance through negotiating this 
virtual force of time itself by replaying the exact contours of the moment of its 
actualization. Therefore, in performance, as in life in general, this is the essential 
syntactical space that is the tension of the present tense. Second, a line that cuts 
across everyday assumptions of time revealing a gap between the happening of 
things -a half second 
delay, a catch - that forever keeps the instance of the present 
moment from our grasp. 
This is a gap exposed by the paradox (Zeno's) that 
measures time in 
discrete manifolds (Chronos) whilst knowing that time is forever 
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slipping away (Alon). As such this gap is a space, or rather a rupturing and a 
spacing, in which to intimate the role of the present moment as something full of 
potential itself. Investigating this gap reveals a virtual texture to our events', 
encounters and performances; it is a siting of what might have been and what is 
also happening. Finally, a third tine ghosts the other two With the coexistence of the 
totality of the past, the 'pure' past that stretches the present by recollecting the past 
and contracting the future at the same time. Different forces, by they of objects, 
places, or people (characters), have a specific duration that is not about the sum of 
series of successive moments but about the coexistence of the past within their 
present unfolding. Proceeding from this, despite the bare particularity of the 
mechanics of each moment, there is at different times and at different places an 
association of the past that brings to the present a historical genesis. This, as I hope 
to have shown, reveals a conceptual place for the making of a sense of weak 
subjectivity. It is a possible explanation, or location for such revelation, for how it 
is that we come to feel an immaterial hue to our lives. All three lines trace a spacing 
in which to cast a new cartography that grapples With the potential of what comes 
next. Using the example of the rehearsal process as an ideal space for 
experimentation with these tines, I have sought to reveal a research strategy not for 
examining the social itself but for working With our understanding of the way in 
which different elements, some virtual and others actual, bring the social about. 
Unlike --L%Iacbeth, 
in the quote that opened this chapter, whilst time maybe a grand 
story affecting us all, an intimate encounter with its operations exposes a space in 
which, rather than signifying nothing, the tale of life is full of potential sigrufication. 
This is to say that moving out of the empty space the traces that we take with us 
are ones which can be registered temporally in the tension of the present, 
choreographed in relation to the contraction of the future, and haunted by the 




It seemed, then, that Friday had triumphed at last over the 
state of affairs he so detested! He had not, of course, 
deliberately caused the disaster .... Friday was not a rational 
being, performing deliberate, considered acts, but rather a 
force of nature from which actions proceeded, and their 
consequences resembled him, the way children resemble 
their mother .... Unwittingly but inexorably Friday 
had 
paved the way for, and finally achieved, a cataclysm that 
heralded the coming of a new era; as for the nature of this 
era, clearly it was in Friday's own nature that Robinson must 
look for it. He was still too much the prisoner of his former 
self to predict what form it would take ... 
And so, having released him from his earthly bonds, Friday 
would now show him the way to sometbinT else, substituting for 
an existence he had found intolerable a new order which 
Robinson longed to discover. A new Robinson was sloughing 
off his old skin, fully prepared to accept the decay of his 
cultivated island and, at the heels of an unthinking guide, enter 
upon an unknown road. (Tournier, 1997: 179-80) 
End 
, game 
7.1 Introduction: an unknown road 
There are dimensions here, times and places, glacial or torrid 
zones never moderated, the entire exotic geography which 
characterises a mode of thought as well as a style of life. 
(Deleuze, 1990a: 128) 
In its raw elements performance delivers the force of corporeality, immateriality 
and temporality in such a way as to strip us of our academic habits of thinking. In 
the face of these forces we have encountered the concept of the empty space that 
frames this thesis, and like Robinson in Tournier's Friday, we find ourselves having 
to find new ways of looking at the world in our attempt to makes sense of this now 
seen-ungly uncultivated island. In tl-iis fight, this thesis has been about experimenting 
with what I feel to be the three most important pared down elements through 
which we come to make sense of our encounters with the world. In utilizing the 
work of Gilles Deleuze as our 'unthinking' guide the aim has been to pave a way 
for making valid sense of the alternative dimensions arising when you give space to 
'being' just in the present moment -a new mode of thought and perhaps a new 
order for the doing of social science. 
Her last words were, 'If you were on a desert island, Just 
remember two words: "Be present", and the rest Will follow' 
(Brook, 1998: 87). 
7.2 Making an exit 
Clov: 'Thýs is what we caU making an exit. " (Beckett, Endgame- 132) 
This is the point where we have to work out how to get off stage, a task made 
difficult because the performance comes to an abrupt stop, signalling that the 
encounter is over despite the fact that the world continues on unravelling. 
Whilst 
the performance is over the experience continues in the way that it has affected us; 
we carry it forward into the street traced within us - art 
has no other object than 
Life (see Smith, 1998). 1 want to operate this conclusion in the same way as this 
cendgarrie' by asking what are some of the traces that are taken forth? These traces 
interfere with the stance we take up in negotiating our next encounter in much the 
same way that the experience of rehearsal 




she makes. This is an experiential process just as it is a referential one; it is the 
conceptual as rhizome, as dimensions that are directions on the move (see Deleuze 
& Guattan, 1988: 21). As these are traces that need to be put on the map, not vice 
versa, I present three ways in which these traces can come to operate usefully 
within our practice of doing social science; three ways that equally infer a 
methodological sensibility shaping the use of Deleuze's philosophy. 
7.2.1 Immanence 
Firstly, the traces operate an 'anti- juridical' stance: why should our sociability need a 
transcendent power independent from our embodied, natural condition, such that 
what we do is prejudged by a context outside the event of its happening (Gatens, 
1996b: 164-65)? The ethics here speak of our mutual immanence to a fife (Deleuze, 
1997), that there is something that exists between a subject and an object, 
something incorporeal, something inherent Within everything, such that everything 
is a virtue of the same substance. This links back to the importance of the body-in- 
itself as substance and the cartography, or choreography of affect, described and 
experienced in Chapters Two and Three respectively. It also connects the academic 
stance towards the appreciation of the immaterial register of things and 
performances, artistic or everyday, as Witnessed through the theory and the practice 
evidenced in Chapter's Four and Five. Through these illustrations, the events that 
people this immanence can be seen to be the effects of the interactions of bodies 
(organic or nonorganic) as combinations of action, passion and circumstance that 
have no "origin in the consciousness of the knowing subject" (Hayden, 1995: 292). 
The encounter with the performance can be taken forwards by using the spaces and 
spacings it opens up to construct a new vocabulary for presenting that which 
cannot presently be said. This creates a grammar connecting us to the immanence 
of both our gestures and those of animals, to the immanence in the effect of 
material spaces to our immaterial sense of them, and to a syntactical appreciation 
that the particular is immanent to a more general nature (love itselo. Relative to 
how we might traditionally think this is anti- foundationalist. Yet to critique a 
foundation is to affirm another one: a performative foundation, or ontology, that is 
immanent, material and open (see Hardt, 1993: xv). In announcing a vital, ethical 
alternative adequate to contemporary social questions, 
in direct kinship With 
Deleuze's later works, the traces are clinical as well as critical in that they look to "a 
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possibility of life, a way of existing" (1995: 100; see also Deleuze, 1998; and Smith, 
1998). Certainly, this vitalism is anti-humanist, being the 'elan vital' (Deleuze, 
1988c) existing in "opposition to the world represented and mediated through the 
framework of the subject and object" (Marks, 1998: 29-30). It speaks the gerund of 
the verb, the expressing of "becomings or events that transcend mood and tense" 
(Deleuze, 1995: 34), such that we now speak of an "empiricism for which 
difference is the generative force of the actual" (Hayden, 1995: 283). 
7.2.2 Practical and pragmatic 
One never has a tabula rasa; one shps in, enters in the nuddle; 
one takes up or lays down rhythms. Peleuze, 1988a: 123) 
Secondlv, the traces are apprehended out of being delivered to the actual where our 
relations come "into existence by practical rather than essentialist or necessary 
means" (Hailden, 1995), such that the encounter that forces us to think is very 
much a part of being in constant interchange with our environment (Gatens, 1996a: 
165). This means that rather than seeking interpretation, asking what something 
means by joining the dots, creating a pattern already orientated through a tracing of 
a historically substantiated (power-ridded) grid of signification, one experiments, as 
I have experimented in this thesis, by asking: 'what can be done here? ', 'And, what 
next? ' The conjunction 'AND' rules (see Doel, 1996) such that there is always the 
possibility of divergence and the destruction of identity (Deleuze, 1995: 45; see 
SrrUth, 1998: xxiii). Subsequently, the world, and our identities, have to be made; 
they need constant maintenance or re-enactment (Deleuze and Guattan, 1988: 6). 
This plays to the importance of the viscerality of our actions in the moment of their 
making. There is a danger here of advocating a "primal scene of an originary, 
unmediated encounter" (Goodchild, 1996: 43) when the point is rather to show a 
sense of everything existing in a 'zone of indiscernability' where we are defined by 
the limits and borders of the relations we slip into (see Marks, 1998: 34). For this 
purpose we need to work on the methodology and the language through which we 
come to map the social field. As I hope to have shown in Chapter Three the field 
of somatic art already operates a space within which people 
both practise a 
language for such mapping and heighten their skills in relation to the pragmatic 
living of their own lives. In relation to academia it is important to note how such 
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practices are used by artists (dancers, painters, and actors) for precisely the purpose 
of scripting an alternative stance that makes the most of the body's seen-ungly 
indiscernible nature. Equally, this works on an ethological perspective that speaks 
of the micropolitics 'in-between' subjects, the spacing cited in that syntactical 
grammar, such that one is always asking: "How can a being take another being into 
its world, but while preserving or respecting the other's own relations and world" 
(Deleuze, 1988a: 126)? This operates conceptually, as in the mixing and creation of 
concepts that produce a particular area of the plane of immanence, as well as 
practically, as in the very actions we make as we sense a way through an encounter. 
Accepting that an ability to affect is reciprocated by a capacity of being affected, 
part of the answer is performative, it is in getting through each individual moment, 
it is in knowing how to go on. Finally, in playing to the significance of time itself, of 
difference rather than identity persisting through time, Chapter Six traced out a 
temporal register for making sense of our encounter with performance by revealing 
the pragmatic way in which actions are always, to a greater or lesser extent, an 
encounter with the 'not-yet-known'. And that whilst risky, and continually testing 
what it is we think we know, the spacings and duration of our encounters are 
always shown to hold within them the colour of the past. Folding the empiricism 
achieved in the observation of rehearsal with theory enabled a way of seeing action 
both in relation to the practicality of the immediate moment and in its pragmatic 
relation to the past that still is. This trace is about thinking/acting on real existence 
as opposed to the possibility of existence being pronounced by a pn'on* ideas: it is 
the 'earthiness' of our daily walks, the encounters for our tears and laughter, and 
our corporeal needs, that etch out the conceptual, not the reverse (see Baugh, 
1993). 
7.2.3 Creative 
Thirdly, taking these traces up is indicative of the incessant need to think otherwise, 
to reatise that we are always thinking on our feet: physically through our 
corporeality (Chapter Three), in registering such thinking materially 
(Chapter Two) 
and through materiality (Chapter Four) in relation to immaterial concerns 
(Chapter 
Five). Setting expectation aside through the concept of empty space, thinking 
otherwise Is "not concerned with 
determining the essence and intrinsic relation of 
each thing, but with 
describing how new relations can be actively created between 
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things in order to produce change in and between the wholes these relationships 
form" (Hayden, 1995: 287). All of the chapters have been about this search for new 
relations through which to apprehend that which we feel takes place and that which 
evidently occurs in our encounters. This is about juxtaposing the advent of theory 
and practice in the attempt to create a space in-between where a sense of some kind 
can be made. Thus, in Chapters Two and Three the space was cleared for a 
cartography of relations built out of the visceral pathways etched out by the body- 
in-itself-, in Chapter's Four and Five, immanent relations to ii-nmateriality and 
eventhood were intimated to enable discussion of that which has not, and cannot, 
be said; and Chapter Six exposed the important relation of timing to all these 
relations, in particular through the way in which time operates the space of the 
comprehensions that can be made through such relations. For example, thinking in 
terms of the past makes sense in the discussions of materiality held in Chapter Four 
rather than in those of visceratity in Chapter Three (which has more to say through 
the temporal metrication of Chronos [corporeal and actual] despite operating 
through the dynamic force of Aion [incorporeal and virtual]). Above all, 
understanding the encounter With performance through a temporal register is to 
emphasiZe the persistence of difference in itself and to accept the inevitability of 
change and the performative sense of experimentation that greets us every day. In 
working through the encounter with performance art to capture the way it forces us 
(me) to think (to have thought), and to work this out of an apprentice ship With the 
work of Gilles Deleuze is to effect a venturesome coupling and a research strategy 
that negotiates the new. This is achieved through following both the empirical and 
theoretical lines of flight that have enabled a way to 'go on'. 
7.3 Writing with a view to an unborn people that doesn't yet have 
the language' 
In utilising Deleuze by linking his conceptualisations to the register of the 
corporeality, immateriality and temporality presented to us in performance, the aim 
has been to operate a form of detective work in the concrete empirical field, where 
the drive has been in explicating what we do rather than what we are (see May, 
1996; Goodchild, 1997). In this regard this thesis has not been about setting out to 
After an expression of Delcuze's (1995: 143). 
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prove the validation of a specific research field with the social sciences, nor has it 
been about achieving a detailed explication of a particular aspect of everyday life. 
Instead, my focus has been to offer a potential syntactical, rather than genealogical, 
philosophical analysis that is ambitious in its attempt to use such syntactics - the 
connective capacities scripted out of the corporeality, immateriality and temporality 
- to grasp that which is inevitably ungraspable. The point I want to make of this 
ambition is that it makes due acknowledgement of the need to embark on such an 
endeavour in and of itself, and that through doing research in this way the thesis 
has been more of an experimentation in contact with, rather than a specifically 
detailed attempt at explaining, what it is we might call the 'real'. This said, the thesis 
leaves so much unanswered, leaving Just the hint of the traces of the possible ways 
in which we might begin to make sense of the seemingly 'ungraspable' realities of 
the three registers of corporeality, immateriality and temporality. Therefore I end 
with the challenge that some of the pathways that I have begun to explore here are 
worth further pursuit, namely: 
0 How specific contexts affect the operations of these three registers in making 
sense. 
0 How, wid-lin a more detailed and specific case study, the traces suggested here 
can be made to achieve practical application. 
0 How such experimentation reveals a space for the creation and justification of 
new methodologies for the capture of those worlds whose vistas are presently 
out of sight. 
What one says comes from the depth of one's own ignorance, 
the depths of one's own underdevelopment. One becomes a set 
of liberated singularities, words, names, fingernails, things, 
animals, little events. (Deleuze, 1995: 7) 
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All My Sons rehearsal research schedule 
DATE REHEARSAL RESEARCH 
SESSION 
COMMENTS 
6/1/98 Tuesday 1 St The opening day when all the cast 
meet each other for the first time. 
This consists of mainly 
improvisation exercises that aim at 
the cast getting to trust one another 
and reveal early thoughts about 
their characters. 
7/1/98 2 nd S1 
8/1/98 3 rd 
9/1/98 4 th S2 
10/1/98 5 th 
12/1/98 Monday 6 th S3 I am invited to stay and come to 
the rehearsals right through the run. 
13/1/98 7 th S4 
14/1/98 8 th S5 
15/1/98 9th S6 
16/1/98 1 oth S7 
19/1/98 Monday 11 th S8 
20/1/98 12 th S9 
21/1/98 13 th S10 
22/1/98 14 th 
23/1/98 15 th Sil 
26/1/98 Monday 16 th S12 
27/1/98 17 th S13 
28/1/98 18 th S14 Director's preview. A complete 
run through in front of audience 
members (held in the rehearsal 
room). -111e lighting designer 
attends the ran through and makes 
changes to the scripted 
choreography already agreed with 
the director. 
29/1/98 1 9th S15 Technical Rehearsal/Set up 
30/1/98 Run through S16 Technical Rehearsal 
31/1/98 Run through S17 Dress Rehearsal 
2/2/98 Monday Run through S18 Dress Rehearsal 
3/2/98 Premiere Performance 
11 did not attend not least because during the first day of rehearsals the actors set abou it 
building a rapport 
amongst themselves through the 
fairly raw, and for some vulnerable, experience of improvisation. The director 
Andy flay also wanted to give them the opportunity to say whether or not they minded my presence. 
It was 
agreed that I should meet 
Andy in the theatre on the second day of rehearsals half an hour before they were 
scheduled to begin, and that 
I should be aware that for the lead actor playing Joe Keller, John Franklyn Robins 
(a stalwart of the Royal 
National Theatre under Tyrone Guthrie and Lawrence Olivier), this would be his first 
day with the rest of the cast. There were no objectors, more curiosity, and it was agreed that 
I could attend the 
rehearsals and make whatever notes 
I wanted. As a kind of probation for all concerned this was agreed for the 
first few rehearsals. To begin with I was going to stagger my attendance so that I could collate my notes and 
give thought to the particular 
focus I wanted to pursue. 
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